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The
as

topic of the dissertation

How well

is this:

And the answer comes

an epistemic theory?

The Root of The Skeptical Problem
problem

make no

in three parts:

argue that the source of the skeptical

I

neither the underdetermination principle nor the closure principle. Instead,

is

claim that

:

does contextualism, in general, fare

it

is

a change in context that generates the problem in the

explicit

the chapter

argument

amounts

to a

in favor

first

place.

I

Though

I

of contextualism as a solution to skeptical problems,

de facto defense of the contextualist solution to skeptical

problems.

The Problem with
resolve Gettier cases.

Gettier cases.

As

However,

I

Gettier:

it

I

consider criticisms of contextualism’ s capacity to

stands, Lewis’ contextualism can’t resolve a

offer a

new rule,

the Rule of Special Similarity, as a

replacement rule for Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance.
not problem-free, can do a

I

then

much better job of resolving

Contextualism, then, needn’t

fail

because

The Wavs of Context: One goal
underscores the fact that precisely

how

wide range of

it

show how

the

new

get a clear

context

v

is

though

the Gettier problem.

can’t solve Gettier problems;

is to

rule,

map

of the

it

can.

territory,

one that

incorporated into the theory matters

epistemically. Another

is to

make

the point that contextualism

plays an essential semantic role in knowledge ascriptions

but a family of similar views. Also,

of the substantial criticisms aimed

Though

the primary

contextualist approach

I

I

offer a

at the

aim of the

general, a

-

is,

the claim that context

not just one particular view,

new kind of contextualism that

avoids

many

others in the family.

dissertation is a defense in three parts of the

view emerges from the

condexicalism, and the dissertation

is

-

dissertation.

I

call the

view

secondarily, a development and defense of that

view.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
Descartes, in Meditations on First Philosophy, introduced something like the

following argument:

(51)

don't

I

know

that

am

I

not being deceived (about having hands) by an evil

demon.
(52) If I don't

know

demon, then

don't

I

(53) Therefore,

The argument above
establish that

is

we can

I

that

men

,

never

know any

or that I

my

am

how

idea that

could

hands when
principle.

I

do

know

for all

not.

I

knows Q. The

is in

know

Many

the lot but not ones like that all bachelors
,

possibility that I'm being deceived

If

we know

S2 seems

P.

One form of the

car

the

If for all

true.

demon may be

closure principle

argument

is

is:

first

is to

on the

I

know I am

deceiving

me

being deceived by an

into thinking that

I

have

is

an instance of some form of the closure

If

S knows P and S knows P implies Q,

-

is

widely rejected and pretty clearly

--

false.

denial
glance, the problem of skepticism appears to be that SI, S2, and the

of S3 are each widely held to be

there

demon,

deeply plausible. Yet the conclusion, S3

along with the skepticism that shortly follows

At

evil

if

P, then our evidence eliminates all

think this premise

skeptic's

by an

that I'm not being so deceived? This premise relies

is infallible.

which not

demon, then

then S

possibly

knowledge

possibilities in

evil

I

ordinary propositions. Intuitively, ordinary

here now. In the skeptic's argument, SI seems true;

none of my evidence rules out the
then

not being deceived (about having hands) by an evil

a typical version of an argument a skeptic might offer in trying to

propositions are those like that

are unmarried

am

I

know that I have hands.
don't know that I have hands.

true, yet they

appear to be inconsistent. But

the problem. Otherwise, G. E. Moore's

1

this isn't all

well-known response would have

sufficed to solve

is

false than

we

it.

solution

—

that

are that either of the premises

the infallibility of

problem, then,

The Moorean

is

is

we

are

-

true

more

certain that the conclusion

requires that

we

knowledge or knowledge's closure under implication.

that

we want to

expense of knowledge's

One nod toward

avoid skepticism, but

infallibility or its closure

a solution

is

we

don't

want

to

that there are

we

use the word's

limited "philosophical skepticism"

sense,

we do

not

know any

accepting that 'know'

these

is

is

at the

we

use the word's

is false.

But when

and philosophical sense, and some very

actually true.

In

some

strict

and philosophical

ordinary propositions. But what reasons are there for

ambiguous? And what

further explanations can be given for

two senses of the word?

A

more complete statement of the problem

knowledge (even

in its

everyday sense)

skepticism (of the serious variety)

knowledge
be that

first

strict

do so

two senses of the word 'know' - an

ordinary sense, and the sort of whole-scale skepticism described above

philosophy,

Part of the

under implication.

ordinary sense and a philosophical sense. In everyday discourse

we do

sacrifice either

it

that resolves the

offers

place (see

some

How can we

maintain that

and closed under implication, yet

false? In addition to offering an account of

problem of skepticism, the mark of a successful solution

will

theoretical explanation of the appeal of the skeptic's argument in the

DeRose

imply that skepticism

is

is infallible

needed:

is

3

and Cohen 1988, 93-94). Though any reasonable solution

is false,

the successful solution

may

will

well allow for (and provide a

defense for) a very limited sort of philosophical skepticism. Finally, the account of

knowledge

that provides a successful solution to the

2

problem of skepticism must not

in

offering a solution

Gettier

problem or

open

It is

such as a failure

to solve the

lottery problems.

David Lewis
that sentences

itself to other defeating objections,

offers a solution to the

such as

I

know I have hands

the appeal to context that

is

problem of skepticism

which he claims

some contexts and

are true in

the key to solving the

in

false in others.

problem of skepticism.

In "Elusive

Knowledge", Lewis proposes the following definition of knowledge:
S knows that P

— Psst!

iff S's

evidence eliminates every possibility in which not-P

except for those possibilities

we

are properly ignoring (Lewis 554*).

Notice that this definition does not contain the word

of

rules, that

'context'.

But

it is

context, via a set

determines which possibilities are properly ignored. The application of the

rules to the context yields the set of possibilities that are epistemically relevant in that

context.

And

is this set

it

of possibilities against which

context. Lewis’ epistemology, then,

is

S's

evidence

is

compared

contextualist.

Understanding the consequences of Lewis’ brand of contextualism
its

response to the skeptical problem

which may

not,

in that

— requires

—

in particular

determining which possibilities may, and

be properly ignored according to the account. Lewis’ rules of relevance

divide into two types: those that prohibit a possibility from being ignored, and those that

allow -defeasibly - a possibility to be ignored. The Rule of Actuality, for example,
the former kind;

it

says that the possibility that actually obtains

may

is

of

never properly be

ignored (Lewis 554). According to the Rule of Actuality, the subject's circumstance or
"location in the realm of possibilia" determines

context).

'

The Rule of Belief is another

Throughout,

all

which

possibility

prohibitive rule:

No

is

actual (in that

possibility that the subject

references to Lewis are to his “Elusive Knowledge” unless otherwise specified (by date).

3

believes or ought to believe (given the subject’s
evidence and arguments that justify a
belief)

may

be properly ignored (Lewis 555). The Rule of Attention

what may be properly ignored, but

this rule is sensitive

of beliefs but to the focus of the speakers and hearers
rule, if a possibility is

properly ignored.

possibilities

Even

true.

also a rule about

not to the subject’s circumstance

in the context.

According

not in fact ignored by the speakers and hearers, then

When

this rule is applied to a context, the set

it is

to this

not

of epistemically relevant

can be affected dramatically.

From
is

is

these rules alone,

is

clear that Lewis' account entails that if S

knows

which the speakers and hearers themselves ignore

in a context in

by presupposing something

it

false, the

P,

P

actuality

Rule of Actuality guarantees that actuality

is still

epistemically relevant in that context. In every context, then, S's evidence must be

compared

to the actual world. In

possibility is eliminated

experience and

by

memory do

(Lewis 553). Since

S's

S's

comparing unignored

possibilities with S's evidence, a

evidence just in case in that possibility

not match exactly S's perception and

perception and

memory

S's perceptual

memory

in actuality

in actuality are self identical, S's

evidence

will never eliminate actuality.

Actuality can't be properly ignored and actuality will never

be eliminated by

So whenever

S's evidence.

'S

knows

P' is true,

P

will be true, since

every unignored, uneliminated possibility (which always includes actuality)

which P

is true.

This

is

how

is

infallible

on Lewis’ view because

eliminates

all

in

and closed under implication

these notions are themselves understood as context dependent.

infallible

one

Lewis' account protects the truth condition.

Lewis' view also entails that knowledge

— when

is

if

S knows P (in some context), then

the (unignored) possibilities (in context) in

4

which not

P.

Knowledge
S's

is

evidence

And knowledge

is

closed under implication. If S

knows P

that context), then (in that context) all

S's

evidence are possibilities in which

P are

possibilities in

which Q. So,

possibilities are possibilities in

(in

some

context), and S

knows P

implies

Q

(in

unignored possibilities that remain uneliminated by
P.

Because P implies Q, aU

(in that context) all unignored,

which Q. So, S knows

Q

possibilities in

which

uneliminated

(in that context).^

Lewis explanation of the skeptical problem also involves some of the
permissive
According

rules.

reliability

to the

Rule of Reliability,

it is

permissible to take for granted the

of our perception, memory, and testimony (Lewis 558).

presuppose that they work without a glitch

in the case

very defeasibly! - a possibility in which they

The Rules of Method and

fail

may

“We may properly

under consideration. Defeasibly properly be ignored'’ (Lewis 558).

the Rule of Conservatism also allow us to properly ignore the

of other normally reliable processes of transmitting information -

failure

sample

is

representative”, “that the best explanation

is

like “that a

the true explanation”, or that

we

can adopt the customary presuppositions of those around us (Lewis 558-559).
Lewis' view provides a reply to the skeptic:

ordinary business,

possibility that

my

I

I

am

generally ignore a great

being deceived by an

many

evil

ignoring of this possibility (and others like

Reliability says that

we may

I

am

I

possibilities,

demon. And
it) is

my

go about

everyday,

among them

the

in a typical everyday context,

perfectly proper; the Rule of

ignore possibilities in which perception, memory, and

testimony are unreliable. So, in this context

which

When

being deceived by an evil

demon

I

know I have

hands.

are uneliminated

by

No
my

possibilities in

evidence; in

my

2

Lewis's view actually entails a stronger closure principle. See Schiffer, p.320 for an interesting discussion
in which a contextualist closure principle might be stated. Lewis's account entails the

about several ways

5

current context

I

properly exclude such possibilities as epistemically
irrelevant in the

first

place.

And
plausibility

business),

vat,

I

I

in

providing for philosophical skepticism, Lewis also
accounts for the

of typical skeptical arguments: Later

go

to

epistemology

concentrate on the idea that

the Rule of Reliability

this

new

context

--

is

demon

is

and memory

might be being deceived by an

I

new

which

in actuality

my evidence

would not

have hands. Whenever

that

moment

might be a brain

evil

a

in a context in

I

am

included

from what would be

demon
I

is

am

I

it, I

may

I

my

(save their reliability),

do not have hands.

fail to

am

all

day.

When

I

In the

my

those

sensory experience

sensory experience and

my evidence

new

context,

I

does not

know many

know

don't

I

am

ordinary things, such as that

we

I

of life as a brain

right

and doesn't

based on a failure to preserve the truth condition or

entail the

one

that doesn't.

6

I

in a vat.

preserve the closure principle. However, does this contextualist view

seem

have

needn't

Lewis’ contextualism seems to solve the skeptical problem without opening

three that

at

return to the everyday ordinary business of tomorrow,

free again to ignore the possibility

to other defeating objections

in

being deceived by an

hands. Epistemology, says Lewis, makes knowledge vanish (Lewis 560). But

do epistemology

-

not

confronted with a typical skeptical argument,

which

in a

demon. Because

among

must be compared. Since

differ

eliminate every possibility in which

I

I

ordinary

We can never properly ignore

context, the possibility that

epistemically relevant. This possibility

memory were I being deceived by

that

focus on the possibility that

I

properly ignore such possibilities.

possibilities against

my everyday,

defeasible, and the Rule of Attention defeats

unignored possibilities. In the
evil

class.

(after finishing

fail

itself

to

because

it

is

unable to solve the Gettier problem or lottery problems?
In

fact,

Lewis

offers solutions to

these classic epistemic problems as well.

Lewis describes a version of the Gettier problem, which was

Edmund

Gettier in “Is Justified True Belief

first

Knowledge?” (1963 Analysis

introduced by

v.23, 121-123):

think that Nogot owns a Ford, because I have seen him driving
one; but
unbeknownst to me he does not own the Ford he drives, or any other Ford.
Unbeknownst to me, Havit owns a Ford, though I have no reason to think so
I

because he never drives

it,

justified true belief is that
right

and

I have often seen him taking the tram.
one of the two owns a Ford. But I do not know it;

My
I

am

by accident. (Lewis, 557).

Lewis also describes a version of the
Probability

in fact

and

the Logic

lottery

problem, introduced by Flenry Kyburg,

in

of Rational Belief (Wesleyan University Press, 1961):

...[Y]our true opinion that you will lose the lottery isn’t knowledge, whatever the
odds. Suppose you know that it is a fair lottery with one winning ticket and many

you know how many losing tickets there are. The greater the
number of losing tickets, the better is your justification for believing you will lose.
Yet there is no number great enough to transform your fallible opinion into
knowledge - after all, you just might win. (Lewis 551).
losing tickets, and

On

Lewis’ version of contextualism,

knowledge both

in Gettier cases

it is

the Rule of

Resemblance

that blocks

and Lottery cases:

The Rule of Resemblance: Suppose one possibility saliently resembles another.
Then if one of them may not be properly ignored, neither may the other.
(Or rather, .if one of them may not be ignored in virtue of rules other
.

.

than this rule, then neither

Both

in Gettier cases

context a

made

new

and

possibility

lottery cases, the

—one

the other). (Lewis 556).

Rule of Resemblance makes relevant

that saliently resembles

relevant in that context by

fails to

may

some

some

in the

other possibility already

other rule, and in each case the subject’s evidence

eliminate that newly relevant possibility. Lewis offers the following diagnoses:

Lottery: For every ticket, there

is

the possibility that

it

will win.

These

possibilities are saliently similar to one another: so either every one of

7

them may be properly ignored,

or else none may. But one of them

may

not

properly be ignored: the one that actually obtains
(Lewis 557).

^ ett er:

d° not know

[that either Nogot or Havit owns a Ford],
because I have
not eliminated the possibility that Nogot drives a car
he does not own
I

^

whereas Havit neither drives nor owns a
properly be ignored. Because,

and second,

this possibility saliently

actuality perfectly as far as

well so far as Havit

is

Nogot

This possibility

car.

may

actuality

first,

is

concerned; and
it

not

not properly be ignored:

resembles actuality.

concerned, since

may

it

It

resembles

resembles actuality

matches actuality both with

respect to Havit’ s careless habits and with respect to the general
correlation between careless habits and carlessness (Lewis
557).
So, at

like a

pull

first

glance, and using Lewis' version as an example, contextualism looks

promising epistemology:

of the skeptic’s argument;

seems

to

It

it

provides avoids skeptical results, while explaining the

preserves the truth condition;

do so while also resolving Gettier cases and

rosy contextualist picture

that Lewis’ version

is

fails to

preserves closure; and

lottery cases.

too good to be true. Stewart

of contextualism

it

But

Cohen makes

critics

it

claim this

a compelling case

handle a wide range of Gettier cases (Cohen

1998a). Cohen’s point, while directed at Lewis, suggests that contextualists in general

can’t solve Gettier cases, particularly those in

and hearers are aware that the subject
linguistic lines, or lines

is

which neither the subject nor the speakers

in a Gettier situation.

of theoretical parsimony. Jonathan Schaffer (Schaffer 2004)

claims that contextualism’ s account of ‘knows’

meaning
a

for the

mere laundry

contextualism

Others object along

is

faulty;

it

fails to offer a suitable

term because the meaning provided by the theory

list

ad hoc amounting

of conditions. Jason Stanley (forthcoming) claims

is true, this

the contextualist

is

makes ‘knows’

framework can be had

at

,

to

that if

a linguistic freak and that the results gained by

a lower cost, that

mechanism of context.

8

is,

without appeal to the

The

topic of the present dissertation

general, fare as an epistemic theory?

And

How well

is this:

the answer

The Root of The Skeptical Problem

:

comes

does contextualism,

in three parts:

Historically, the

problem of skepticism has

been pinned either on the underdetermination principle or on the
closure
argue that the root, or source, of the skeptical problem
a change in context that generates the problem in the

argument

explicit

in favor

is

neither.

first

in

principle.

Instead,

Though

place.

I

I

I

claim that

it

is

make no

of contextualism as a solution to skeptical problems, the

chapter amounts to a de facto defense of the contextualist solution to skeptical
problems.

The Problem with

Using Lewis as an example,

Gettier:

the view’s capacity to resolve Gettier cases.

As

it

I

stands, Lewis’

consider criticisms of

view

can’t resolve a

wide range of Gettier cases. Nor can a minor modification save the view from these

damning consequences. However,
Gettier cases.

offer a

I

new

rule, the

Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance.

can do a

fail

much

because

it

I

I

then

argue that contextualism can successfully resolve

Rule of Special Similarity, as a replacement rule

show how

can’t solve Gettier problems;

clear

ways of using context

map of the

territory,

one

it

rule,

though not problem-free,

can.

Significantly, there are

“context” into an epistemic theory, and not

the

new

better job of resolving the Gettier problem. Contextualism, then, needn’t

The Ways of Context:

map

the

to

all

many ways of incorporating

of these ways are contextualist. Here,

accommodate an example

case.

One

that underscores the fact that precisely

incorporated into the theory matters epistemically. Another

is to

-

is

goal

how

make

contextualism - the claim that context plays an essential semantic role

ascriptions

for

just to get a

context

is

the point that

in

not just one particular view, but a family of similar views.

9

is

knowledge

I

I

consider

specific versions of this family of views to
determine
criticisms.

criticisms

And
aimed

I

offer a

new

which views

kind of contextualism that avoids

at the others in the family.

10

are subject to

many of the

which

substantial

CHAPTER 2

THE ROOT OF THE SKEPTICAL PROBLEM
The
that

it

central motivation for accepting a contextualist account
of knowledge

provides an escape from what Lewis calls “the whirlpool of
scepticism” (Lewis

550). Before addressing the question of whether or not

some version of contextualism

provides a solution to the problem of skepticism about the external world,
to

be clear about what the problem of skepticism about the external world

think,

is

no easy matter

diverse

some involve demons,

lot;

or barn fa 9 ades.

mundane

to say precisely

things

background

Each

we

for an

what

that

problem

is.

others dreams or vats,

story invariably concludes that

it

is.

is

important

It is, I

Skeptical stories are a widely

still

we do

others invoke painted mules

not

know some

or

all

of the

take ourselves to know. Each of these stories, then, provides the

argument

for skepticism.

There

is little

controversy over the surface

structure of such arguments. Generally, skeptical arguments appear in the following

simple form, where P

is

some

appropriately

mundane proposition and SK

is

some

suitable

i

skeptical hypothesis

1 )

2)
3)

'

Cohen

(

:

know P, then I know not-SK.
I do not know not-SK.
Therefore, I do not know P.
If

I

1998b) actually thinks that

of either form (see his footnote

better to

it is

8, p. 147).

think each of the three central propositions

Briefly,
is

view the problem as a paradox rather than as an argument
we have a paradox because we have good reason to

true, but they can’t all

11

be

true.

Despite general agreement about this simple form,
there

about which principle (or principles)

lies at the

is

much disagreement

heart of the problem of skepticism.

Umit

Yulcin has this to say about the search for such a principle:
It

will

be highly implausible to suggest

skeptical challenge takes hold,

that in all those cases in

we presuppose

that

we have

to

which

the

know that

the

possibility just raised (e.g., dreaming, evil

demon, or what not) does not obtain,
such presuppositions by virtue of some general principle.
[A

without being led to
principle to

following].

which we conform, though not one we are aware of intentionally
The existence of a multiplicity of structurally similar possibilities

indicates that (1) our intellectual response to Descartes’ reasoning
the unique features of the dream possibility qua dream possibility;
there

good reason

is

is

not based on

and

(2) that

to believe that our response is

based on the existence of some
general principle that leads us to judge, in each case, that our knowledge
claims
are (at least until further investigation) rendered suspect by the raising
of that
possibility. (Yulcin 8).

Umit Yulcin
Brueckner

in

in “Skeptical

Arguments from Underdetermination,” Anthony

“The Structure of the Skeptical Argument”, and Barry Stroud, among

others, argue that the underdetermination principle is the

all

one general principle on which

skeptical arguments are based:

UP: For

all S,

<(),

\\f,

hypothesis

They argue

that

if S’s

\j/,

something

evidence does not favor

<j)

over some incompatible

then S’s evidence does not justify

(j).

like the following reconstruction correctly reveals the

deeper

2

structure of the skeptical argument:

ARGUMENT U
my evidence

does not favor P over SK, then

my evidence

(1U)

If

(2U)

My evidence does not favor P over SK. [premise]
My evidence does not justify P. [from 1U,2U]

does not justify

(3U)

P. [an instance

of UP]

2

These versions of the relevant arguments are Cohen’s (Cohen 1998b, 145-146).
calls

calls

I’ve

renamed the key

What call Argument U, Cohen labels ‘C’. What he later
UND is essentially the same argument. What call Argument C, Cohen labels ‘D’, and then later he
what is essentially the same argument, DC.

arguments so that the names are more

intuitive.

I

I

12

(4U)

do not know

I

Historically, others

problem

skeptical

closure principle

is

P.

[from 3U]

have thought that the one general principle

some version of the

closure principle.

One

of the

reasonable version of the

a closure principle for the kind of justification that

is

at the heart

is

necessary for

3

knowledge:

CJ: For

all S,

(j),

justifies

if

v|/,

\\j

S’s evidence justifies

Advocates of the view that the closure principle
arguments think something
structure

and

<j>

<j)

entails

v|/,

then S’s evidence

.

is

the central principle behind skeptical

like the following reconstruction correctly reveals the deeper

of skeptical arguments:

ARGUMENT C
(1C)

If

my

evidence justifies P, then

my evidence justifies

not-SK.[an

application of the closure principle CJ]

(3C)

My evidence does not justify not-SK. [premise]
My evidence does not justify P. [from 1C,2C]

(4C)

I

(2C)

In

do not know

“Two Kinds

notion that there

is

[from 3C]

of Skeptical Argument,” Stewart Cohen attempts to put

exactly one route to skepticism.

In principle CJ, ‘justification’

may

P.

is

to

He

to rest the

claims:

be understood as the kind of justification necessary for knowledge

CJ is just one of many versions of the closure principle. Here are just a
few other versions: If S knows P and P entails not- SK, then S knows not-SK; IfS knows P and S knows P
entails not-SK, then S knows not-SK IfS is justified in believing P, and P entails not-SK, then S is justified
CJ is one plausible version of the principle because it does not require the subject to
in believing not-SK.

(whatever that

turn out to be).

;

recognize that his evidence justifies the relevant proposition; S

extremely complex propositions
if

that, via entailment, his

the subject has justification for

‘justification’ is so

understood

in

P and P

entails

is

evidence

not required to recognize
justifies.

SK, then S has justification

for not-SK.

premises one and two of Argument C, the conclusion,

follows only with an additional premise

all

the perhaps

Rather, this version claims that

Because
strictly

speaking,

that links the lack of propositional justification in premise 3 to the

lack of doxastic justification in the conclusion. Also, strictly speaking, in order for

Argument C

to

be valid,

P must be the kind of proposition such that knowledge of P requires evidential justification (e.g., P can’t be
known a priori). In this paper P is always such a proposition. Similar comments apply to UP and

Argument U.
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[E]ach principle provides the basis for an independently
motivated skeptical
argument. Because of this, neither principle is required
to make the

case for

skepticism, nor

According
but not

to

Cohen,

is

UP may be

skeptical cases, while

all

arguments

I

all

the epistemic principle behind

that all skeptical

UP

to formulate plausible skeptical

CJ may be used

principle

skeptical arguments.

I

UP

cannot be the

Cohen)

that

also argue that

arguments can be divided between those based on

In fact,

is at

CJ and

UP

UP

CJ cannot be

it is

not the case

and those based

are largely irrelevant to the skeptical problem; neither

the heart of the skeptical problem.

Preliminary Remark: During

- Cohen’s

this discussion,

it

will

and those

in

which the skeptical alternatives are

Global skeptical alternatives, such as that

I

am

(Cohen 1998b,

I

claim to

know

am

being

about the

zebra, or the car theft case, “compete only

with a restricted class of knowledge claims”(Cohen 1998b, 155). Later

in the paper,

convenient distinction as theoretically unfounded.

the skeptical stories are familiar

I

154). Local skeptical alternatives, such as Alvin

Goldman’s barn faqade, Fred Dretske’s painted

reject this rhetorically

‘restricted’, or

a brain in a vat or that

deceived by an Evil Demon, “compete with any proposition
external world”

be helpful to adopt - for the

division of skeptical stories into those in which the skeptical

alternatives are ‘global’

‘local’.

some

argue that the problem of skepticism can be generated without appeal to either

I

or CJ.

present

in

(Cohen 1998a, 15 5).

skeptical arguments, and (contra

all

arguments

to formulate plausible skeptical

argue (in agreement with Cohen) that

epistemic principle behind

on CJ.

used

in virtually all skeptical cases

what follows,

In

either principle superfluous. (Cohen 1998a,
143).

enough

that they needn’t
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be

retold.

I’ll

I

assume

that

Underdeter mination

ways

( 1

U)

to

If

(2U)
(3U)
(4U)

to

be three interestingly

does not favor P over SK, then

my

evidence does not

justify

[instance of UP]

My evidence does not favor P over SK. [premise]
My evidence does not justify P. [from 1U, 2U]
I

do not know

[from 3U]

P.

argue that none of these defenses

fail to

seem

there

defend the second premise of the underdetermination
argument:

my evidence

P.

I

not the root of the problem.

“Two Kinds of Skeptical Arguments”

In

different

is

is

adequate — either the defense

is

based on claims that

capture the sufficient conditions on favoring, or the defense captures the relevant

conditions on favoring but yields the result that

question-begging. Since

2U

is

2U

implausible, or else the defense

is

is

either indefensible or implausible, the underdetermination

principle cannot be the principle at the heart of the very compelling skeptical problem.

Brueckner defends the claim

would be
That

true regardless of whether

that

2U

is

true

P or

SK

is

true”.

that

“E (my evidence)

(Cohen 1998b, 148; Brueckner

835).

is,

SK

(B) S’s evidence, E, does not favor P over

be true and
Clearly, if the nearest

one

by claiming

in

which E

As Cohen

P were

SK world

is true,

consistency to which

if

B

is

one

E would be
in

E would favor P
appeals

is

trial

E

which E

if

SK were true, E

would

true.

is

not true, while the nearest P-world

is

over SK. But the sort of counterfactual

not sufficient to

points out, the mere fact that

count against the claim that

following

true,

because

if

SK

favors P over

were

show
true,

SK (Cohen

that

E does

E would

not favor P over SK.

be true does not seem

1998b, 148).

Consider the

case:

Suppose there has been a horrible theft in the neighborhood. Deaton’s copy of
Duke Nukem has been stolen. The police have investigated, finding Jones was
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to

seen entering the room. Jones’ fingerprints were
found all over the room,
especially near the computer. Furthermore, Jones
is a seedy, angry fellow who
has a history of computer-game theft. Jones was
found by police playing Duke
Nukem. Smith, police discover, can’t stand either Jones or video
games.
Let’s call the police’s evidence E. Since the police’s
evidence as a whole points to Jones,

E

-

clearly favors J

that Jones did

- over S -

it

that Smith did

it.

(Let’s stipulate that

Smith and Jones would not have worked together because they don’t
get along.) Note

were

that if J

were

true,

thief and

whether

true,

E would

E would be

would have
J

stolen

J

over

it

J

and E,

to spite Jones.

E makes

- Smith did it.

though E favors

true.

let’s

assume, are in fact

So,

E

Even though E would be

is

also, if

S

true regardless of

much more

is

counterfactually consistent with both J and S, even

likely that J is true

- Jones did

it

-

than

S.

favoring, or evidential neutrality.

even though E

But

it

This case illustrates that counterfactual consistency

support insufficient to

true.

had Smith stolen the game he would have been a more careful

true,

or S were true,

that S is true

be

show

that

B

is

is

much weaker

than non-

not an adequate defense of 2U because

E does

not favor P over

B

offers

SK; E might favor P over

SK

counterfactually consistent with both P and SK.

Cohen mentions what might be an

alternative defense of

2U

in a footnote in

which

he rejects Brueckner’s (B); he says:

SK

would explain the truth of E. This is
because the mere fact that E would be true if SK were true does not seem to be
enough. Let SK be the bare hypothesis (not-P & E). The mere fact that if SK
were true, E would be true, does not seem to count against saying that E justifies
[or favors] not-SK. We need some skeptical hypothesis that would explain the
I

appeal to the fact that

truth

of E. That

is

if

were

true,

it

the reason for specifying the hypothesis that

I

am

a brain-in-a-

vat...

For

this reason, the

truth

motivation for [2U]

is

better conceived as the fact that the

of E would be explained, regardless of whether P or

1998b, 148)
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SK

is true.

(Cohen

This suggests a second possibility for the defense
of 2U:

(C 1

)

S

s

evidence, E, does not favor P over

would explain

the truth of E, and if

SK because
P were

true,

if

SK were true, SK

P would explain the

truth

of E.

Cl

is

also an inadequate defense of 2U.

explain E, so

even

Cl does not provide

in cases in

many

In

which both P and
local cases

SK

First, in

SK

is,

roughly, that

my

SK explain E,

fails to

car

is

evidence in this case consists of a
statistical

car

is

my

offers

SK

fails to

is insufficient.

explain E. In the car-theft case,

is

that

my car

is

SK

seems

memory of leaving

my

in

car’s having

,

some

SK - that my

my memory of

no way explains

Nor would my

car in the lot this morning.

it

My

the car in a certain spot plus

car has been stolen. But

--

to

where I parked

in the lot

not in the lot but in the hands of car thieves.

evidence about the likelihood that

left

Cl

the defense

not in the lot but in the hands of car thieves

having

local skeptical cases

a reasonable defense of 2U in these cases. Second,

explain none of the evidence. In this case, P

and

most

been stolen (SK)

explain the statistical evidence about the unlikelyhood of car theft in general. So, in the
car-theft case,

Cl simply would not apply

as a defense for

not explain E. (Note that P doesn’t explain

In

most

(if

not

all)

much of E

other local skeptical cases

2U

because

SK

(if true)

would

either.)

SK

explains

some

but not

all

of the

evidence. In the barn fa 9 ade case, the subject has visual evidence as of a bam. There
also evidence that

it

takes

much

time and

money

relatively

few people have such money, and

choose

spend

to

it

that

on such a frivolous endeavor,

’background evidence’. In the barn case,

to generate a realistic

even fewer

etc.

I’ll

SK - that I am
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who have

call this

bam
it

is

fa<?ade, that

would

likely

second kind of evidence

seeing a barn fa 9 ade rather than

a barn

-

does seem to explain

my

visual evidence, but

does not explain any of my

it

My seeing a bam facade would not explain anything about the

background evidence.

general propensity of those in rural settings to
spend large amounts of money frivolously.

Nor does

the

mundane

regular barn in

much

hypothesis, P, fare

my visual

field clearly

better in explanatory power; there being
a

provides no explanation of bam-fa?ade financing.

Similar remarks apply to the zebra case as well as other local
skeptical cases.
cases, the

background evidence

skeptical cases,

Cl

is

isn’t

In these

explained by either P or SK. So in most local

inadequate because the defense

it

offers

is

inapplicable to the case;

4

such cases, Cl

in

Cl
Like B,

it

is

is

entirely beside the point.

also an inadequate defense of 2U in general for both local and global
cases.

fails to

provide a sufficient reason for the claim that

E

does not favor P over

5

SK

Two

.

might

still

competing hypotheses might be such

each would explain E, yet E

that, if true,

favor one hypothesis over the other. Consider the following case:

You

see an image of a rainbow.

One hypothesis

is

R:

A regular rainbow (a

certain pattern of light being refracted through clouds of ice crystals) exists,

causing your rainbow image
hypothesis

is

in the

M: No rainbow

normal way (whatever that

magical stardust that causes rainbow-like images

Someone might have
theft case)

both P and

in

SK

explain E.

On

this

Still,

Cl

A competing

humans.

a very restrictive view of what counts as evidence.

restricted to just the visual evidence.

is).

present; Martians have sprinkled into the air a

is

view, then, in
is

all

On

such a view, E might be

the local cases just discussed (except the car

no good as a defense of 2U. The discussion of Cl’s

general inadequacy (rainbow case, following paragraph) should suffice to

show why.

Additionally, this

account of evidence seems implausibly narrow.

Someone

else

might claim

that in the local cases,

though P and

they are parts of rival (and equally good) explanations of E.
principle like the following

On

this

SK

do not themselves explain

view, then,

some

sort

E,

of general

must be behind the defense of 2U: For any x and y and any explanations X| and

X

a part of X) and y is a part of 2 and X! and X 2 are competing explanations of E, then x is not
favored over y. Again, the discussion of C l’s general inadequacy (the rainbow case, following paragraph)

X2

,

if

x

is

should suffice to show that such a defense of 2U

is

inadequate.

Additionally, the general principle seems

implausible.

The case under consideration
local

E,

and global cases) even

E may

still

if

is

a local one, but

it

serves to

make

the point that in general

(i.e., in

both

two competing hypotheses have equivalent explanatory power with respect

favor one hypothesis over the other.
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to

Each hypothesis,

R

However, just as

in the local skeptical cases, neither explains
the additional

evidence

that there

-

and M, would,

if true,

explain your visual evidence of a rainbow.

such as that undetected Martian entry into the atmosphere

seems

to

is

background

a bit unlikely or

be no reliable information about the workings of magical

But we can extend both

R and M

stardust, etc.

appropriately so that each actually explains the

full

body

of evidence that exists - both the visual image and the background
evidence. To extend

R

sufficiently,

we would need

add claims

to

respect to rainbows and light refraction, claims that

participation in daily events

failings

that

Martian

highly unlikely, and claims that our information about the

to

be added to R, but

it

is

clear that

new, widely extended hypothesis R*.

expanded exactly as

R was,

is

is

explanation-wise

is

stardust.

full

M*’s explanation of the

M*

R* were

true

M*

were true

it

same way

that

R*

The only

R* were

R* and

would explain E (your

is

be

to

M*’s explanation of the

if

refraction (or something) while if

by Martian

stardust.

just like R*’s. In short, if

in the very

that if

could be appropriately extended. Call

just like R*’s, and

every piece of background evidence, and

background evidence

that

except that on this one particular instance and no other your

infrequency of Martian visits

of magical stardust

R

M would also need to be expanded. M

rainbow image was caused by Martians with

distrust

would explain

with

of magical stardust are pretty well-founded. Perhaps there are other items

would need
this

is

how the world works

that explain

would explain

would explain each piece of

true your visual evidence

M*

are

does.

it

general

difference

would be explained by

light

were true your visual evidence would be explained

competing hypotheses. Each

is

such

that, if true,

body of evidence on rainbow viewing). R* and
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M*

are

it

equally

good explanations of E. Yet E

clearly favors

R* over M*.

After

much of E

all,

consists of claims about the high degree of
improbability of Martian stardust use for the

creation of rainbow images in humans.

C
cases,

1 ,

Cl

then,

is

is

not an adequate defense of 2U in two respects.

not applicable because

SK

First, in

does not explain E. Second, Cl

is

general because the fact that competing hypotheses might,
if true, explain

does not count against the claim that
counterfactual explanatory

power with

neutrality with respect to E.

would explain

how

it

E.

E

The

E might

Since neither

B

respect to

E does

unsuccessful in

E

equally well,

not guarantee epistemic

critical feature in skeptical stories is

be true while P

nor Cl

local

favors one hypothesis over the other. Equivalent

Rather, the important feature in these stories

could be that

most

is

is

SK

not that, if true,

that

SK explains just

not.

an adequate defense of 2U, proponents of the

is

underdetermination argument might turn to

C2

as a defense of

(C2) S’s evidence, E, does not favor P over

2U:

SK because

Pr(P/E) does not exceed

6

Pr(SK/E).

On one way
and

SK

of interpreting C2,

respectively, given E.

probabilities

defense

is

it

A

makes

a claim about the statistical probabilities of P

C2-like defense of 2U that appeals to

might seem reasonable

at first glance,

but

Cohen shows

statistical

that

such a C2-like

not successful for local skeptical cases, such as the car-theft case:

For though our evidence

justifies us to

skeptical alternatives are false,
to the degree necessary for

while

it is

we

claim to

my

know

some degree

in believing restricted

very plausible to suppose

knowing

very plausible to suppose that
propositions

it is

it

does not justify us

skeptical alternatives are false. But

it is

not

evidence does not favor the mundane

over restricted skeptical alternatives. For example,

very plausible to suppose that

6

Suggested by remarks Cohen makes on pp. 149 and 155.
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my evidence

does not justify

me

to the

degree necessary for knowing
to

my car has not been stolen, it is not very plausible
does not favor the hypothesis that my car is parked in
garage over the hypothesis that my car has been stolen.
The fact is that I have

suppose

my

fairly

good

that

my evidence

evidence that favors the former hypothesis over the
natural to balk at saying I know my car has not been

statistical

Nonetheless,

it

is

latter.

stolen. (Cohen 1998b, 155).

C2

an inadequate defense of 2U in the car-theft case because

is

is

it

false that Pr(P/E)

does not exceed Pr(SK/E). In the car-theft case, E contains something
proposition: In general, car theft does not occur very often. That
statistical

information makes

likely than

SK -that my car is

car theft in general

now)

(right

in

P

is

P—that my car
(now)

is statistically

in the

is

(now)

in the lot

like the following

E contains

where

I

left it-

more

hands of car thieves. Given our evidence

less likely than not,

it

is far

more

of

this sort

likely that

that

my car

7

the lot rather than in the hands of thieves.

is in

The

state

of affairs described

a specific instance of a general type; the state of affairs described in

specific instance

of another general type; and

we have some

SK

is

a

evidence that the former
g

general type has a higher frequency of occurrence than the

latter.

Similar remarks apply to other local skeptical cases; P and

of affairs that

state

of

statistical

is

a specific instance of a

more general

type,

SK

each describe a

and E contains some

information that bears on the likelihood of these general types, with the

result that the general P-type state

of affairs has a higher frequency of occurrence than the

general SK-type. That zookeepers are both deceptive and artistically talented

is

statistically less likely than that they are either honest or not artistically talented; that

In these cases

we

a

is, we have no additional
when you left it or that there

huge and very localized increase

in car thefts.

g

It is

well-known

problematic, but

I

one

are clearly assuming that “all other things are equal”. That

information such as that there were thief-like people hovering near your car

been

sort

that assigning

one type

to a specific event, state

ignore that issue here.
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of affairs, or act token can be

has

will run across a barn fa ade is
far less likely than that
9

old barn; etc.

only

In fact,

on the

statistical interpretation

indefensible in the local cases,

is

it

one

will run across your average

of favoring that C2 suggests,

an important claim

in

not

is false.

That underdetermination arguments are
not successful
false is

2U

Cohen’s paper. He

in local cases

because

2U

is

says:

[P]lausible deductive closure arguments
can be constructed using either kind of

skeptical alternative, underdetermination
arguments require global skeptical
alternatives. (Cohen 1998b, 155).

I

think

Cohen

is

partly right. Underdetermination arguments
are at best implausible in

local skeptical cases.

so are

Cl and B.

I

Not only

also think

is

C2

Cohen

unsuccessful in defending

partly

is

an adequate defense of 2U

C2? Can such

I

have already argued that neither Cl nor B

in either local or global cases.

But what about

a defense succeed in the global cases?

In both local

states

in the local case, but

wrong. Underdetermination arguments are

not plausible in global skeptical cases either.
will provide

2U

and global cases,

it

is

reasonable to think of P and

of affairs that are specific instances of a more general type, but

not reasonable to claim that

these general types.

While

we have any

SK

as describing

in global cases

false), there is

in the local cases there is

statistical probability

hypothesis and the

no relevant

is

evidence about the frequency of occurrence of

some

statistical

evidence available

to serve as the basis for the relevant probability claims (though this evidence also

2U seem

it

statistical

makes

information to serve as the basis for

claims in the global cases. In the global case, both the skeptical

mundane hypothesis

are

open

to a

kind of generalization. SK,

after all,

does describe a specific instance of a more general type - being envatted, being wholly
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deceived, or being such that each detail of
describes a specific instance of a

perspective there

may be

life

has merely been dreamt.

And P

more general type - being handed. From

also

a God’s-eye

information available about the frequency of
being envatted

versus the frequency of being handed, but from
a non-God’s-eye perspective, any claim
that the statistical likelihood

than the latter type

is

of the former general type

entirely unjustified.

equal

is

to, greater than,

or less

In the global cases, since S is not privy to
the

relevant God’s-eye perspective, S’s evidence contains no
information about the frequency

of the general type of which P
the general type of which

SK

is

is

an instance nor any information about the frequency of

an instance. Since

in the global cases

our evidence

contains no statistical information that could sensibly serve as the
basis for the claims that

Pr(P/E)

is

not greater than Pr(SK/E), in these cases

C2 just does

probabilities are interpreted statistically,

global cases because there

is

no

C2

wholly unfounded.

is

not

is to

misunderstand C2. Instead,

C2

degrees of evidential support.

not

in

C2

2U

is

it

contains.

as being statistical

C2 might be understood

then claims that

the

as a defense of 2U in

rational basis for the probability claims

Perhaps to understand the probabilities mentioned
probabilities

work

When

true because

as a claim about

my

evidence does

more strongly support P than SK.
First,

on

this interpretation

satisfactory defense

of 2U, but

supports P than SK. Consider

of the probabilities, not only does C2

2U seems

false.

That

some of my evidence

is,

my

fail to

offer a

evidence more strongly

in the global case:

9
It

should be clear that the objective probability

not what’s relevant here, otherwise (presumably) there’d

is

be no skeptical problem. Rather, what’s relevant

is

S’s access to information about that probability.
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have evidence from reading
is

not currently available.

scientific journals that the necessary
vat technology
I surmise that if I
were a brain in a vat there

And

would most

likely be occasional glitches or
repeated sequences in
sensations; I’ve not been aware of any such
glitches. I

my stream of
have never even seen a
show on PBS that explains how specific impressions
get created. I have other
evidence along similar lines. Plus, I have some
“background evidence” such as
t lat simpler hypotheses
seem more likely to be true than more elaborate
ones.
There may be other background evidence as well.
“background evidence” alone makes

Just as

evil

demon deceiving me about

while standing on one

appearance of maple
slightly

more

leg,

I

more

likely that there is a straight-forward

everything than that there

deceives

trees, so the

likely that

it

me just on

is

an eccentric

that

demon who,

leap year Tuesdays and only about the

background evidence alone makes

have hands than

evil

I

am

it

at least ever so

a brain in a vat or that

I

am

being

deceived by an evil demon. Surely, the background evidence plus the
(possibly neutral)
other evidence in global cases

think

it is

given E.

I

think that

C2 works

C2

is

probabilities

makes 2U seem

that

P

fact,

C2

only

to support

I

in these cases really does

if

2U,

P

is

this

E does

is (slightly)

more

not more likely than

way of looking

likely than

the central point remains:

adequate defense of 2U in global cases.
true because

SK. In

SK
at the

false.

some remain unconvinced. However,

is

2U

likely than

unsuccessful because P does seem more likely than

Although / am convinced

2U

more

my evidence

as a defense of

given E. Rather than providing a means for

claim that

so slightly

hard to claim with a straight face that

equally support P and SK!

SK

makes P ever

question-begging defense of the claim that

E

given E, surely

C2 does

Why? Because when C2

not support P

SK

is

understood

more strongly than SK, C2

does not favor P over SK.

When

probabilities are understood as claims about degrees of evidential support,
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not provide an

is

to

be the

a

the

C2 simply

repeats the premise

over

it

SK because E

is false,

No

such support of

the burden to offer

„

,

2U

gets offered

reason

false.

C2 can
C2

claim that E does not favor P
in light

of the argument

by C2; C2 simply “repeats the

that

to the skeptic.

line” for

which

it

is

10

also fails to offer an adequate defense of 2U. In local

sensibly be understood as a claim about statistical probabilities, but the

offers

-

that

In global cases,

statistical

to the

independent support.

Along with B and Cl, C2
cases,

amounts

some independent defense of 2U belongs

.

to offer

it

does not favor P over SK. Particularly

2U

supposed

ostensibly defends;

claims

it

P

not statistically

is

when C2

makes

is

more probable than SK given E -

understood as a claim about

are wholly unfounded, and

about degrees of evidential support, the reason
support P than

SK —

is at

C2

when
—

offers

it

is

clearly

statistical probabilities, the

is

that

understood as a claim

E does

not

more

strongly

best question-begging as a defense of 2U.

Skeptical arguments are, once grasped, powerful arguments - whirlpool-like in

their pull

toward an unwanted conclusion.

If

underdetermination arguments are adequate

reconstructions (or interpretations) of the skeptic’s argument, then these too ought to be

difficult to dismiss.

But

far

from being

difficult to dismiss, the

arguments - both local and global - seem indefensible
the argument

2U - E

is

The reason Cl

offers

is

My

comments on
UP:

If

q

may

is

insufficient.

C2

C2

sensibly

when

so

also apply to a recent version of UP proposed

of Skepticism”:

a competitor to p, then a subject S can
q.

offers

statistical probabilities in local cases, but

the interpretation of probabilities in

S) than

For Vogel, p

B

indefensible line of

also insufficient, as well as false in the local cases.

in “Varieties

is

The

at best.

does not favor P over SK. The defense

can be interpreted as a claim about

by Jonathan Vogel

underdetermination

(Vogel

know p

only

2).

favor q on “broadly inductive grounds” (Vogel
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2).

if

p has more epistemic merit (for

understood the defense
claim about

C2

offers

seems

false.

C2 can

not sensibly be interpreted as a

statistical probabilities in global
cases, so in these

question-begging (and likely

(And some suggest reasons
argument, then,

is

false).

that

2U

None of these
is false).

C2

cases

is at

best

provides a successful defense of
2U.

Upon examination

the underdetermination

implausible for both local and global cases
because

2U seems

either

indefensible or false. Far from being at the
heart of the skeptical problem, the

underdetermination argument

is

largely irrelevant to

Closure
I

now

is

it.

not the root of the problem.

turn to the closure argument:

(1C)

If

my

evidence justifies P, then

my

evidence justifies not-SK.[an

application of the closure principle CJ]

My evidence does not justify not-SK. [premise]
My evidence does not justify P. [from 1C,2C]

(2C)
(3C)
(4C)

I

do not know

it is

1C

that reveals

Recall that

1C

is

For Vogel, p

may

I

think

A

supposed

why
to

P.

[from 3C]

closure

is

not at the heart of the skeptical problem."

be an instance of the closure principle:

favor q on “broadly inductive grounds” (Vogel 2).

brief digression regarding 2C:

Cohen argues
on UP.

that the

Briefly, he claims to

second premise

show

needn’t be so strong as to justify

Cohen

for

two reasons

-

that

SK

in the

2C does

closure argument does not depend for

not rely on

2U

because even

E

if

(Cohen, pp. 146-147). That the two are independent

because he claims there are two

when formulated

on closure. Cohen, then,

is obliged to produce a successful defense of 2C that does not
on the underdetermination principle. He gives the following defense:

Suppose we conceive of
one thing
true,

it

that

is

how

the truth of E.

But having noted

that very evidence could justify not SK....I

this,

SK
it

plausibility

is

E

important to

UP

and one

as arguments based
rely explicitly or

evidence as being represented by the proposition E.

particularly salient about the skeptical hypothesis

would explain

puzzling...

my

is

distinct routes to skepticism (one via

via CJ) and because he claims local skeptical cases are plausible only

implicitly

its

favors P over SK,

that if

SK

Now
were

becomes extremely

do think

[this]

represents a

very natural motivation for premise [2C]. (Cohen 1998b, 146-147)

Cohen intends his support for 2C to remain intuitive. However, for those who find the need to appeal
some general principle in support of 2C, he suggests principle Z (restricted to non-contradictions):
(Z)

For

all S,

(j),

if

the truth of

<])

to

would explain S’s evidence, then S’s evidence does not justify

not-(J).
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CJ: For

all S,

(j),

justifies

The

first

\\),

\\j

if

S’s evidence justifies

premise of the closure argument appears

by the closure principle, CJ. However,
applicable

more

it

generates a

clearly,

we can

(J)

and § entails

v|/,

then S’s evidence

.

first

in

premise that

to

be a substantive premise, generated

most skeptical
is

stories

even when CJ

essentially trivial. In order to see this point

divide the skeptical hypothesis into two parts: Let

parts of the skeptical story that

the story that entails not-P.

do not

Case

:

and

entail not-P,

Now consider the

Split Interpretation

There

is

is

SK* be

all

the

not-P* be the part (or parts) of

let

following version of the evil deceiver case:

an

evil deceiver.

This entity has lots of

power. The deceiver causes hand-like images and sensations. These are
detailed and just like images and sensations you would have were there a

hand

in front

ofyou.

Furthermore the deceiver causes you
,

to think

you

have a hand when you do not.

P

In this skeptical story

italicized

is

that

I

have a hand. All of the parts of the story

belong in SK*, because none of these

entails not-P.

The

parts,

nor any combination of them,

part of the story that belongs in not-P*

(Whenever not-P*

explicit denial of P.

just

is

not-P,

that are

I’ll

is

just the part in bold, the

drop the asterisk.) Consider the

following application of CJ:

CJ1:

CJ

evidence justifies P and P entails not(SK* and not-P), then S’s
evidence justifies not (SK* and not-P).

If S’s

applies because

P

entails not (not-P).

So

in Split Interpretation

itself
applies, the details of the skeptical hypothesis

-

Case

the crazy story

,

though CJ

we most

often

does not apply. Nor does Cohen’s
not be true, but in local skeptical cases it just
the evidence
above, SK does not explain large chunks of
more intuitive defense. As 1 have already argued
nor do
case
theft
car
the
in
all
evidence at
Specifically, SK does not explain any of the
in these cases
may well
1.
plausible.
be
well
evidence in other local cases. 2C may
explain dw background or statistical
provide
will
remarks
intuitive
cases, neither Z nor Cohen’s more
have a defense. But at least in the local
cases, he
arguments based on UP are not plausible in local
that
claims
Cohen
such a defense. While
Principle

Z may

or

may
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identify with the skeptical hypothesis

—

(SK*)

are really a superfluous feature of CJ1

relevant entailment holds even if these details are absent.

role in

CJ

1

SK*,

Consequently, the corresponding instance of

.

1

C

is

no

then, plays

oddly just a

the

;

essential

trivially true

claim about evidence for P:

1

C

1

If S’s

:

That
1

C I'

evidence justifies P, then S’s evidence justifies not (SK* and not

is,
:

If S’s

evidence justifies P, then S’s evidence justifies either not-SK* or

Since the skeptical hypothesis

is

P.

incidental to the first premise, the first premise

essentially reduces to a trivial claim about evidence for P.

is

P).

the second premise, rather than the

first,

Upon

careful consideration,

that is the only substantive

premise in

it

this

closure argument. Presumably the details of the skeptical hypothesis will be essential in a
plausible defense of the second premise in a closure argument. But in such a defense the

essential feature

of the skeptical hypothesis

of the second premise
the first premise

is

is

it

than producing a substantive

I

it is

first

premise,

think that virtually

of2C

entails not-P; that

is,

the defense

all

it

The second premise

is

a

In this argument, then, the closure

some kind of plausible

skeptical argument, but rather

offers a first premise

whose content

is

skeptical stories can be interpreted along the

plausible
maintains that arguments based on closure are

successful defense

it

just trivially true.

does not rely on closure.

principle cctn be used to formulate

essentially trivial.

not that

not based on a closure principle. So, in Split Interpretation Case,

based on closure, but

substantive premise, but

is

in local cases.
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in local cases.

He

has not, however, supplied a

of Split Interpretation Case.

lines

If so, closure

begins to look less central to the

13

formulation of skeptical arguments in general.

Second, some skeptical stories are such that CJ cannot be used
plausible skeptical argument, because in

some

cases, the

mundane hypothesis does

of the skeptical hypothesis. In some skeptical cases CJ

entail the denial

because the skeptical hypothesis

is

to formulate a

not

not applicable

is

open-ended so that again the mundane proposition

does not entail the denial of the skeptical hypothesis. In these cases, closure arguments
are not plausible because the relevant instance of closure just does not apply. Consider

the following skeptical story:

Open-ended Case

I

:

am

looking

considering whether or not

me

that there is

know

I

an area of up-state

that

I

we might not be.
I am looking at

barn. In fact,

like a barn,

see a barn.

New York in

I

then decide that

a

bam and we

You

and I’m

arrive

and

tell

which some of the barn-

You

and others are fa9ades.

like structures are real

that area or

something that looks

at

do not

I

we might be in
know that I see a

say that

are not in an area

where there

are barn facades.

In this case, the skeptical hypothesis

which some of the barn-like
open whether P or not-P

is

- that

12

If

SK

is

its

am

in the area

of up-state

structures are barns but others are

true (where

SK. In Open-ended Case, where SK*
hypothesis and

I

P
is

is that

New York

mere barn facades - leaves

S sees a barn). So P does not

the skeptical story

denial, the relevant instance of CJ

would

in

entail not-

minus the mundane
be:

have a hand, then clearly not-P is an essential part of SK.
However, 1 still
lines of Split Interpretation Case
a case that cannot be interpreted along the
why.
reveals
Case
Gettierized
this case, and I think
that

I

am

a brain-in-a-vat and

P

is

that

I

.

So

this is

think closure

is

irrelevant to

13

Additionally,

if

the

first

premise of Argument

C

what
can be defended without the use of closure, then
when
even
plausible
to the problem. I think that 1C is
I

is incidental
say here shows that the closure principle
there must be
think
I
So,
P does not entail the denial of SK.

closure or underdetermination.
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some defense of 1C

that

does not involve

CJ2:

It is

clear that

or not-P)]. In

P does not

entail

not[SK*

&

(P or not-P)];

Open-ended Case and others

like

1C because the relevant entailment does not
In

&

evidence justifies P, and P entails not [SK*
evidence justifies not [SK* & (P or not-P)]

If S’s

still

it,

In such cases,

true.

is

consistent with

& (P

[SK*

the closure principle does not apply to

hold.

other cases, the skeptical hypothesis

about P’s being

P

(P or not-P)], then S’s

may even

some

contain

SK clearly does not entail

explicit claim

not-P, so the closure

principle clearly does not apply to 1C. Consider the following:

Gettierized Case

I

:

am

standing near a table, considering whether or not

that there’s a table nearby.

My

out that

I

point out that

I

might be a brain

my

by the objects

seem

I

know

is

an effective skeptical

structured so that in the skeptical scenario

,

if

point

vat might be located on a table.

have told

Case

You

to perceive.

story.

That

skepticism no less than any of the other stories. But in this case,

In Gettierized

I

in a vat.

impressions and sensations might be caused by electrical stimulations

in the vat juice, rather than

Notice that what

You

SK*

is

P

is

true

(where P

the skeptical hypotheses

is

minus

is, it

SK

seems

intentionally

is

‘There

to motivate

is

a table nearby’).

P, the following

is

the

relevant instance of CJ:

CJ3:

If S’s

evidence justifies P, and P entails not (SK* and

justifies not

P -

(SK* and

that there’s a table nearby

fairly

P),

then S’s evidence

P).

- does not

entail the denial

of the skeptical hypothesis - a

long conjunction involving frequent mention of vats. P

hence SK. So the closure principle does not apply
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to

1C

is

consistent with

in Gettierized

Case

.

SK* and

The

closure principle cannot be used to formulate a plausible
skeptical argument in

Gettierized Case because the relevant entailment does not
hold.'

Open-ended and Gettierized Cases,

In

conclusion

is

just as strong as

it is

4

the motivation toward a skeptical

in other very similar cases.

Skeptical arguments based

on these cases, then, would be just as plausible as other skeptical arguments.
Yet
ended and Gettierized Cases the closure principle

is

irrelevant;

it

is

in

Open-

not applicable

because the relevant instance of it plainly does not apply. These cases show that some
plausible skeptical arguments, both local (Open-ended Case

Case

),

do not require the closure

principle.

More

and global (Gettierized

)

importantly, no plausible skeptical

argument based on Open-ended Case or Gettierized Case can be formulated using CJ.
have already argued that

U2

in

arguments based on underdetermination

indefensible or implausible, so Open-ended and Gettierized Cases also
plausible skeptical arguments -again both local and global

—

is

I

either

show

that

are based neither

some

on the

15

closure principle nor on the underdetermination principle.

Someone might

object here that

mundane hypothesis

either the

have somehow cheated;

I

or the skeptical hypothesis. In

I

have misinterpreted

Open-ended Case, someone

14

Others,

among them G.E. Moore in “Certainty” p.47 and more recently, Jonathan Vogel in “Varieties
p. 14, have made roughly the same point using veridical dream cases. My Open-ended and

of

Skepticism”

Gettierized Cases extend that point. These cases

show

that veridical

dream cases should not be

treated as

realm of skeptical stories because virtually any skeptical case can be appropriately
similarly adjusted so as to thwart arguments (both Underdetermination and Closure) that require the
rare anomalies in the

mundane proposition and

the skeptical hypothesis to be incompatible.

Additionally, consider the version of

UP: For
vp,

all S,

<j>,

vp, if

UP

stated earlier:

S’s evidence does not favor

then S’s evidence does not justify

4>

over some incompatible hypothesis

<j).

SK have to be “competing”. On the most natural interpretation,
‘competing’ probably means that P and SK are not jointly satisfiable. If UP requires P and SK to be
competing or incompatible hypotheses, then my comments here that in many skeptical cases CJ does not
UP

is

sometimes stated so

that

P and
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might object that

I

component when

in fact

Even

have interpreted the skeptical hypothesis as having
a disjunctive
it

does not:

NY in which some of the barnand some are fa9ades, the subject does know ‘That’s
a bam’ provided the barn-like structure in front
of S is a real bam. Since no
skepticism results when the bam in view is real, this part
of the story should not
count as part of the skeptical hypothesis. The only
legitimate interpretation
if the subject, S, is in the section

of upstate

like structures are real barns

of the

skeptical hypothesis in

Open-ended Case

is:

that

I

am

in a section

of upstate

NY

which some of the barns are real and some are fa?ades and there is
not a real
barn now in front of me. The skeptical hypothesis is not
properly broken down
into SK* & (P v not-P). Rather, it is SK* & not-P;
the part of the story in which
in

we

are told that there are

some

When Open-ended Case
closure principle

is

real

bams

near the

fa<j:ades is

difficulty with this objection

is

that provided

guidance of an evil demon, the person
situation in

which the

who

we

& not-P], then S’s

are not brains in vats or under the

claims that S

knows

possibility of barn fa<?ades in the area has

that S sees a barn in a

been raised but not “ruled

out” ought to claim that in everyday hand-viewing situations skepticism
dismissed. If skepticism can arise only in cases in which P

standard skeptical stories, there

true.

So, those

who

is

then in

easily

many of the
is

take the threat of skepticism seriously ought not appeal to the

In Gettierized Case,

is

is false,

is

(presumably) no real threat of skepticism because P

objection that in Open-ended Case

mundane

detail.

is:

CJ2': If S’s evidence justifies P, and P entails not [SK*
evidence justifies not [SK* & not-P],

The

an irrelevant

properly understood, the relevant version of the

hypothesis.

I

SK cannot be

someone might

have represented

it

interpreted as being consistent with P.

object that

I

have misrepresented the

as being a simple proposition,

when

in fact

it

a long conjunction:

P is not the simple proposition that there is a table nearby.
a more complex proposition — a conjunction whose conjuncts include

In Gettierized Case,

Rather,

it

is

UP. That is, in many skeptical cases UP cannot be used to formulate
argument because P and SK are compatible or non-competing (since P does not

apply, also apply to

a plausible

skeptical

entail not-SK).

32

claims about light refraction and claims about
the subject’s perceptual apparatus,
as well as many other similar claims. Properly
understood, P really has the
following structure: p,
&...p
where
2
each
n
p
p; is some particular claim about

&

how

the world

works

,

in the actual

world when

it

comes

to table perception

The

conjunction claims that tables, rather than evil scientist
with vat controls, cause
(through some complicated but “normal” process) my
images of nearby tables
When Gettierized Case is properly understood, SK is also a large and
complex
conjunction having the following structure: sk, & sk
...,sk
where each
2

&

some

particular claim about

how

n

sk, is

,

the world

works when it comes to the generation
of table images in the vat-world. P and SK, then, are competing
hypotheses about
the way our world works, about what our world is like.
When P and SK are
properly understood as large and complex conjunctions, P does
entail the denial of

SK

-

Pi

because for some conjuncts

&p

2

SK =

&...p n and

sk)

principle in Gettierized Case

p,

and sk„

& sk &
2

p, entails

,...sk n , the correct

&

version of the closure

is:

CJ3': If S’s evidence justifies P, and
sk 2

the denial of sk,. Given that P

(p,

& p 2 &...p

n)

entails not-(sk,

&

sk n ), then S’s evidence justifies not-SK.
This interpretation of Gettierized Case preserves the closure principle.

This objection also

fails.

Gettierized Case, the

that

my

- even
since

be

.

On

.

.

the objector’s closure-preserving interpretation of

mundane hypothesis

everyday evidence justifies any

a very local claim about

cannot even describe

I

like,

.

I

think

I

how

in

do not have the

addition of normality,

any

is

sort

hardly mundane.

far

of complex claim about

from clear

how the

detail

me

to

world works

perception occurs in a particular instance. In

fact,

what such a “normal” perceptual event would

beliefs requisite for

P includes

It is

knowing

By

P.

requiring the

the claim that S isn’t dreaming, or being deceived, or

hallucinating, or malfunctioning, or (in local cases) in an area ripe with barn facades.

Under

the objector’s interpretation of P,

mundane of circumstances.
skeptical results

I

think

I

don

't

know

In the redescribed Gettierized

P,

Case

even under the most

,

closure does apply, and

do follow, but something of the skeptic’s position has been

skeptic claims that

we

lost; the

don’t have knowledge of the mundane, but on this account, the

skeptic wins the day by giving up on the claim that
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P

is

mundane. That

is,

the skeptic's

position

becomes

that

we

know many non-mundane

fail to

response to the objection because

illegitimate

So

far

have argued

I

6

to the skeptic’s original cause .'

that there are

I

reject this

I

allows a version of the skeptic’s position to
capture

gam, while not doing justice

heart of the skeptical problem.

these

it

propositions.

some

cases in which closure

is

clearly not at the

have done so by describing several such cases. But

few cases reveal the broader

point: Nearly all skeptical stories can either be

interpreted or adjusted (through slight and insignificant
variations) so that closure
largely irrelevant or inapplicable to the formulation of a
skeptical argument.

is

think

I

virtually all skeptical stories can be interpreted along the lines
of Split Interpretation

Case. But

seems unconvincing, adjustment

if re-interpretation

is

even more revealing.

16

here revisit the reinterpretation of cases like Gettierized Case As both Vogel and 1 have noted,
the
I give against closure - that in many skeptical
examples, P and SK are not
inconsistent/incompatible - applies to UP(Vogel 13). In a recent paper, “Varieties of Skepticism”,
I

.

same objection

Jonathan Vogel argues that that a version of Deceiver Argument based on the Underdetermination Principle
is the skeptic’s best (most defensible) argument. The relevant version
of UP Vogel favors is:

UPV If q is a competitor to p, then a subject can know p only if p has more epistemic merit (for S)
than q (Vogel 2).
In the part of the discussion in which Vogel grants that dreams can be veridical, he suggests that a skeptical
argument based on
are

now awake,

UPV

that

can be defended,

you are now

“it’s part

of what you ordinarily believe about the world that you
and that you aren’t dreaming. The possibility that

really perceiving things,

you are dreaming tout court is, therefore, inconsistent with your body of beliefs about the world taken as
whole”(Vogel 18).
think this approach fails to capture the root of the skeptical problem for reasons

a

I

above

similar to those given
veridical

dream

case,

UPV

hypothesis ‘I’m dreaming that
that

is

like

our world and

which the subject

is

in

I

which the subject

dreaming.

(as in the case

to the

have hands’. Rather,

On

this

is

it

I

understand Vogel’s interpretation of the

proposition,

is

T have hands’, and

not dreaming and a q-world that

non-dreaming, non-deceiving, non-malfunctioning,
ever

interpreted

know

it.

Since Vogel

-commits him

is

is

now

etc.

I

-

a p-world

our world but

in

And

to favor

P over

a proposition not just about hands but

The proposition

not a contextualist (RAT),

to skepticism in

like

no epistemic reason, from S’s point of view,

of CJ3’), the “mundane” proposition

like the

dreaming becomes non-mundane because P must now include (somehow)

we

is

they are true competitors.

about hands and not dreaming. The requirement that P include anything

think

the skeptical

applies to something like whole worlds

way of construing P and SK,

skeptical results surely follow, since there

SK. But

As
mundane

for the rejection of CJ3’.

does not apply

is

claim that S

that perception

is

is

not

“normal”

no longer mundane, and

think accepting

UPV

I

-

don’t

-with P and SK so

even the most normal of circumstances, for S surely does not

have access to the god’s-eye perspective on possible worlds

that

might give S the “broadly inductive

UPV does not yield
grounds” (Vogel 2) for granting P more
supplies
with the broadly inductive
evidence
S
the
background
skeptical results in many local cases because
epistemic merit than SK. Also, note that

grounds for rejecting SK.
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The dream

story

becomes

the veridical

dream argument. The

evil deceiver deceives the

subject not about the objects that are nearby
but about the origins or sources of his
images

and sensations; the subject

is

deceived because he thinks he perceives his
world when he

does not. Car-theft and painted-mule stories can easily
be adjusted along the

Open-ended Case. (One exception
example when P

is

that

I

all

have a hand; any adjustment

skeptical stories closure

of

to this adaptation process is the brain-in-a-vat

brain-in-a-vat consistent with having a

nearly

lines

is

hand

in this story that

makes being

a

will be a non-trivial adjustment.) Since in

irrelevant or inapplicable in the formulation of any

plausible skeptical argument, closure

is

largely irrelevant to the skeptical problem.

Unifying the Skeptical Problem

Over

the course of

many

years, both underdetermination

and closure have been

hailed as the principles best used as the basis for formulating skeptical arguments.
At
first

glance, arguments based on underdetermination or closure

argument

for skepticism contained in skeptical stories, but

seem

to capture the

upon closer examination,

neither does an adequate job of reflecting the skeptic’s reasoning.

Arguments based on

underdetermination are implausible or indefensible, while skeptical stories are

remarkably compelling and

difficult to dismiss.

The

details

of the skeptical hypothesis

17

seem

irrelevant to the closure principle itself,

essential.

Importantly,

some

but in skeptical stories these details are

plausible skeptical stories

- Cases 2 and

3

—

are such that

neither underdetermination nor closure can be used to formulate plausible skeptical

arguments based on these

More

carefully, these details

stories.

seem

If

both underdetermination and closure are largely

irrelevant to the first premise,

the closure principle.
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which

is

supposed

to be an instance of

S

irrelevant to the skeptical problem, then

what

is at

the heart of it? Contextualists

including Peter Unger, Stewart Cohen, and
most recently David Lewis have provided the
tools not only for a solution to the

diagnosis of the problem

problem of skepticism but also

The

itself.

for a satisfactory

principle at the heart of the skeptical problem

is

a

contextualist one:

ENT:

knows

If ‘S
if

P’

true in context c, then for every possibility
e-relevant in

is

S has evidence

The companion argument

E

c.

8

in that possibility, then

P

is

true in that possibility.'

ENT follows:

to principle

Argument E
(El) If

knows P

"

is

S has evidence
(E2) There

P

is

true in context c, then for every possibility e-relevant
in
E in that possibility, then P is true in that possibility.

a possibility e-relevant in c in which S has evidence

E

c, if

but in which

is false.
19

(E3) ‘S

With

ENT

in

knows

P’

not true in

is

mind, consider anew a

c.

encounter with a skeptical argument:

first

The professor asks you if know you have hands. “Sure”, you answer, “I’m
looking at them right now”. Meanwhile, you think to yourself that this is a dumb
class. “Perhaps you do not have hands”, your instructor remarks. “Maybe we all
just have stubs and not hands”, someone jokes. “Yeah, I know I have hands
”, you
finally reply.

The professor then suggests that maybe you are a brain in a vat. Then she
points out to you in precise detail just how you might have the very perceptual
evidence you now have even though you did not have hands but were a brain in a
vat. Your visual hand-like perceptions are not caused by hands at all. Instead,
some vat operator changes the electromagnetic current in the vat causing your
18

The point of principle ENT is to express the relationship that must hold between E and P when S knows P
context. Above, I adopt Lewis’ account of evidence, on which evidence is the subject’s perceptual
experience and memory (Lewis 553), so talking of the truth of E makes no sense. However, the point here
in a

is

not tied to a particular account of evidence;

then the right

way

to express

several differences.
c, if

S’s evidence

E

In
is

ENT

ENT
is:

is

it

is

broader. If one thinks that evidence can be propositional,

an obvious relative of the Lewisian analysis of knowledge. There are

If ‘S

knows

P’

true in that possibility, P

true in context c, then for every possibility e-relevant in

is
is

Significantly, this principle

true in that possibility.

is

a

necessary condition, not a sufficient one.
19

ENT and

Argument E

are stated as metalinguistic claims.

The

object-language counterpart to each principle/argument. The
claims should not be problematic.

If ‘S

knows

P’

is

true in

36

c,

contextualist and

shift

then

I

(here) also hold the

from metalanguage
in that

to object-language

context S knows P.

hand-like images. Each time you mention
clear

You

how
start

some new sort of evidence, she makes
might be just the same even though you are
a brain in a vat
thinking maybe you’d better say “Ok, so 1
don ’t know 1 have hands ”
that, too,

and you find yourself thinking

this class is not so bad.

Before the skeptical story gets presented, the student
thinks his evidence

is sufficient.

After the story, he does not. Loosely speaking,
what the skeptical story does
student recognize that at the latter time his evidence
does not in any
truth

of the mundane proposition he

same evidence. The
latter

in

skeptical story

seems

took himself to

to

do

this

sufficiently justify.

evidence. Rather,

is

the set of possibilities relative to

Although

remembrance of a

problem with

skeptic’s reasoning

first

seem

skeptical encounter

shown

that underdetermination

neither

UP

mind

at the earlier time.

it

might otherwise

is,

is

not the

ENT

intuitive

in

mind should help make

and plausible,

this

fond

of course, no argument for ENT.

and closure are largely irrelevant

what follows,

I

argue that

ENT can unify the

by generating plausible skeptical arguments

The

proof, as they say,

is

in the

I

have

to the skeptical problem;
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skeptical problem, in

in all the skeptical stories here

pudding.

is

his evidence.

nor CJ can generate plausible skeptical arguments for a wide range of

skeptical stories. In

considered.

to

at the

the earlier time to the later time

which the student evaluates

revisiting the skeptical

ENT’s account of the

come

the earlier time to the latter time

What changes from

the context.

“guarantee” the

the basis of that

“disconnected” from the mundane proposition

What has changed from

it is

know on

cause the

by making the student aware

time of a possible situation, a situation that did not

which the evidence

part

earlier

way

is

Before discussing the degree to which
in the principle require further

standard in epistemology,

Second,

ENT also

discussion, e-relevance

Knowledge

is

(Later, in

.

I

mention.

ENT

is

First, since

successful,

two notions made use of

ENT’s appeal

to context

these rules

tell

what

fairly

appeals to the notion of e-relevance. For the
present

Lewisian relevance as determined by David Lewis

Chapter

sufficiently clarify

three rules govern

now

will not here discuss the notion of
context.

4,

in “Elusive

e-relevance will be redefined, but the results of the

cases considered in the pr esen t discussion should remain
unchanged.)

below should

is

how e-relevance
may

possibilities

in

ENT works.

The Lewisian

For Lewis, the

rules

first

not be properly ignored. In the case of ENT,

us which possibilities are e-relevant:

Rule of Actuality

The

:

actual possibility

is

always e-relevant (Lewis 154).

A possibility the subject believes to obtain or one that he ought to

Rule of Belief:

believe obtains

Rule of Attention

is

e-relevant (Lewis 555).

If the participants in a conversational context attend

:

to/consider/focus on a possibility, then that possibility

is

e-relevant in that

20

context (Lewis 559).

For Lewis, the second

set

of rules governs which possibilities

ignored. In the case of ENT, these rules

may

be properly

us which possibilities are (defeasibly) not e-

tell

relevant:

Rule of Reliability

:

We may defeasiby presuppose that perception,

testimony are processes on which
(defeasibly) that perception,

we can

rely; that is,

memory, and testimony

memory, and
we may presume

are reliable indicators

of truth. Defeasibly, possibilities in which our perception, memory, or
testimony are not reliable are not e-relevant.

Rule of Method

:

We may also presuppose that a sample is representative and that

the best explanation of our evidence

I’m assuming some familiarity with Lewis’

rules.

It

is

the true explanation. Defeasibly,

should be clear that I’ve merely switched ‘properly

ignoring’ for ‘not e-relevant’ and ‘not properly ignored’ for ‘e-relevant’ and that (here) nothing turns on
this

terminological change. Also, I’m assuming that Lewis’ Rule of High Stakes can get subsumed under

this rule.

In a

High Stakes

situation, the participants in fact focus

on more

possibilities, so the rule

attention will guarantee that the set of relevant possibilities expands accordingly.
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of

possibilities in

which samples are not representative
or

to the best explanation

is

in

which inference

not reliable are not e-relevant.

ignore here Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance
because
discussion. (I discuss it at length in Chapter
I

it

not applicable in the cases under

is

3.)

Defeat:

Loosely, a rule of presupposition (Reliability,
Method)

context in two ways: (a)

if as

a result of a rule from the

first

may

be defeated

in a

category (Belief, Actuality,

Attention), a particular possibility that might
otherwise not be e-relevant by one of the

presupposition rules

become

e-relevant, then a presupposition rule

is

defeated (b)

if

because the participants (speakers and hearers) question
the legitimacy of a certain kind

of presupposition

itself (e.g.,

they wonder whether a given sample size

whether future events will resemble past events),

- namely

e-relevant

-

become

possibilities that

is

large

enough or

might otherwise not be

propositions in which the relevant (dropped) presupposition

e-relevant, then a presupposition rule

is

defeated.

is false -

These methods of defeat

are

by no means exclusive. Generally, the discussion of a particular skeptical scenario
causes
participants to drop

kind of defeat

occurs, as

is

when

some presuppositions about

accompanied by the second
the presupposition itself

is

reliability or

kind. But

method, so

that the first

sometimes only one kind of defeat

dropped without the aid of a specific skeptical

scenario. Additionally, defeat can occur piecemeal or whole-scale; the Rule of Reliability

might be defeated for visual images as of a barn but not for visual images as of a

car, for

instance.

We

can

now return

precise account of how the

to the classical skeptical story above, this time offering a

ENT and its companion argument,
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Argument

E, explain the

.

skeptical problem.

reasoning present

Though more
in the earlier,

precise, this account of the

more

intuitive, account.

problem should preserve the

Let’s call the

first

part of the

story Part 1, the second Part
2, the student S, the professor B, and
the student’s evidence
(visual) E.

In the

context of Part

possibilities in

by the Rule of Attention, B’s comment makes
e-relevant

1,

which S has stubs

relevant all such possibilities.

rather than hands.

By

the Rule of Reliability, S and

legitimately presuppose that perceptual evidence

perceptual evidence

is

But B’s comment does not make

is

B

in this context

reliable, so possibilities in

not reliable are not e-relevant. B’s

e-

comment makes

which S’s

e-relevant only

those possibilities in which S has stubs rather than
hands and in which S’s perceptual

evidence

is reliable.

So

of the e-relevant possibilities, there are possibilities
in

has stubs rather than hands but S does not have

having hands) and possibilities

in

Argument

E.

When

is

In the context

that S

is

2,

B

e.g.,

no

e-

so no skeptical results get generated via

is false),

I

are

but does not have hands. In this context, the

know I have hands”

the end of Part

makes

than a person with hands.

—

at

of Part

a brain in a vat

might be unreliable

E

S claims “Yeah,

The statement made

truly.

2E

true (and

(the perceptual visual evidence of

which S has E and has hands, but there

relevant possibilities in which S has

consequent of ENT

E

which S

1

is

at

the end of Part

true in the context of Part

which S

is

also mentions important details about

S speaks

1

by the Rule of Attention, B’s mention of the

e-relevant possibilities in

1,

possibility

a brain in a vat rather

how

S’s perceptions

they might have been caused not by hands but by a vat

21

My

account of defeat for the two rules above should be consistent with the examples Lewis discusses

“Elusive Knowledge”, though

it

may

or

may

not be an accurate account of how he would say defeat in

general works for these rules.
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in

Though

manipulator.

perception

unreliable, the Rule of Attention

is

we

makes

can ignore possibilities

presumption testimony)

in the

context of Part 2

is reliable.

possibilities

-

-

in

which our

e-relevant possibilities in which

no kind of perception, memory, or testimony

virtually

S

the Rule of Reliability says

is reliable;

that our perception

B’s comments break the

(memory, method, and

B’s comments, then, make e-relevant two important sorts
of

(7) possibilities in

which S

is

a brain in a vat and (2) possibilities in which

not a brain in a vat, but which are similar to the
brain-in-a-vat worlds with respect to

is

the complete lack of perceptual

(e.g., a possibility in

case

this

is

one

in

which S

which S

(memory, testimonial, and methodological)

is

a

is

a brain in a tub). Since the specific possibility attended in

BIV without

e-relevant by the Rule ot Attention

become

reliability

—type

hands, possibilities of the

(a) defeat.

Possibilities

first

kind are

made

of the second kind

relevant since, because of the specific possibility described, the speakers
and

hearers question the legitimacy of a broad range of presuppositions - type (b) defeat.
In
general, no presupposition of reliability of perception,

memory,

or testimony

is

legitimate

since the Rule of Attention (via the specific possibility described) defeats the Rule of
Reliability whole-scale. In the context of Part 2, then, there

which E
but P

2E

is

true but

S speaks

is

not

-

a possibility in

Since such a possibility

is false.

is true).

P

When

truly.

The

skeptical claim

is

an e-relevant possibility

I

made

don’t

at

know I have hands”

the end of Part 2

is

at

ENT

is

false (and

the end of Part 2,

true in the context of Part

22

2

.

and Part 2 are fairly straightforward, but suppose that instead of explaining
someone’s perceptual evidence might be just as it is if the person were just a brain in a vat whose

The contexts

in Part

1
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in

a brain in a vat, S has evidence E,

e-relevant, the consequent of

is

S claims “OK, maybe

which S

is

that

Having examined
advantages of accepting

the mechanics of

this

ENT

and Argument E,

I

now

turn to the

account of the skeptical problem. Argument E fares better

than either the closure argument or the underdetermination argument in reflecting
the

.23
skeptic’s reasoning.

Unlike the closure arguments, Argument E reveals

of the skeptical hypothesis are important. With

ENT

at

problem, the role of the skeptical hypothesis becomes

E from P

disconnect

becomes

in

e-relevant.

way

such a

that a class

possibility in

hypotheses

clear; skeptical

of possibilities

in

which E and not-P

which E but not

about reliability moperant

itself.

The

details

is

on E’s

problem because they ensure the salience of a

P, usually

by rendering some customary presupposition

in the context.

relation to

The reason

SK

P when

perceptions are caused by vat manipulation,

the details of the skeptical

B

is

is

ENT?

mention of a skeptical
possibility

is

I

think not.

alternative.

I

merely mentions

to the students that the

think that the Rule of Reliability

The

never makes e-relevant possibilities
is

change

in

break

is

not automatic.

a context, but

it

may

that

such

is

person might be a

Would

skeptical results

not automatically trumped by mere

details of the story allow the listeners to understand that the

inconsistent with S’s having hands, to take seriously the possibility and, in so doing, to grasp

the scenario’s implications for reliability.

it

Argument

that

e-relevant rather than, as with closure

brain in a vat, without describing any of the details of the classic skeptical scenario.

be generated via

such a

of the skeptical story are

hypothesis are indispensable on this account of the skeptical problem

E’s focus

is

accomplish the disconnection by

incorporating not-P into the skeptical scenario

integral to this account of the skeptical

the details

the center of the skeptical

In standard stories, the skeptical hypothesis itself

possibility, but skeptical hypotheses needn’t

why

a

My point

which

is

not that merely mentioning an outlandish possibility

reliability is

broken (thus generating skeptical

Mere mention of BIV’s

to a

results), rather,

crowd of philosophers may serve

to

not so serve amongst a crowd of naive undergraduates.
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More

accurately,

it

fares better at reflecting the reasoning present in skeptical stories.

of course, not accept that there are any contexts

What
That

I

is,

in

which

a

person can truly claim

to

The

know

skeptic would,

a proposition.

am trying to capture here is the skeptic’s reasoning when giving a particular skeptical argument.
am trying to explain the plausibility of the skeptic’s argument without accepting full-scale
1

skepticism. (The skeptic and the

fallibilist

could accept a non-contextualized version of ENT. The skeptic

—
would then get the result that whole-scale skepticism — as opposed to contextually relativized skepticism
line
corresponding
deny
the
and
ENT
version
of
non-contextualized
follows. The fallibilist will reject the
in the non-contextualized version of Argument E.)
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arguments, on the logical relation of P to
SK. As a
the closure

argument

Argument E

result,

Argument E

fares better than

in reflecting the skeptic’s reasoning.

also fares better than underdetermination
arguments in reflecting the

skeptic’s reasoning.

Unlike underdetermination arguments, each

a strong defense; unlike

Argument U, with

its

line

of Argument E has

indefensible second premise,

Argument E

coriectly captures the force, or strength,
of the skeptic’s argument. Unlike 2U,
clearly true. In fact, each premise of
Argument

Not only does Argument E do a

E seems

who

better job of capturing the skeptic’s reasoning

E

explain

role

— SK

explain

E just
s

as well as P.

role (even in

how E

also preserves

much of the

advocate either underdetermination or closure arguments.

advocates of underdetermination focus on SK’s explanatory
to

ENT makes

problem cases

could be true though P

to raising the salience (e-relevance)

is

and plausible.

intuitive

than closure or underdetermination arguments,
Argument
insight of those

2E

is

clear that

like

not.

role;

SK plays

Some

they claim SK’s role

an important explanatory

Open-ended and Gettierized Cases)

The

details

is

of SK’s explanation are

is to

critical

of the possibilities that allow the generation of

skeptical results. Advocates of closure focus on the logical relation that
holds between P

and SK; they claim

is

that

P

entails not-SK.

the “entailment” relation between

that

ENT preserves

E and P when

the focus on entailment, but

it

restricted to e-relevant possibilities

is critical.

In addition to its

advantages over underdetermination and closure

more accurate account of the
and local cases

Because an

to

skeptic’s reasoning,

be treated equally, or

infinite string

ENT

(via

Argument E) allows

alike, in the generation

of local skeptical cases can be used
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in offering a

of skeptical

to

global

results.

generate global

skepticism, and because a global skeptical hypothesis can
be used to generate local
skeptical results, there

in

these

seems

to

be no significant difference

two kinds of cases. Since the separation of cases

seem driven by any

theoretical difference in the

treatment of these types of skeptical cases

Kinds of Skeptical Argument”, global and
claims that while global skeptical cases

is

in the

way

into global

the skeptic reasons

and

two kinds of skeptical

local

does not

stories, equal

an advantage. In Stewart Cohen’s

“Two

local cases receive separate treatment.

may plausibly be

Cohen

interpreted either as

underdetermination arguments or closure arguments, plausible interpretation of local
cases requires closure arguments (Cohen 1998b, 155). Unlike Cohen’s account,
accepting

ENT

as the central principle behind the

problem allows

local

as ditferent versions of the very

same argument, Argument

as the car theft case, the painted

mule

skeptical hypothesis

consequent

is false,

is itself

2E

is

case,

and the

bam

an e-relevant possibility

clearly true,

and skeptical

in

and global cases

E.

to

be cast

In typical local cases

such

fayade case, the relevant

which E and not-P. ENT’s

results follow via

Argument

E.

Similarly, in typical global cases such as the evil deceiver case, the brain in a vat case,

and the dreamer case, the relevant skeptical hypothesis

itself is

which E and not-P. Again, ENT’s consequent

2E

is false,

Unlike either closure or underdetermination,
or problem cases, like

clearly true, and skeptical

ENT

is

;

in

that in these cases, the

consistent with P, so no possibility

gets described or mentioned this

argument can be used

can accommodate non-standard

Open-ended and Gettierized Cases. Recall

skeptical hypothesis described in detail in the story

which E but not P

in

argument above.

results follow via the

in

is

an e-relevant possibility

is

why no

plausible closure

formulating the arguments for Open-ended or Gettierized Cases.
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Significantly, scenarios/possibilities/hypotheses
can be e-relevant in a context without

being specifically spelled out or mentioned in a
context.
Cases, even though the skeptical hypothesis
the skeptical hypothesis does

explicitly get

make

to

be

false.

in

whole

which the

How?

In each

class

details

SK

is

to

in

be true but could just as easily have been

And

presence ol bams.

is

in the skeptical

e-relevant

of Reliability (and Method

Open-ended Case,
bam. Because

it.

false.

bam

So

in

is

each case, by the Rule of

by

truth

-

of P

are not reliable indicators of the

reliable indicators

the Rule of Attention, and, via

in global cases) is either

P just

In the skeptical hypothesis

hypothesis described in Gettierized Case,

of perception, testimony, memory and method are not

SK

do not

of the skeptical story are the

no way guarantees the

described in Open-ended Case, perceptions as of a

each case,

that

e-relevant. Additionally, in each of these cases, the skeptical
hypothesis

disconnects E from P by making clear that E

happens

of scenarios

of these cases the skeptical hypothesis

e-relevant because the speakers in the context attend to

Attention,

Open-ended and Gettierized

not itself a possibility in which E but not P,

e-relevant a

mentioned - scenarios

same, but P happens

is

In

of truth. So

SK’s e-relevance,

wholly or

all

sorts

in

the Rule

partially defeated.

In

participants no longer presuppose the reliability of perceptions as of a

the Rule of Attention (via the possibility described) partially defeats the

Rule of Reliability (bam-like perceptions can’t be presumed

reliable but hand-like

perceptions can be presupposed reliable), participants can no longer (legitimately) ignore
the possibility that

bam. So,

in

is

exactly similar to the skeptical hypothesis except that there

Open-ended Case,

bams

no

the dropping of the presupposition about the reliability of

bam-like perceptions makes e-relevant possibilities
perceptions as of

is

in

which there

are unreliable visual

but not possibilities in which there are unreliable visual
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perceptions as of a hand. In Gettierized Case,

namely

possibilities in

which there

is

all

sorts

of possibilities become relevant -

a general, large-scale, lack of reliability
of

perception, testimony, and method of the sort brought
to attention by the specific
skeptical scenario described.

Some of these

possibilities

become

e-relevant because the

speakers and hearers focus on the possibility itself [type-(a)
defeat]; others become
ielevant because the skeptical scenario causes

reliability or

method

One

[type-(b) defeat].

them

to

drop a presupposition about

possibility that

becomes

relevant because the

Rule of Attention (via the possibility descnbed) wholly defeats the
Rule of Reliability and

Method,

is

the possibility in

which you

4

are a brain in a vat, but the vat

is

on the

So, as in typical skeptical cases, in Open-ended and Gettierized
Cases, there
relevant possibility in

which E but not

skeptical results follow again via

P.

The consequent of ENT

Argument

E.

is false,

With ENT, problem cases

is

2E

floor.’"

an

e-

is true,

and

are no longer

problematic; they get treated just like typical skeptical stories.

Again, unlike either underdetermination arguments or closure arguments,
explains

why examples

skeptical problem.

involving the problem of induction are a subclass, or type, of

One way

to generate skeptical results in induction cases is to

describe, or bring attention to, a scenario -a possibility

For example,

that

if

you claim

you don’t know

emeralds hidden

this

in the

ENT

to

know by

induction that

because there

New

is

some

Zealand bush.

In

all

as yet

-

in

which the inductive

emeradls are green,

unexamined

such a case, you

induction because you focus on a specific possibility in which

fails.

might claim

stash of purple

fail to

E

I

step

have knowledge by

but not P, and the Rule

24

Another possibility that becomes relevant because the presupposition of reliability is widely defeated
which you are a brain in a tub. So, in the context described in Gettierized Case, the

the possibility in
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is

of Attention makes that possibility e-relevant.
generated

when

possibilities in

particular story or scenario

someone knows
possibilities in

still

other cases, skeptical results are

which not-P become e-relevant without

mentioned

For example,

at all.

the sun will rise tomorrow,

I

lot

of

swan coloration

based on large sample
relevant possibility in

it,

in discussing

might make e-relevant a class of

at length, calling in

not.

Rather,

I

sizes.

In so doing,

which E

I

have created a context

(the subject has the

have attended

presupposing

that

past events

a reliable method.

is

that past

rise).

I

to or focussed

making inferences about

By

I

question the reliability of making inferences

in

same abundant

which there

is

an

e-

past sunrise

have made such a possibility e-relevant

not by giving a detailed “skeptical story” that explains how, exactly,

is

whether or not

does not entail anything about future experience. Perhaps

experiences) and not-P (the sun does not

P

there being any

which E but not-P by repeatedly mentioning or explaining

experience, even a

discuss

hi

on the

fact that

future events based

we

E could be

true while

are merely

on experience of similar

calling into question such a presupposition in a

context, the presupposition itself becomes a matter of attention and so can no longer

legitimately be presupposed irrelevant.

a class

of possibilities

earlier

when

not hold or

there

when

is

the presupposition

is

defeated in a context,

presumed not-e-relevant becomes e-relevant by

defeated rule (presupposition). Again,

either

When

a specific scenario

ENT

the

will yield skeptical results in induction cases

made

e-relevant in

which the induction

step does

a general presupposition (say, about the appropriateness of the sample

size or about the validity of the induction) gets called into question; otherwise,

subject also fails to

now

know

that there are vats.
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we

can

have knowledge by induction (via “proper”
presupposition). So,

accommodates problems about induction

this account, Lottery

Lewis account, the
there

to skeptical

know he

problems. As on

will lose the lottery because

an e-relevant possibility in which he has loads of
statistical evidence

is

-

-that he loses

made

does not

is false.

However, on

this account, the possibility that

by the Rule of Attention. Those who attend

which there

is

a fair lottery, namely, one in

which

E and

he wins

relevant because of the Rule of Resemblance, rather,
the possibility

relevant

25

are akin to Gettier problems (see

problems are akin

lottery ticket holder

nicely

as a subclass of skeptical problems.

While on Lewis’ account, Lottery problems
Lewis, p.557), on

ENT

is

P

yet

not

is

made

e-

to the Lottery case attend to a case in

there’s a winner.

So, in attending to

the lottery, speakers and hearers automatically attend to
the winning possibility. Since

discuss lottery cases

the right

way

at

length in the following chapter,

them - namely,

to treat

receives a unified treatment by

as another variety

I

here simply state what

of skeptical case

I

think

1

is

that, again,

ENT.
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In “Varieties

of Skepticism”, Vogel points

out:

our beliefs about the external world are justified by evidence, and the evidence for those beliefs
doesn’t entail [that is, entail with no restrictions] their truth, then the support for our beliefs about
If

the world

is

inductive.

If a general

skepticism about induction holds, then our beliefs about the

world don’t have the status of knowledge. Cartesian skepticism would follow from Humean
skepticism [skepticism about inductive justification or inductive knowledge] as a special case
(Vogel 21).
I

think that our having knowledge depends on our

justification

by induction,

Cartesian skepticism depend on some or

wholly)

So,

I

think that

making presuppositions - about the reliability of
- and that arguments for domestic

the reliability of perception, testimony, etc.

Humean

all

of those presuppositions being dropped (or defeated partially or

skepticism

is

a subclass of

what Vogel

skepticism, one that involves the defeat of a presupposition about

calls

domestic Cartesian

some aspect of induction. However,

if

it

knowledge somehow relies on
presuppositions about induction, then that will mean that all forms of skepticism are Humean. Either way,
my central point remains: Cartesian and Humean skepticism are of a kind; arguments for them are
turns out that all these other kinds of skepticism turn

structurally the

same and

on induction because

all

resolutions of those arguments ought to be essentially the same.
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ENT
preserves

its

elucidates the skeptical problem by
intuitive plausibility

making

precise an account of it that both

and generates skeptical

does not require the separate treatment of global and
local cases.
cases,

problem cases, induction cases, and

Argument

E,

ENT

possibilities in

lottery cases all in the

will generate skeptical conclusions

ENT

-

even future sun risings and

whenever there

very same skeptical argument.

ENT

is

at the heart

-

all

are e-relevant

vats,

dreamers

get treated as versions of the

the one general principle that can treat

skeptical problems equally and correctly;

one general principle

lotteries

handles typical

same way. Via

which E but not-P. Cars, zebras, bams, deceivers,

(veridical or not)

ENT

ENT

results appropriately.

unifies the skeptical problem.

all

It is

the

of the skeptical problem.

Before addressing the question of whether or not some version of contextualism
provides a solution to the skeptical problem,
the

it

problem of skepticism

is.

If

I

am

right that

best reflects the reasoning present in

whirlpool of skepticism

is

it

all

is

important to be clear about what exactly

ENT

together with the argument based on

skeptical stories, then one

some form of contextualism.
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key

to

escaping the

CHAPTER 3

THE PROBLEM WITH GETTIER
I

skeptical

the

have argued that a Lewis-style contextualism both

problem and solves

it.

Roughly speaking,

Lewis system when the Rule of Attention

identifies the source of the

skeptical problems are solved under

acts as a defeating

of Reliability, the Rule of Method, or the Rule of Conservatism.
hearers in a context focus

skeptical possibility

of Reliability

-

that

is

on a

mechanism

for the

If the speakers

Rule

and

skeptical scenario, the Rule of Attention requires that the

- under

relevant, thus defeating the operant presumption

such a possibility

is

a Rule

not relevant. If the speakers and hearers are in

an everyday context in which they do not attend to a skeptical scenario, the Rules of
Reliability,

Method, or Conservatism

properly ignored.

are

I

now

are not defeated

turn to Gettier problems.

and the skeptical

Roughly speaking,

possibility

Gettier problems

supposed to be solved under the Lewis system when the Rule of Resemblance

as a defeating

mechanism

for the

is

acts

Rule of Reliability, the Rule of Method, or the Rule of

Conservatism. According to Lewis, Gettier problems are solved because the Rule of

Resemblance requires the inclusion of

a world at

which P

is

false

and

that S’s evidence

can’t rule out. Consider again these central rules:

Rule of Resemblance

Then

if

“Suppose one

:

possibility saliently resembles another.

one of them may not properly be ignored, neither may the

other.”

(Lewis 556).

[W]e have a presumptive rule about what may properly
be ignored; and it is by means of this rule that we capture what is right

Rule of Reliability

:

“.

about causal or

.

.

reliabilist theories

of knowing. Consider processes

whereby information is transmitted to us: perception, memory, and
testimony. These processes are fairly reliable. Within limits, we are
entitled to take them for granted. We may properly presuppose that they
work without a glitch in the case under consideration. Defeasibly - very
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-

defeasibly!

a possibility in which they

fail

may

properly be

ignored. (Lewis 558).

Now, suppose

hill

S

that

a Gettier situation: S

is in

is

looking

behind which (unbeknownst to S) there happens

a sheep-shaped rock on a

at

2

to

be a sheep.

According

to

Lewis, the Rule of Resemblance requires the inclusion of the
sheep-shaped-rock-minus-

sheep possibility. The inclusion of this possibility defeats the Rule of
Reliability and since S can't ignore or rule out that possibility

Throughout

this chapter,

model, though the basic points
broadly. In the first section,

part

by examining

how the

resemblance unrestrained,

sort

I

-

solves the Gettier problem.

again take Lewis’ brand of contextualism as the

in the chapter, like those in

Chapter Two, apply more

discuss Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance in

I

rule

lest

is

not supposed to work;

it

is

some

detail, in

not supposed to unleash

whole-scale skepticism follows. Toward that end, some

of provisos on resemblance seem essential

Gettier problems without generating

in

any rule that successfully resolves

unwanted skeptical

Though Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance

results.

contains two provisos,

I

concentrate, in the

second section, on the second of Lewis’ provisos - salience. Stewart Cohen

in

“Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the

There are

also:

Rules of Method

:

“We

are entitled to presuppose

-

again, very defeasibly

representative; and that the best explanation of our evidence

is

-

that a

sample

is

the true explanation. (Lewis,

p.

558)

and

the Rule of Conservatism

“We

:

are permitted, defeasibly, to adopt the usual and mutually

expected presuppositions of those around us.” (Lewis 559).
For simplicity of discussion,

I

propose that these two rules above be subsumed under the Rule of

Reliability along the lines suggested
reliable processes

and by assuming

by Lewis - by counting the methods mentioned above as normally
behind our customary practices lies a normally reliable process

that

(Lewis 559).

A

version of this example

was

first

given by Roderick Chisholm
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(

d
Theory of Knowledge, 2" edn.,1977).

Lottery” argues that

defeating

is

it

mechanism

just this feature of the rule that causes

for the rule of Reliability.

Cohen

is right;

Rule ot Resemblance does not provide a satisfactory
solution
argue that

fails to

Mark

it

be an ineffective

to

as

it

stands, Lewis’

to Gettier problems.

provide a satisfactory solution to Gettier problems.
While Lewis’ proviso

cases that

it

it

should. Neither

In the third section,

for this rule

should not, Heller’s proviso does not admit knowledge
is

new

present a

I

match between the

the Rule of Special Similarity

proviso and rule. The defeating mechanism

-

it

contains a proviso

subject’s beliefs and circumstance.

is

rule can be incorporated into a Lewis-style contextualism, and, if

that

emerges does a better job of resolving Gettier

problems and

inherit the

its

I

The new

rule

-

a relative of Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance. So, the

new

In the fourth section,

in

a satisfactory proviso.

does not rely on a proviso involving salience. Rather,

that involves a

its

also

Heller’s salience-based boundary-specific proviso,
introduced in also

admits knowledge in cases

out

I

it is,

new view

the

cases.

defend the Rule of Special Similarity (ROSS) by pointing

promise. The

new

proviso

is reliabilist

in spirit,

and so

it

might

problems of traditional process Reliabilism. Reliabilism has often been

touted as a promising solution to the Gettier problem, but reliabilist views are also

plagued by a serious weakness - the generality problem, as shown by Earl Conee and

Rich Feldman
the generality

all

in

“The Generality Problem

problem

for Reliabilism”.

Although

that plagues traditional reliabilist views,

it

retains a

reliability-based views, namely, a remaining lack of clarity about

appropriately specified process

is

or

is

truth-conditions for reliability claims

ROSS

can avoid

weakness of

when an

not reliable. There not being an analysis of the

is

clearly a
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weakness

for a rule that relies

on the

truth-conditions of such claims, but since the truth (or
falsity) of appropriately specified
reliability

claims seems intuitively clear and since the problems
of specifying truth-

conditions are not (as

is

the generality problem) fundamentally intractable,
the

should not be rejected on these grounds. Furthermore, the
gets the right results in

many

new

rule

new

rule

shows promise;

Gettier cases, as well as other related cases.

it

ROSS may

well provide Lewis-style contextualists with a better approach to the
Gettier problem.

A
In order to

Proviso on Resemblance

how

understand

mechanism of defeat

for the

the Rule of

supposed

to

Required

Resemblance

Rule of Reliability,

does not work. The example below

is

it

is

helpful

one way

illustrates

in

is

supposed

first to

to

work

understand

which the

rule

is

as a

how

it

not

work:

Consider possibilities pi, p2, p3 .... And suppose the following: pi is actual; p2
and p3 resemble pi in the appropriate way; p4 resembles p3 in the appropriate

No

way, and p5 resembles p4.

By

the Rule of Actuality.

because pi
etc.

The

So,

rule is not

all

is.

And p4

is

other resemblances hold. Well, pi

is

relevant by

the Rule of Resemblance, p2 and p3 are relevant

relevant because p3

is,

and p5

is

relevant because p4

is,

of resemblances

in

the possibilities are relevant.

supposed

to

work by including

which each one resembles the

possibilities in a chain

next. Instead, the rule should only include that cluster of

possibilities that closely resembles a possibility that itself cannot be ignored for

independent reason. According
u

[w]e should say that

of rules other than

if

to

Lewis,

one

this rule

In the

to

may not properly be ignored in virtue
may the other. Else nothing could be

...[possibility]
,

then neither

properly ignored; because enough

anywhere

some

little

steps of resemblance can take us from

anywhere. )”(Lewis, 556).

example above, pi

is

relevant by the Rule of Actuality, and only p2, and p3 are

relevant by the Rule of Resemblance. But p4 and p5 get excluded because, although
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they resemble a relevant possibility

-

p3 and p4 respectively, those possibilities are

relevant only by the Rule of Resemblance. This

Resemblance
which

I

first

proviso in Lewis’ Rule of

essential for reining in resemblance.

is

introduce

later, retains this

proviso;

I

The Rule of Special

don’t discuss

it

further.

Similarity,

Instead, the

discussion centers on Lewis’ second proviso.

Lewis also explains a second way
supposed

Lewis

to

in

which the Rule of Resemblance

is

not

work. Consider the following:

We

are in an everyday situation in

E.

E

the

knowledge claim and the audience who hears

which S knows that P on the basis of evidence
surely a salient feature in that context because the speaker who makes

is

that claim are interested in the

subject’s evidence.

the actual world

actual

By the Rule of Actuality,
world and the BIV world resemble one

another exactly with respect to E,

and E

is salient,

so by the Rule of Resemblance, the

says, “Plainly, the

BIV world

Rule of Resemblance was never meant

resemblance!”(Lewis 556). The rule

is

supposed to apply

is

is

The

relevant

relevant.

to apply to this

to salient

resemblances other

than the subject’s evidence, otherwise the view would amount to an acceptance of
3

skepticism in

in order for

all

This feature of how the rule

contexts.

resemblance to turn

to relevance, another

is

not supposed to

kind of salience

essential in resolving Gettier situations. Consider the sheep

of Resemblance
there’s a sheep

is

sheep-shaped rock on

The reason

hill

it

—

again.

The Rule
that

because the possibility in which there’s a sheepless

hill

to

have the

result that the subject

does not

that

required -is

know

supposed

on the

example

is

work

with a

can’t be properly ignored or ruled out by the subject’s evidence.

that possibility can’t be ignored

is

that the actual possibility

is

relevant by

the Rule of Actuality, and the sheepless possibility saliently resembles actuality with
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respect to the sheep-shaped rock,
so by the Rule of Resemblance
the sheepless
possibility

relevant. Salience, properly
understood,

is

resemblance;

if

it

is

not

mere

evidential

were, unwanted skeptical results
would emerge, since, even

in

everyday circumstances, the
sheep-shaped-rock-minus-sheep possibility and
the actual
possibility resemble

one another exactly with respect

to the subject’s evidence.
So, there

must be an additional reason (other than
qua piece of evidence)
rock

is

salient (or there

that the

must be an additional resemblance (other than
the sheep-shaped

rock) between these two worlds). With
this bit of background about

supposed
Without

to

it,

work, the essential role of the salience proviso

it

in

how

the rule

is

not

Lewis’ rule emerges.

skeptical scenarios are always e-relevant
because they exactly resemble the

actual world with respect to evidence.

because

sheep-shaped

Some

proviso on resemblance

is

essential

allows a solution to the Gettier problem that keeps
full-blown skepticism

bay; for Lewis, that proviso

is

at

salience.

Faulty Provisos
Stewart Cohen

Gettier,

in

,

‘Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems;

and the Lottery”, concludes

that, as

it

stands, Lewis’ Rule of

Scepticism,

Resemblance does

not solve Gettier problems:

Because

ol the salience qualification, the

sensitive.

...

Rule of Resemblance is speakerThis means that features of the context of ascription - facts

concerning what resemblances are salient to the speaker (and hearers) - will
determine which possibilities can not, by this rule, be properly ignored. This
aspect of the Rule of Resemblance, I shall argue, leads to a serious difficulty for

Lewis’ treatment of the Gettier problem. (Cohen 1998a, 295).

3

That the rule applies

to salient features but not to the clearly salient feature

application of the Rule of Resemblance

ad

hoc. (See

Lewis 556-557).
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of evidence makes the

Cohen

s

point

is

Gettier cases in

that Lewis’ rule fails to act as an adequate
defeating

which both the subject and the speaker

a Gettier situation.

is

how the

is

that the subject

is in

rule fails,

it

d oes successfully resolve many standard Gettier cases

looking at a sheep-shaped rock on a

sheep.

who

F,

claims that S

is far

fails to

example above, the

behind

rule

in

one below:
S

In the

unaware

However, before reviewing Cohen’s account of why the

important to see

like the

are

mechanism

it

is

away from

know

it is

hill

behind which there happens

can see that S

that there’s a

possibility in

relevant because

S,

is

sheep on the

which there

Cohen suggests two

a sheep-shaped rock with a sheep

is

The Rule of Resemblance makes

the actual possibility.

when

subject-salient

when

sheep-shaped rock

is

that feature is

that feature

is

somehow

A feature

is

important to the subject. In the example above, the

situation.

Had S been aware of a sheep-shaped

situation.

Since in

all,

rock, S

Gettier examples the subject

situation, subject-salience is not the kind

Resemblance

A feature of a possibility is

important to the speaker.

not salient to the subject. After

all

some

interpretations of the appeal to ‘salience’ in the Rule of

Resemblance: speaker-salience and subject-salience.
speaker-salient

F

hill.

relevant any possibilities that saliently resemble possibilities that are relevant by

other rule.

to be a

in a Gettier situation.

is

the subject

would not be

is

in a Gettier

in a Gettier

unaware of being

in a Gettier

of salience that would allow the Rule of

to resolve Gettier problems.

So, in resolving Gettier problems the kind of

salience operant in the Rule of Resemblance must be speaker-salience (see Cohen,

1998a, 295). In the example above, the sheep-shaped rock

precisely because

F

is

is salient

for the speaker, F,

in a position to appreciate that S is in a Gettier situation.

Because

the sheep-shaped rock-minus-sheep possibility saliently (for F) resembles the actual
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possibility (in virtue of the rock), that possibility

Resemblance. So
sheep on the

hill

ignored and can

is

in this case, the correct results follow:

is

S fails to

know

there

is

a

because the sheep-shaped-rock-minus-sheep possibility
can’t be
t

be ruled out. The Rule of Resemblance ensures, via the
mechanism of

speaker-salient resemblance, that the possibility in

but no sheep

relevant by the Rule of

relevant, but the Rule of

which

there’s a sheep-shaped rock

Resemblance also preserves S’s knowledge

with respect to hands by ensuring that BlV-style possibilities are
not relevant because
they are not saliently similar to the actual world. The Rule of Resemblance
contains a

proviso

—

salience

—

that resolves

many

standard Gettier cases while keeping skeptical

results in check.

If all Gettier

examples were

like the

one above, perhaps Lewis would have

solved Gettier’ s problem. But Gettier examples are a widely varied

become more

clear in the final section of this chapter).

easily fail to be speaker-salient, as

Cohen shows

The

lot (as shall

relevant resemblance

may

in the following alternative version

of

the case above:

S

is

in the

same

Gettier situation, at the bottom of a hill looking at a sheepto be a sheep. A and B are also with S
Both A, B, and S think they are looking at a sheep

shaped rock behind which there happens
at the

bottom of the

hill.

rather than a sheep-shaped rock.
situation.

A

utters to B,

No

one involved recognizes he

“S knows there’s a sheep on the

shortened version of Cohen’s example (Cohen, 1998a, 297)

is in

hill”.

a Gettier

(This

any person in the context

there’s such a rock present (they

feature of their surroundings.

all

(S,

A or B).

think

is

it

Someone might
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a

).

Notice that in the very slightly modified example, the sheep-shaped rock feature

salient for

is

is

not

Since none in the context even believes

a sheep), none finds the rock an important

object that the rock

may

be salient for

someone de

re

-

as in, that thing-over-there-shaped-like-a-sheep

objection won’t do.

may

Under such a

well be salient, but

we have

seen, lest

salience at

work

all

it

salient only in virtue

of its status as evidence. As

contexts are skeptical ones, there must be

Rule of Resemblance

shaped rock feature of the actual world

is

which there

is

a sheepless

some

to apply.

additional sort of

Because the sheep-

neither subject-salient nor speaker-salient in

the relevant way, the Rule of Resemblance cannot be
used to
possibility in

important. But this

scenario, the thing-over-there-shaped-like-a-sheep

would be

in order for the

is

hill

make

relevant the

with sheep-shaped rock. Perhaps ‘salience’

might mean something other than speaker-salience or subject-salience?
Perhaps Cohen
overlooked some other, more objective, notion of salience?
‘salience’ roughly

amounts

to ‘importance’,

The speakers (and

that requires a subject.

possibilities for those to

whom

shown

that in the very slightly

knows

that there’s a

I

think

it

I

think not. Because

really is a psychological notion

hearers) and subjects

seem

a feature might be important. So,

I

to exhaust the

think that

modified example, the Lewis account has the

sheep on the

hill

even though S

is

in a Gettier situation.

Cohen has
result that S

Such a

4

result

is

unsatisfactory.

contextualism

-

Cohen’s example shows

in particular the

that as

it

stands, Lewis’ account of

Rule of Resemblance - does not give a satisfactory

solution to the Gettier problem. In a broad class of Gettier cases, the Rule of

Resemblance

fails to

having knowledge

defeat the Rule of Reliability, resulting in the Gettier subject’s

when he should

not.

As

a proviso on resemblance, then, salience

fails.

4

I’m not going to argue that
notes,

it

is

open

to

Lewis

this result is unsatisfactory;

I

think

it

is

obviously so. However, as Cohen

to claim that there really are different results in the different case, but
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I

think

Mark

Heller, in

Contextual ism and Anti-Luck Epistemology”
proposes an

alternative solution to Gettier problems:

Context, the evaluator’s context, selects a set of
relevant respects of similarity
[The relevant respects of similarity will include the
subject’s reasoning process
in

forming the belief and an environment

belief.

The

(125).]

actual world....

like the one in which he formed his
combines with that set to select a world

ordering around the actual world. The evaluator’s context
draws an approximate
boundary line between those worlds that are close enough to the
actual world to
be relevant and those that are too far away. (Heller 121).

According

to Heller, in

everyday situations and in Gettier cases, the evaluators (speakers

and hearers) determine two things
is

— they determine

that the relevant similarity ranking

similarity with respect to the believer’s evidence plus similarity with
respect to the

believer’s circumstance, and they determine that the boundary line for relevance
does

not extend very far from the actual world along that ranking. In everyday situations,

knowledge

is

preserved because the BlV-world

is

outside the e-relevance boundary set

by the interests/attentions of the speakers and hearers; the BlV-world

is,

though exactly

similar with respect to evidence, distal with respect to believer’s circumstance

(presuming the actual world

when

those involved

- the

is

not a BlV-world). BlV-worlds

subject or the speakers and hearers

become
-

e-relevant only

attend to the possibility

and, in so doing, extend the boundary line of relevance. But in the Gettier case,

knowledge

is

not preserved because the sheep-shaped-rock-minus-sheep-world, though

not necessarily salient

itself, is

within the e-relevance boundary set by the

interests/attentions of the speakers

world

is

exactly similar with respect to evidence and

circumstance

there are

and hearers; the sheep-shaped-rock-minus-sheep-

—

--

since the subject

is in

a Gettier

very similar with respect to the believer’s circumstance. Heller’s

good reasons

to reject this response.

Cohen gives some. (Cohen 1998a,
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298).

account, then, includes a boundary-specific proviso on
resemblance that
based. Possibilities

possibility),

become

is

salience-

relevant because of resemblance (to an already
relevant

even mere evidential resemblance, but only

if the

resembling possibility

lies

within a boundary set by the conversational participants on the
basis of salience.
Heller’s boundary-specific proviso seems to get Gettier cases right
while

warding off skeptical

results in

everyday situations.

keep skeptical results appropriately

in check.

However, Heller's account

Suppose

fails

that the topic of conversation

to

is

handedness, and the conversants take seriously the possibility that S might be a non-

handed Architeuthis (giant squid); they take
possibility

is

it

seriously, but they think that that

eliminated by S’s evidence. Possibilities in which S

is

a non-handed

Architeuthis are e-relevant but ruled out, since there are no (relevant) possibilities in

which E

is

true

and

in

which S

Architeuthis possibility

ranking.

know
is

means

is

a non-handed Architeuthis. But the inclusion of the

that the relevance

So on Heller’s account, even

that S has

hands (rather than

in

boundary

is distal

along the similarity

an everyday sort of conversation, S does not

tentacles).

Because the boundary

line for relevance

so distal along the similarity ranking, skeptical possibilities surely get included; a

world

in

which S

is

handless and dreaming

is

surely closer to the actual world with

respect to the subject’s evidence and circumstance than one in which S

is

a handless

6

Architeuthis.

On

Heller’s view, then, unwanted skeptical results infect the solution to

I’m just granting here that Heller’s two-part similarity requirement is unproblematic. See
Conee/Feldman for a discussion of why it might not be unproblematic (Conee/Feldman 23).
'

6
1

learned of this kind of objection in Jonathan Schaffer’s epistemology seminar. This sort of example

was discussed

as an objection to standards views.
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Gettier problems. Heller’s boundary-specific proviso

on resemblance

generate a successful solution to Gettier

fails to rein in

s

problem;

A New
To

rein in resemblance,

some

sort

it

also fails to

resemblance.

Rule

of proviso seems essential to any rule

that

includes possibilities as e-relevant based on similarity to an already included possibility.

However, neither Lewis’ salience proviso nor Heller’s boundary-specific proviso can
resolve Gettier cases while keeping unwanted skeptical results at bay.

reasonable interpretation of Lewis’ salience proviso,

to the subject’s

having knowledge

in Gettier cases

Heller’s boundary-specific-proviso leads, in

knowledge
which the

some

its

when he should

rule in

which the proviso

-

resemblance

is

new

needed - one

is

I

in

independent

propose a

is

an objective

a feature of the world that does not depend on the

rule, loosely speaking, the

it

depend on what

either

proviso on inclusion based on

a mis-match between the subject’s belief system and his circumstance in

an already e-relevant possibility.

ROSS

is

salient.

awareness or focus of either the speaker or the subject, nor does
takes to be salient. In the

cases,

The inclusion of

for the inclusion of additional possibilities

feature of an already included world

some

cases, to the subject’s not having

of what either the subject or the speakers and hearers take to be

new

not.

on the basis of similarity

trigger for inclusion of possibilities

any

inclusion leads, in

everyday situations when he should. So, a new proviso

in

On

I

call the revised rule the

Rule of Special

Similarity,

for short:

When

considering whether subject S knows that P in context

c,

the Rule of

Special Similarity applies:

Rule of Special Similarity
if

p

is

:

For any possibilities p and

relevant in c in virtue of

some

rule other than
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q,

and proposition Q,

ROSS

,

and

p

is

a possibility in which

Q

is a false belief or presupposition
that
figures prominently in the formation of S’s belief
that P,

then

if

q

is

appropriately similar to

p

-doxastically indiscernible

with respect to S, exactly similar to in that
p
Q is also false at
otherwise very similar to p with respect to S’s circumstance

-

e-relevant in c (that

ROSS

retains Lewis’ first proviso

is,

-

q cannot be ignored

ROSS. But ROSS does

to Gettier

problems

is

ROSS,

problem with Lewis’ salience proviso; because

that the subject

is

ROSS
in

way

that

ROSS

does not

feature of the subject’s

some

hearers, nor subject recognize

Like Heller’s account,

is

through

rule other than

of additional

in

ROSS,

is

minimally

that salience or attention (subject or speaker) affects

the inclusion of additional possibilities

in a salience

some

which neither the speakers,

contextualist, because the only

triggers the inclusion

ROSS,

has the result that the subject does not have knowledge

in a Gettier situation.

attended to possibility via

rule

a failure of a critical sort in the formation of S’s P-belief.

require the speakers, hearers, or subject to find

- even ones

some

salience, but under

is

Gettier cases

also

not retain Lewis’ second proviso: Under the Rule of

the crux of the solution

circumstance salient,

is

that additional possibilities get included as e-

Resemblance, the crux of the solution

then, avoids the

q

is

in c).

relevant only if the appropriate constraints apply to possibilities included
by

other than

fromp

and

q,

possibilities

initial

inclusion of a salient or

ROSS. But

unlike Heller’s view, what

on the basis of similarity

is

not inclusion

boundary. Rather, what triggers the inclusion of additional possibilities

an already included possibility, there

is

is

a false belief or an assumption that figures

prominently in the formation of the subject’s P-belief. ROSS, then, avoids the problems

of Heller’s boundary-specific proviso; because
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ROSS

does not require that

all

possibilities within a salience

boundary are relevant,

skeptical results infect everyday cases

As

- even cases

the discussion progresses, the details of

give a brief account of

how

new

the

discuss two Gettier cases. Since

I

ROSS

does not have the result

it

in

which the topic

is

should become more

that

outlandish.

clear, but first,

proviso works to resolve very basic Gettier cases.

think Gettier cases

come

in

two

strains,

I

I

I

discuss a

paradigm of each type:
Sheep: Consider again the standard Gettier situation involving sheep.
Does the
subject in that

example know

that there’s a sheep

on the

hill?

relevant by the Rule of Actuality. In the actual world, there

is

No. The actual world

a false belief that figures

prominently in the formation of the belief that there’s a sheep on the
reasons for believing that there’s a sheep on the

such a

belief,

which he might express

‘That thing right there
at

‘The thing

my visual

in

the subject

hill.

would

If

asked his

readily invoke

one of the following ways:

a sheep.’

is

‘I’m looking

in

hill,

is

it.’

field is a sheep.’

‘I’m perceiving a sheep.’
‘I’m seeing a sheep.’

The

subject looks at/perceives/sees a rock, not a sheep. Likewise, the thing right there-

the thing in the subject’s field of vision

rock-minus-sheep possibility

is

respect to S, and that possibility

-

is

a rock, not a sheep.

doxastically indiscernible from the actual world with

is

also very similar to the actual world with respect to

S’s circumstance (because of the sheep-shaped rock).

possibility

is

The sheep-shaped

exactly similar to the actual world in that

at/perceiving/seeing a sheep. So, by

ROSS,

And
it

is

finally, the sheepless

false that S

the sheepless possibility

subject in the Gettier sheep example does not
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know

that there’s a

is

is

looking

relevant.

sheep on the

The

hill

because there

which

is

an unelimmated (not ruled out), unignored
(relevant) possibility

that proposition is not true,

this case right,

and

in

subject in the sheep

does

know

so-doing

it

namely, the sheepless possibility.

ROSS

example does not know

that he has hands; although a

is

seems

to get

does not leave resemblance unrestrained. While
the
that there

BIV

is

possibility

a sheep on the

is

the subject

hill,

doxastically indiscernible

with respect to S’s evidence and with respect to the subject’s
not looking

BIV world

in

at a sheep, the

not otherwise very similar to the actual world with respect
to S’s

circumstance. While S

s false

belief at the actual world resolves this Gettier problem
by

triggering the inclusion of additional worlds, appropriate similarity
keeps resemblance.

and thus unwanted skeptical

results, in check.

7

Barns:

In this barn

example, unbeknownst

which there are both barn fa9ades and
subject

is

actual fake

bams, only mention of the

aware of it). The

earlier

Gettier problem.) In the

bam? No. Again,
false that figures

in front

is

in a land rife

example

is

is

with

prominently

is

is in

bam

always relevant.

structures.

In the

fa9ades, but no one mentions

is

not

-

it’s

it

a

that S is standing in front of a

And

again, there

is

formation of the belief that S

in this case, unlike in the

in

example, there are no

a skeptical problem; the latter

in the subject’s

an area

a different barn example

might be such

example above, does S know

the actual world

of a barn. But

fact that there

S

one mentions fake barns. The

in the previous chapter. In the earlier

present example, the subject

is

No

standing in front of a real barn. (Importantly, this

from the one considered

(or

real barns.

to the subject,

something

is

sheep case, the “something”

standing

is

a

7

This example comes from Alvin Goldman, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”

of Philosophy

73, 1976.
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in

The Journal

presupposition. Unlike the belief in the sheep case, the
subject might not have this

assumption “on his mind”, nor need
explicitly the particular false

there are

many

it

be the case that S would,

assumption he makes. As

if

asked, be able to state

in the case

with most

beliefs,

presuppositions that remain “in the background”. Nevertheless,
several

of those background assumptions

may

well figure prominently in the formation of the

subject’s P-belief. In the barn case, one of the assumptions that
figures prominently in
the formation of the subject s barn belief is false.

If
If

If

it

looks like a real bam,

The

barn indicating system

Each assumption
real barns,

is false;

of a fa9ade and not a barn

The

not.

is

barn, they are correct.

is reliable.

many of the bam

though they are

facades look/appear/are perceived just like

possibility in

which the subject

it

fa9ade possibility the assumption

is

exactly like the actual possibility in that

is false;

and

it is

possibility in

front

relevant.

which

It is

it is

of a barn. And, as

at the

otherwise very similar to the actual

possibility with respect to the believer’s circumstance.

is

standing in front

is

doxastically indiscernible from the actual possibility from

the point of view of the subject;

possibility

might be:

it is.

it appears to me to be a real bam, it is.
my perceptual mechanisms indicate a real

My

false proposition

So, by

ROSS,

the fa9ade

an e-relevant (unignored), not ruled out (uneliminated)
does not

false that P, so the subject

in the

know

that

sheep case and for similar reasons, S

he

in the

is

standing in

bam

case also

knows he has hands.
I’ve said that Gettier

problems come

in

two

strains.

Their coming in two strains

adds credence to the rule’s disjunctive nature. In Gettier cases of the
the sheep case

is

a paradigm, the subject would,
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if

asked,

list

first

kind, of which

the relevant false

proposition as one of his beliefs; the subject
the

first

is

aware of having

that belief. In cases of

type, the false belief is generally not about the reliability
of a process. In the

sheep case, the subject mistakenly identifies a rock as a sheep, but
one mistake does not
unreliability

On the

infallible.

is

make. The subject’s sheep-identification may

still

be reliable, just not

other hand, in Gettier cases of the second kind, of which the barn
case

a paradigm, the subject has the relevant false belief, but

it

is

a “background belief’

an assumption the subject makes (and would acknowledge having

would not necessarily

cite if

simply asked. That

but might not be aware of having

In cases

it.

is,

if

it

-

mentioned) but

is

the subject clearly holds the belief,

of the second type, the false assumption

8

does involve a

reliability claim.

The new
to resolve

ROSS

is

two

rule,

strains

ROSS,

not without problems, but

problems and

ROSS

I

think

and

all

its

I

think there

In the following section,

is

I

something right about
discuss

of the standard Gettier cases

case, each time

appears

results.

this

messiness and

approach

its

merits,

proviso on resemblance.

fall

within one paradigm or the other, but

a gradation of cases that begins in one paradigm and ends in the other.

Obviously, this case

its

it

promise. Each of these discussions should serve to further clarify

its

new

at first glance,

of Gettier cases without yielding unwanted skeptical

that deserves attention.

its

deserves further explanation, but

it

is

not hard to imagine

Start with the standard sheep case.

Add one more sheep-shaped rock. Continue describing the
When you’ve got a case in which there is a whole
sheep-shaped rocks, then you’ve got a case that now fits the other paradigm.

fits

the

first

paradigm.

add one more sheep-shaped rock.

village, say, filled with

Where does one kind of case start and the other stop? I don’t think it is clear, just as I don’t think that it
how many actual mistakes it takes to make a system unreliable. (Notice that counting
counterfactual mistakes would make sheep identification unreliable in even an everyday case, so don’t
think that’s the way to go.) It’s being unclear where one kind of case stops and the other kind starts does
not mean there are not two kinds of cases. Additionally, it should be clear that whichever kind a case is,

entirely clear

I

this disjunctive rule resolves

it.
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Its

Problems and

Messy: ‘Figures prominently
can make

I

it

a bit

more

in the

Promise

formation of

by distinguishing

clear, in part

by offering a rough account of what

Its

it is.

it

A belief -Q-

formation of subject S’s belief that P, even though

Q

is

downright fuzzy, but

from what

it

is

and

not,

might figure prominently

is

think

I

in part

in the

not justification for or evidence

9

for P.

Suppose

that

Q

is

that

my sense perception

taken a philosophy class, simply looks

a

is

reliable

at the tree in front

and

that S,

who

of her and comes

has never

to believe

S’s evidence includes her sense perception as of a tree;

it

does not

include a presupposition about the reliability of perception in general. S,

if

asked for

that that

's

justification

tree.

of her tree

about perceptual

belief,

reliability.

would

Though

offer her sense perception, not a presupposition

beliefs that are evidence or justification for

P

figure prominently in the formation of the belief that P, a belief or presupposition that

figures prominently in the formation of the belief that

P need not be evidence

for or

justification for P.

Loosely speaking, a belief or presupposition -Q- figures prominently
formation of S’s belief that P when,

identify those

S would,

if

presented with a

on the basis of which S came

would check Q.
P,

if

Q

list,

of propositions and asked

to believe that P, (an ideally rational)

In the tree example, while S

were on a

list

would

not, if asked, cite

recognize her reliance on

Q as

Q

might also be a belief

9

—

support for P. So,

in particular,

believe
For Lewis (1996, 553), S might have evidence E even though S does not
discussion.
further
for
account of evidence. See Chapter 5
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E.

to

S

Q as support for

figures prominently in the formation of S’s tree belief. In the tree example,

background presupposition. But

in the

I

Q

Q

is

Q
a

might be a

don’t accept this

belief that supports S’s justification for P. In
this case,
the formation of S’s belief that P, not because

presupposition, but because Q, though
still

is

Q

is

slightly

Q might figure prominently in

in the

background as a

removed from

directly justifying P,

occupies a significant place in the belief- forming chain that
results

While S’s justification supports P

directly,

in S’s P-belief.

Q may “figure prominently” by supporting

S’s justification. So, in the long belief-forming chain that

is

part of any belief-forming

process, temporal closeness generally (though not always) matters
and remoteness or

nearness along the chain generally matters. Presumably, such proximity
will be
reflected by S’s checking

are “close

So, if

Q

is

on the hypothetical

enough” and omit those

part of S’s evidence for P, if

forming chain for
Loosely put,

if in

P, then

Q

What

it

a hypothetical

means

Q justifies

in

forming

P

(for S), if

P, or if

Q

is

Q

is

that

distal.

a significant

“proximate” in S’s

belief-

figures prominently in the formation of S’s P-belief.

list

on which S’s P-belief depends, then
that P.

though supportive of P, are too

that,

“background presupposition” S holds

S will check those propositions

list;

of propositions, S would check

Q

Q

as a proposition

figures prominently in the formation of S’s belief

for a belief or presupposition to “figure prominently in the

formation of a subject’s belief that P” should

at least

now be

intuitively clear, although

the notion remains philosophically woolly.

Inherited Problems: In

many

Gettier examples,

I

claim that the relevant false

proposition that figures prominently in the subject’s formation of the belief that P

background presupposition about
spirit

and may

inherit

So,

reliability.

some of the problems

my

solution

is

decidedly

is

a

reliabilist in

inherent in traditional reliabilist accounts.
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The Generality Problem

In

argue that traditional (process)

-

the generality problem.

for Reliabilism,” Earl

reliabilist

Conee and Rich Feldman

accounts are subject to an intractable
problem

Conee and Feldman

characterize the central idea of process

reliabilism as follows:

A

belief

is

and only if it
(Conee/Feldman 1).

justified if

true beliefs

The generality problem begins with
formation, there

is

produced by a process that

is

the need for typing. For any

sequence

is

reliability

do not apply

types of which the particular sequence

is

is

that there are

which among the many process-types

is

seem

ROSS,

is

the one type that

production of the belief (Conee/Feldman

formation, would

sequence

many, many

different process

a token; these various process types vary

widely with respect to their status as reliable; and there

like

to a particular

claim must apply to a type of process of which that particular

a token. In brief, the problem

A principle

one instance of belief-

exactly one sequence of concrete events that leads
to the formation of

that belief, but since claims about reliability clearly

of events, the

reliably leads to

no principled way
is

to pick out

the “relevant type” in the

1-3).

centered around presumptions about reliability in belief-

to suffer

from the same problem. Consider an average, everyday

case in which, based on seeing a barn-shaped image, a subject forms the belief that
there’s a barn in the distance. That subject

the typing of a process,

we might

makes a presupposition about

b)
c)

d)

Like

variously characterize the subject’s presupposition

about reliability with any one of the following propositions:

a)

reliability.

My perception is reliable.
My visual system as a whole is reliable.
My perception of large-sized objects is reliable.
My perception of mid-sized buildings is reliable.
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e)
f)

g)

h)
i)

j)

k)

It

seems

My visual perception of barns and houses is reliable.
My barn-indicating system is reliable
My perception of bams is reliable.
My perception of barn-door handles is reliable.
My perception of bams every other day between 12 and 2 is
reliable
My perception of ‘/2 of the bam and V2 the house is reliable.
My perception of some bams and one house is reliable.

that the subject

might presuppose any of these propositions

However, these assumptions

belief.

and there seems no principled way

the subject s presupposition

is

in

forming his barn

are a widely varying lot with respect to
reliability

to

choose which of the many ways of characterizing

the relevant

way with

respect to reliability.

In

particular, the subject himselt will likely not be helpful in
identifying exactly

these presumptions as the proposition used in the formation of his

presuppositions are likely a blur of background

The

attend.

’

The

information to which he does not

problem

for process reliabilism.

Turning to ROSS, as long as none of the presuppositions
generality will not be a problem; according to

ROSS,

the issue of

is false,

the subject

is

free to

make

as

true presuppositions about reliability as he likes without triggering the addition of

newly e-relevant

possibilities.

true presuppositions.

seems

belief.

generality problem for presuppositions about reliability seems parallel to

the generality

many

bam

one of

to matter.

But

if

At no point does the theory require adjudication among

one or more of the presuppositions S makes

For example,

if the

(a) is false,

then

ROSS

because

sorts

of possibilities

all

is false, it

one and only fundamental presupposition

yields the result that the subject does not

know he

which perception

would

in

is

unreliable

is (a)

and

has hands,

get counted as

10

Essentially, the same arguments against ways of determining which is the relevant process
ways of determining which is the relevant assumption. (Conee/Feldman 4-24).
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also apply to

relevant, including worlds in

it

the

which S

is

handless and hallucinating.

one and only fundamental presupposition

the result that the subject retains his

possibilities in

generality because there

presuppositions.

Though

The

few reasonable

then

ROSS

the subject

reliability fails are e-relevant.

makes

is false,

seems no principled way

there

seems

to adjudicate

glance

ROSS

seems

to be a

yields

So

if

one or

problem of

between the possible

to inherit the generality

think with a better understanding of

I

(e) is false,

generality problem seems to remain.

at first

reliabilist cousin,

and

the other hand,

knowledge of hands and houses, since no

which hand/house perceptual

more of the presuppositions

is (e)

On

stipulations,

ROSS

ROSS

problem from

its

and the acceptance of a

can avoid the generality problem.

begin with a few reasonable stipulations and then return to a clarification of

I’ll

ROSS:
Claim

1:

Presuppositions about reliability are natural.'

Claim

2:

One

presupposition can subsume another. If one presupposition subsumes

another, then if S presupposes the former, S presupposes the

Claim

3:

A reliability presupposition that subsumes a false reliability assumption need
12

•

not itself be false;

Consider the

upstate

bam

New York

it

may

be either true or undetermined.

case, but this time let’s again suppose that the subject

in

which there

for the reasonable rejection

is

a preponderance of barn fagades.

of presuppositions

Feldman and Conee discuss naturalness and
problem

latter.

for reliabilists

it

fails,

though

it

Obviously, some account of naturalness

(i)

-

(k)

is

in

Claim

an area of

1

simply because they are non-

the generality problem.

As

a solution to the generality

can narrow the scope of the problem to some small degree.
is

needed, but obviously I’m not giving one here.

12
1

think

it is

probably undetermined

if

allows

“enough”

question of true vs. undetermined gets resolved

is

parts of

it

are false, but this

not relevant here, though

project of giving truth conditions for reliability claims.
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it

How the

is

another topic.

is

relevant to the general

natural; since in characterizing S’s belief
formation,

psychological process,

characterizations.

it

seems

we

in part characterize S’s

place a naturalness restriction on such

fair to

In the hypothetical

list

of propositions that S would mark as figuring

prominently in the formation of S’s P-belief, non-natural
propositions won’t appear.

One
another

is

pretty clear

when

way

that

one presupposition about

reliability

the former has a higher “level of generality”.
(Conee/Feldman’s term;

Conee/Feldman

8).

In the

above,

list

(a)

subsumes

(b) -(h), as well as

presuppositions, such as that

my bam door

again to the hypothetical

presented to S, according to Claim

list

indicating system

a presupposition that figures prominently in S’s

subsumed presuppositions
subject probably

makes

as well.

jots

So, in the

bam

bam

earlier that the subject

of presuppositions about

would

likely not

Claims

1

that

and

2,

belief, then

S checks off (a) as

S also presupposes the

reliability.

(Of course, remember

of e-relevant

possibilities).

is

forming his P-belief, but what

by using the subject’s picks from the hypothetical

we can

Returning

is reliable.

2, if

unlisted

I

be helpful in picking from the hypothetical

the one proposition that figures prominently

is

many

case under current consideration, the

that only those that are false will trigger the addition

seems clear

can subsume

generate the correct

list

list

said

list

now

together with

of propositions (beliefs and

presuppositions) that figure prominently in the formation of S’s P-belief.

Though
shortly,

(a)

and

I

I’ll

have more

here just want to

(f); (a)

subsumes

to say about the truth conditions for reliability claims

make

(f).

the point that

According

value need not be false. That (a)

is

true

Claim

Claim

3

is

pretty reasonable. Consider

even

if (f)’s

value

seems reasonable

in part

because the vast

to

3,

is false, (a)’s

majority of S’s perceptions do seem reliable; in the situation described, S’s visual
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perceptions as ot hands, cars, people, animals,

etc.

remain reliable as do

other types of perception including sound, touch, smell, and taste.
That

seems reasonable given S’s circumstance (S

Though

(a)

subsumes

even though

I

in a region

with

lots

of

(f) is false

also

of bam fa9ades).

undermined by the presence of fake barns

(a)’s truth is not

(f),

is

all sorts

(f)’s is.

now

return to a clarification of ROSS. Recall that the generality problem

occur for

ROSS

only

assumption among

many

as the one presupposition used by the subject. But no such

seems

to

selection

is

(the subject

now

required.

is

No

if,

like process reliabilism,

selection

assume

entitled to

include claims (a)-(e).

as

presupposes both

is

(a)

required

many

among

(f),

which

undetermined assumptions

earlier

Such presuppositions

require the selection of one of the

appeared to be the case. Every

world some subject,

and both presuppositions figure prominently

formation of S’s P-belief, then possibilities in which

possibilities in

true or

false should count. If in the actual

and

requires the selection of one

true ones as he likes).

Nor does ROSS

remaining false presuppositions, as
presupposition that

is

it

(f) is false

become

(a) is false

become

significantly relies

made

on any

e-relevant by

in the

e-relevant and

e-relevant (provided, of course, that these

possibilities are also otherwise appropriately similar to the actual world).

that if in a possibility

S, falsely

some

ROSS

claims

other rule, S, in forming the P-belief,

false belief, then other possibilities that are similar to the

already included world with respect to that false belief or presupposition also get added
as e-relevant (provided, of course, that they are otherwise appropriately similar).

result, the e-relevant set

of possibilities that

ROSS

a

generates will always be the more

inclusive set with respect to the false presuppositions. Despite
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As

initial

appearances, no

generality

seems

to

problem need occur

Even

if

problem from

ROSS

Plus, the resulting e-relevant possibility-set

which

bam

doors

its reliabilist

cousin.

“A

is

retained,

is not.

does not suffer from the generality problem,

against process reliabilism:

is

ROSS.

be just right in the barn case - knowledge of hands and
houses

while knowledge of bams and

specify

for

Conee and Feldman make

it

does inherit one

the following point

second necessary task for process

reliabilists is to

situations of a process type’s operation determine whether or not the
type

reliable”(Conee/Feldman

what a given process

3).

That

is reliable.

is,

the process reliabilist

The comparable point

for

must explain

ROSS

is this:

statistical

information affects truth,

about the truth or

falsity

of a

determining

in

etc.

reliability

reliableness.

its

(Notice that above,

I

assumption based on

Nor

it is

is it

basically just

intuition.)

of

there are no

clear truth conditions for reliability claims (presuppositions). For example,

which features of the process count

in virtue

not clear

how

clear

make claims

Though

truth

conditions for reliability claims are not clear, there are several areas in which progress

can be made:

1)

Circumstance matters. The truth-value of a claim about
with the subject’s circumstance. For instance,

if

reliability

may

vary

an amateur birder finds

himself in the North America and not near a large body of water, then he

can truly presuppose that
Eagle. But

if that

assumption

is

same

no longer

if

he sees a large white-headed

birder strays toward a large
true;

he

may be

fail to

an

body of water,

that

seeing an osprey. Or, a process

that is generally reliable (say, identifying a barn

may

bird, it’s

by

its

visual appearance)

be locally reliable (say, because the local presence of lots of

barn fa9ades undermines the

reliability

Truth-values for presuppositions about

of that process in that
reliability

area).

vary across locales or

situations; the process is reliable “here” but not “there” or “generally”

but not “locally”. But

Greenwich, can
until

it

how

far

“out”

is

“here”

(if

barn-perception

fails in

be truthfully assumed reliable again by Darien or not

Massachusetts)?

And when does

local failure

undermine a more

generalized reliability presupposition (how does barn-perception failure
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3

locally affect the truth of presuppositions
about
plain perception) in general?

bam

perception (or just

Size

matters (statistically speaking). Statistics are
important in
determining the truth conditions for reliability. In
order for it to be true
that a process is generally reliable, there
must in general be a statistically
very high correlation of the (actual) predicted
outcome to the (actual)
presence of that outcome. But how highly correlated do
the results need
to be? Clearly not 100%. I think that one or
two “incorrect” results do

2)

not

make

a generally reliable process unreliable. For example,
long-distance vision of sheep is working well in general,
but

if

my

I once
mistake a sheep-shaped rock for a sheep, then I think that my
sheep
identifying process remains reliable. However, if I find
myself in an area
riddled with sheep-shaped rocks, then that process is no
longer locally
leliable (perhaps because the process theoretical
underpinnings are no
longer true or perhaps because counterfactual statistical results
somehow
1

become
results

So the question remains, how many “incorrect”
take to undermine the reliability of a process locally?

relevant).

does

Generally?

it

And how -if at

—do

counterfactual results get counted?
Process matters. The nature of the process itself is important in
determining its reliability. Very good statistical results are necessary but

3)

all

As Conee and Feldman mention, a good
account of reliability will not “render irrelevant the details of the process
not sufficient for reliability.

intervening between an input and a resulting output” (Conee/Feldman
1 5).
The nature of the process counts, lest repeated instances of “dumb

luck” amount to a reliable process.

A reliable process might be reliable in

virtue of having the appropriate sort of underlying causal

mechanism

or

For example, determining the time by looking at a clock is a
reliable process only if (in general) the time-telling mechanisms on
theory.

And

clocks work.

identifying sheep or

bams by

a

list

of visual

reliable only if (in general) those criteria only apply to sheep or

criteria is

bams

So a process that is generally reliable might be locally
unreliable even though there is 100% statistical correlation between
prediction and outcome if there is a local “breakdown” in an underlying
causal mechanism or theory that is critical to the reliability of the
process. But what features of the mechanism, precisely, are the ones that
(respectively).

count?

With each area

in

which some

clarification can be

made, much more

clarification

is

needed; the truth conditions for reliability claims remain somewhat opaque.

13

Adding counterfactual
result that our

results as a condition

common, everyday,

identifying process

is

perception

unreliable because

it

is

on

is

reliability strikes

unreliable.

If,

me

in the

as a sure

counterfactually true that S can’t
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way toward

getting the

sheep case, the subject’s sheeptell

a sheep

from

a sheep-

Nevertheless,

I

hope the points above make two things

(reliability) is not a

on intuition

bankrupt” or “empty” one,

so,

clear:

while

at

This very useful notion

we

present

will

in determining the truth-conditions for reliability
claims, the

have

to rely

problem of

producing appropriate truth conditions for such claims does not seem
entirely
intractable.

ve argued that

I

problem

for

seems

that

clear.

if

ROSS. And

to

Claims 1-3 are accepted, the generality problem
I’ve indicated that the notion of reliability

is

is

a useful notion

have some clear meaning, though an account of that meaning

Unlike the generality problem, resolving the truth conditions

not a

is far

from

for reliability

does

14

not

seem

intractable.

The problems ROSS

inherits

from

its reliabilist

cousin are

problematic, not damning.

It’s

Claiming

that

ROSS

doesn’t have severe problems

adoption. However, illustrating

how ROSS

such an argument. I’ve already said that

bam
that

Promise
is

hardly an argument for

can solve a wide array of Gettier problems

ROSS

does not yield unwanted skeptical results

which the topic

is

in

to

And

I’ve already said

everyday cases even those

outlandish, such as whether or not the subject

shaped rock, then the same seems

is

resolves the basic sheep case and the

facade case without generating whole-scale skeptical results.

ROSS

its

hold for a doxastically similar subject

knows he

who

is

is

in

not an

not in a Gettier

situation.
14

what I’ve just said about ROSS’s avoidance of the generality problem and the hope
You needn’t reject ROSS. A) Virtually anytime particular
intentions) can be multiply typed and a choice of type must be made, some relative of the

Suppose you
of giving

reject

a satisfying

tokens (acts,

account of reliability.

problem occurs. Generality -type problems abound in philosophy and are often ignored. B)
Whatever problems there are with the notion of reliability, Lewis already has them. Obviously the Rule of
Reliability makes use of assumptions about reliability. So, ROSS doesn’t worsen that problem.

generality
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Auhiteuthis.

doing,

11

I

now

illustrate

assume a basic

I

how ROSS

resolves a range of Gettier cases. In so

familiarity with the cases themselves.

15

Clocks:
the correct time

The

-

subject looks at a broken clock,

5:00.

Does

the subject

know what

resolved in either of two ways; whether this case

is

which happens

time

it

It

in the actual world, the subject has a false belief,

works. Alternatively,

it

might be that

might have a false presupposition that
matters). Either

way, a

like the

No. This case can be

a Sheep-type case or a Barn-type

case depends on the subject’s actual belief forming process.

Sheep case,

is?

Bam case,

might be

that like the

namely, that the clock

in the actual world, the subject

this clock is reliable (it’s not

because process

false belief or presupposition figures prominently in the

formation of the belief that the time
inclusion of similar worlds in

which the clock

which

is

5:00. This false belief/presupposition triggers the

that belief/presupposition is also false.

world

in

and

uneliminated by the subject’s evidence, the subject does not

is

to be stopped at

is

broken but stopped

at

5:20

is

Because a

included in the e-relevant set

know

that the time

is

5:00.
16

Coins:

In the first of Gettier’s original cases, Smith has a false belief that

figures prominently in the formation of his belief, namely, that Jones will get the job

and that Jones has

ten coins in his pocket.

The

actual possibility

Rule of Actuality. Because in the actual possibility Smith has a
prominently in his belief that the

'

The

original clock

example

is

man who

is

,

e-relevant by the

false belief that figures

will get the job has ten coins in his pocket,

Bertrand Russell’s.

It

appears

in

Human Knowledge:

Its

Scope and

Limits, 1948.
16

Both

this

and the following case are from Gettier’s

“Is Justified

121-123).
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True Belief Knowledge?” ( Analysis 23,

additional possibilities

become

relevant. In particular, the possibility
in

gets the job but has five coins in his pocket

becomes

e-relevant;

it is

which Smith

a possibility that

is

similar to the actual possibility in that ‘Jones
will get the job, and Jones has ten
coins in
his pocket

is

false at

both worlds,

with respect to Smith, and

it

is

it is

doxastically indiscernible from the actual world

otherwise very similar to actuality (only the number
of

coins in Smith’s pocket changes). So, Smith does not
the job has ten coins in his pocket because there

is

know

that the

man who

an e-relevant possibility that

ruled out by Smith’s evidence and in which the proposition

not

in the actual

namely, that Jones owns a Ford. That belief figures

prominently in his belief that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown
This makes relevant a possibility in which Jones does not
in Brest-Litovsk.

is

is false.

Fords: In the second of Gettier’s original cases, Smith, the subject
possibility, has a false belief,

will get

Such a world,

call

it

q, is e-relevant

own

is in

Brest-Litovsk.

a Ford and

Brown

is

because the actual possibility

not

is e-

relevant by the Rule of Actuality, and in that possibility Smith has a false belief that
figures prominently in the formation of his belief that either Jones

Brown

is

in Brest-Litovsk

and because q

the false belief (in both possibilities

it

is

is

is

Jones owns a Ford), q

is in

Brest-Litovsk because there

is

is

doxastically

otherwise very similar to the actual world

(only Brown’s location changes). So, Smith does not

Brown

a Ford or

similar to the actual world with respect to

false that

indiscernible with respect to Smith, and q

owns

know

that Jones

owns a Ford or

an e-relevant (unignored) possibility that

not ruled out by Smith’s evidence and in which that proposition
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is false.

is

Hallucinogens:

Lewis views

this case as a Gettier

problem.

He

gives the

following description of and resolution of the problem:

Sometimes, though, the possibility of hallucination is not properly ignored; for
sometimes we really do hallucinate. The Rule of Reliability may be defeated by

Or it may be defeated by the Rules of Actuality and of
Resemblance working together, in a Gettier problem: if I am not hallucinating,
but unbeknownst to me I live in a world where people mostly do hallucinate and
I myself have only narrowly escaped, then the uneliminated
possibility of

the Rule of Actuality.

hallucination

First,

it

is

unclear

too close to actuality to be properly ignored. (Lewis 558).

is

how

the Rule of Resemblance could consistently yield this result. If

both speakers and subject are

aware

that

anyone

is

hallucinating.

The

the resemblance salient.

breakdown

in the

sheep example.

members of the

the subject nor the speakers

salience proviso on the Rule of

Lewis solution

ROSS

So neither

hallucination world, then none of them

in this case, just as

it

eliminates this problem, while

would

is

find

Resemblance can cause a

can in Cohen’s version of the

still

leaving open this Lewis-style

account of and resolution to the hallucination case:

Unbeknownst

to the subject, he lives in a

world where everyone else hallucinates

wildly. In the subject’s actual world, visual perception in general

is

not reliable.

So even though the subject does not hallucinate, the Rule of Special Similarity
guarantees that he
that rule

makes

is

not entitled to presuppose that visual perception

relevant a possibility in which

is reliable;

the subject’s visual perception

is

just like that of the rest of his world-mates.

This

way of looking

at the

seems

case makes

me

about this case.

It

the subject does

know things

to

there

it

is

a barn-type case.

another

I

am

way of looking

via perception. After

all,

his

own

not sure what

at

it

17

The

original version of the hallucination case

is

this

think

according to which

perception works

perfectly well and in the customary way. Plus, unlike the barn case there

about his world or his surroundings that undermines

I

is

nothing

method. So, on the other way

from Lewis, “Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic
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8

of looking

at the

problem,

can accommodate this

Unbeknownst

it is

not a Gettier problem.

way of looking

at the

The Rule of Special

example as

Similarity

well:

to the subject, he lives in a

world where everyone else hallucinates
wildly. In the subject's actual world, visual
perception in general is not normally
broadly reliable. However, the subject’s own visual
perceptual system is
normally and currently fully reliable. Though others in his
world have no
knowledge, the subject does. Since in the subject’s actual world
his

system

is

met. So the possibility in which he, too,

On

this

own

visual

perfectly reliable, condition (b) in the Rule of Special
Similarity

way of looking

at the case, the subject

is

not

8

hallucinating

is

is

not relevant.'

(and only the subject) knows the usual

things via visual perception.

Since

I

have conflicting intuitions about

the Rule of Special Similarity that

it

this case,

I

think

it

is

an advantage of

can accommodate both intuitions about

this case.

Lotteries: Lewis treats lottery problems like Gettier problems; both are

resolved by the Rule of Resemblance:

the Rule of Resemblance that explains

why you do not know that you will
no matter what the odds are against you and no matter how sure
you should therefore be that you will lose. For every ticket, there is a possibility
that it will win. These possibilities are saliently similar to one another: so either
It is

lose the lottery,

one of them may properly be ignored, or else none may. But one of them may
not properly be ignored: the one that actually obtains. (Lewis 557).

The Rule of Resemblance does seem

to resolve the lottery case above.

ROSS, on

the

other hand, cannot resolve lottery problems; in the actual possibility (and in other

already e-relevant possibilities) there

no

is

false belief or

assumption that acts as a

trigger for the inclusion of additional possibilities (specifically the

win”).

Is this

a disadvantage of

ROSS?

I

think not.

The reason

I

one

in

which “you

don’t think

it

is

a

Vision,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58, 1980.
1

Remember

that in this

way of looking

possibilities involving hallucination.

at the case,

But

|f

we

those

in the

world are not attending to any

here in our world attend to
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it,

then

we

can’t attribute

disadvantage

is that,

like

Cohen,

I

don’t think lottery cases are a special
variety of

9

Gettier problem.'

Stewart Cohen has this to say:

“...I will take issue

assimilation of the Gettier problem to the lottery
problem.

problem
Since

I

is

same

ilk as skeptical

problems,

failure to resolve lottery cases not as a
disadvantage but as

more

argue that the lottery

of a piece with scepticism, not the Gettier problem”
(Cohen 1998a, 292)

think lottery cases are of the

I

...I

with ...[Lewis’]

I

count ROSS’s

an advantage.

think the Rule of Attention resolves lottery cases
and does so in a

satisfactory than the resolution offered

Janet buys a ticket in a

numbers

lottery.

way

that is

by Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance. Suppose

Then Janet focuses on

the lottery

-

a set of

possible outcomes of number distribution. If Janet buys a lottery
ticket, Janet ipso facto

focuses on the possibility that she will win; she focuses on

number outcomes {qua ways
Janet).

I

the lottery

say that Janet does not

know

may

it

go, not necessarily

who

no chance of winning, but they can’t ignore

that

is

to the subject because

a different case.

It

Similar remarks apply to

becomes

we

They may think Janet has

this possibility

the lottery as a set of possible outcomes, one of which

knowledge

ticket for

discuss Janet’s lottery knowledge. Such speakers and hearers

are talking about a lottery, a set of possible outcomes.

virtually

qua winning

set

she will lose because in focussing on or attending

to the lottery, she attends to the possibility that she will win.

speakers and hearers

qua a member of a

is

when

they consider

that Janet wins.

are attending to the possibility that he might be hallucinating, but

a skeptical case, not a Gettier case.

19
I

don’t give an argument for this claim. However,

I

think that one

mark of a

subject relies on a false belief or presupposition in forming S’s P-belief, and
lottery cases

do

this.
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I

Gettier case

is

that the

don’t think the subjects

in

Nor

is

the solution to the poor Bill version of the lottery
problem

lost.

Assimilating lottery problems with skeptical problems rather
than Gettier problems

allows what Lewis says about the poor Bill case to remain basically

intact:

- He squanders all his spare cash on the pokies, the races,
and the
be a wage slave all his days. We know he’ll never be rich. ...When

Pity poor Bill!
lottery. He’ll

we

are

the

many

busy pitying poor
possibilities

Bill for his habits

was not so

mentioned the possibility

and not his luck, the resemblance of

salient.... Afterward,

switched the context.

I

might win, wherefore

that Bill

that possibility

I

was no

longer properly ignored. (Lewis 565).

It is

the salience proviso in Lewis’ original Rule of Resemblance allows

plausible results in the poor Bill case, and

it is

know

Bill will

not on the lottery. (They

behavior.)

If,

So
resolution

far,

I

first,

the speakers

be poor; they focus on Bill’s irresponsible financial behavior,

may mention

but not attend to this feature of Bill’s financial

however, they focus on the

that Bill will be poor.

to get

just this feature of the case that allows

roughly the same solution to emerge using the Rule of Attention. At

and hearers

him

(Cohen makes

the

lottery

behavior

itself,

then they don’t

same point (Cohen 1998a,

know

298)).

both Lewis’ resolution, using the Rule of Resemblance, and the

favor, using the Rule of Attention,

seem on a

basic lottery cases and poor-Bill-type lottery cases. But

the latter approach.

I

par.

That

is,

think there

is

they both resolve

an advantage

to

Solving basic lottery problems with the Rule of Resemblance

generates a problem for our knowledge of many statistical laws, such as the Second

of Thermodynamics, which

we commonly

take ourselves to know.

following application of the Rule of Resemblance

to the basic Lottery case (see the

is

Notice that the

parallel to Lewis’ application of

beginning of this section):
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Law

it

Consider an array of molecular arrangements. Each
is saliently similar to the
If one can't be ignored, neither can the
rest. One of those possibilities
is
the one in which entropy is reversed,
violating the Second Law of
Thermodynamics. So, since that possibility can’t be ignored
and is not ruled
out, we don t know that law to be true-- ever.
(Just as we never know we’ll lose
other.

the Lottery.)

Resolving lottery problems by appeal to a resemblance rule generates
problems for

knowledge of other propositions

that

we

routinely claim to

know

despite there being a

negligible (and appropriately similar) statistical possibility to the
contrary. Resolving
lottery

we

problems with the Rule of Attention does not generate such problems; as long
as

don’t focus on the “aberrant possibility,” our knowledge

cases, the participants always attend to the

the (fair

the

and potentially winnable)

winning

possibility.

winning possibility

lottery itself, but in

Comparably,

is intact.

poor

In basic lottery

in virtue

Bill cases

of attending

no one attends

in a cases involving statistical laws, if

we do

focus on the statistically unlikely possibility, our knowledge remains intact, but
really

do focus on the “aberrant

statistical nature,

or that

then

we do

some quantum-based
So, while

ROSS

possibility,” perhaps

not

know that,

effect

fails to

cases should not be resolved as

by carefully attending

if

to

not

we

to the law’s

for instance, entropy will never be reversed

won’t appear

in the

macroscopic world.

resolve lottery cases, this

if

to

is

not a disadvantage; lottery

they were Gettier problems. Instead, lottery problems

should be treated like skeptical problems and resolved with the Rule of Attention.

Restricted Skeptical Cases with Gettier Twists

Similarity

(ROSS)

also ensures the failure of the relevant

skeptical cases with Gettier twists. Recall the

Phil

1

:

knowledge claims

example of the

10 students to suppose that they might be in a vat that
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The Rule of Special

instructor

sits

on a

in all

who

table.

tells

the

The student

at the

back of the room claims that he retains some knowledge of the
external world,

namely

that there are vats

and

tables.

case; the student does not have

knowledge of vats and

general

is reliable,

general

is

making

e-relevant

If the case is artificially

possibility

made

fails to

in

in

of possibilities in which perception

which the student

which the vat

is

is

on the

have knowledge of vats and

relevant by the Rule of Attention, there

a

BIT

is

table

tables.

in

(brain in a

is

restricted

- ROSS

In the one

a whole-scale breakdown of

of perception, memory, and testimony; nearly every presupposition about

reliability the subject

of Attention,

which there

makes

ROSS makes

is

is false.

Because

is

this possibility is e-relevant

Specifically,

makes

it

envatted, tabled world with respect to the whole-scale

there are vats or tables, even

is

somehow

when

the context

in

is

similar to the

breakdown of reliable systems.

example described, the Rule of Attention and the Rule of Special

together ensure that the entubbed, pedestal possibility

- ones

relevant a possibility in

entubbed and on a pedestal because that possibility

speakers and hearers

by the Rule

e-relevant a vast array of other similar possibilities

unreliability of all sorts.

which the student

know

tables in this context because the

modified (say by stipulation) so that attention

one envatted possibility - one

guarantees that the student

reliability

all sorts

unreliable, such as the possibility in

to exactly

In the

Rule of Attention resolves the

of the example cause the student to stop presupposing that his perception

details

tub).

In such a case, the

is

is

Similarity

relevant, so the student does not

such that the focus of the

artificially restricted.

Conclusion
In this chapter,

I

don’t claim to have solved the Gettier problem; that would be

philosophically naive. Instead,

I

claim to have produced a rule -
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ROSS - that,

though

not without problems,

correctly.

At

shows promise

in that

it

seems

heart, this rule is not contextualist.

can affect the outcome of the rule (because the

to resolve

That

many

Gettier cases

though conversational context

is,

“initial” set

of e-relevant worlds can be

affected by the attentions of speakers and hearers), that
effect seldom matters. At heart,
the rule

is reliabilist,

since the solution centrally depends on the inclusion
of

possibilities as e-relevant

based on similarity with respect

to the believer’s belief-

forming circumstance, regardless of conversational context.
itself,

ROSS’s

not being, by

primarily contextualist needn’t be challenging to the overall project
of producing

a contextualist epistemology. Instead, contextualists can

embrace

lends itself to incorporation into an epistemology that

overall, centrally contextualist

and because a contextualist epistemology

comes

to resolving Gettier’ s

is,

that includes

problem.
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ROSS

ROSS

because

will fare better

it

when

it

CHAPTER 4
THE WAYS OF CONTEXT
If

contextualism

is true,

then the truth of knowledge claims

is

context

dependent. Perhaps the most compelling objections
against contextualism are based on
the claim that the context

dependence of knowledge claims

is

somehow

problematic.

For instance, some claim that the context dependence
of knowledge claims

is

problematic because “know” does not behave like a well-behaved
indexical. Others
object that the contextualist’ s brand of context dependence
of knowledge claims

generates an unnecessarily unparsimonious or unintuitive semantics
because the
linguistic

phenomena

that contextualism

is

supposed to explain can be explained

without adopting the contextualist’ s semantics. But not

And

not

with a capital ‘C’.

To

indexicalist.

all

all

contextualist views are

ways of contextualizing knowledge claims

are Contextualist,

better understand the class of views that might appropriately be

called ‘Contextualist’ as well as to understand the class of objections to

loosely speaking be called ‘linguistic-based’,

ways of contextualizing.

In particular,

it is

it is

them

that

might

necessary to understand the different

important to understand

of contextualizing yield significantly different epistemologies. In
offer such an explanation, as well as a suggestion for the best

how

different

this chapter,

way of capturing

I

ways

try to

context’s

role in epistemological claims.

In

the

“On

Quantifier

Domain

Restriction”, Jason Stanley and Z.G.

phenomenon of quantifier domain

restriction.

Theirs

is

context contributes to interpretation’^ Stanley/Szabo 219).

Szabo discuss

a discussion about

It is

“how

a discussion about

context figures into the process of determining what a speaker meant by making a
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“how

linguistic

occurrence on a particular occasion”
(Stanley/Szabo 219). This, too,

discussion about

how context
linguistic

how

context contributes to interpretation.

figures into the process of determining

It,

is

a

too, is a discussion about

what a speaker meant by making

a

occurrence on a particular occasion. But rather
than quantifier domain

restriction, this is a discussion

knowledge claims.
three different

ways

ways

divide the

“On

In

about

how context
Domain

Quantifier

that context

contributes to the interpretation of

Restriction,” Stanley and

can contributes

More

to interpretation.

that context contributes to interpretation into
three

the point in the interpretation process at

the roles of context

which context plays

Szabo

identify

carefully, they

main types based on
Their division of

its role.

apt and equally useful for the present discussion, so the
present

is

discussion about knowledge claims follows the Stanley-Szabo
discussion about
quantifier

domain

restriction in

making use of this

division.

The

three roles of context

are as follows:

Grammatical:

What

is

articulated

+ context = what

is

uttered

Semantic:

What

is

uttered

+

meaning + context = what

linguistic

is

said

Pragmatic:

What

is

said

+ context = what

is

communicated. '(Stanley/Szabo 228-230).

Loosely speaking, one might think of what
expressed, and what

Throughout

is

this chapter,

I

communicated

- structured

propositions - appear

after a that-clause.

clarity, these

if

articulated,

what

is

uttered,

and words - appear

in single quotes;

I

all

the

I

use ‘S’ or

examples

’

nothing

I

I

is

said

‘s’

for the subject

-

of the knowledge claim,

consider these are the same. Again, ‘S’

use ‘p and q for possibilities. Though propositions

say assumes

are

and what

clarity, 1 sometimes italicize propositions or offset them
use ‘P’ and ‘Q’ for propositions, though sometimes, for

used as a variable for the purported knower, never as a variable for the speaker.
’

-

which

For

they were numbered).

appear as lower-case, unitalicized.

I

is

as items in a staged linguistic process, in

lexical items

not the subject of the sentence, though in

the speaker.

what

use the following conventions: articulations - strings of sounds

underlined; utterances

within the text (as

is

‘

this.
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may be

sets

I

use

is

‘x’ as a variable for

of possible worlds,

each item

is

one of these

associated with a different stage in the
process.
roles, there is

some

When

context plays any

early stage in the linguistic process
in

which

there

is

an

item that does not fully determine the item
associated with the next stage. In each
of its
roles, context

provides a means of fixing, or determining,
which of the items associated

with the next stage gets uttered, said, or
communicated. The three different roles reflect
the three central points in the process at

Each of these three basic

which context can enter the

picture.

roles that context can play reflects a different
general

approach to handling the interpretation of knowledge claims.
Consider the following
2

conversation:

Hannah and her husband are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They
plan to stop
bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. But as they drive
past the

at the

bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often
are on Friday
afternoons. Thinking that it isn’t very important that their paychecks
are deposited

away, Hannah says, “I know the bank will be open tomorrow morning.”
But
then Hannah’s husband reminds her that a very important bill comes due
on
right

Monday, and that they have to have enough money in their account to cover it. He
says, “Banks do change their hours. Are you certain that’s not what is going
to
happen tomorrow?” Hannah concedes, uttering “I guess I don’t really know that the
bank will be open tomorrow.” (Stanley 3).
Since the conversation above

knowledge ought
by taking

it

to

is

perfectly natural,

accommodate

seriously.

I

here

it

seems reasonable

that a theory of

the linguistic evidence provided by the conversation

mean ‘accommodate’

theory accommodates the conversation

when

it

in the

provides

following broad sense - a

some kind of theoretical

explanation of the coherence of the conversation. Theoretical explanations that

accommodate
basic kinds.

the evidence provided by the conversation above can be divided into three

Each type of accommodating explanation

Stanley attributes this example to Keith DeRose.
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features context in

some kind of

prominent explanatory

role,

however, the level

at

which context enters the

picture

is

significantly different in each of the three sorts of
explanations. Contextualists claim
that context plays a

knowledge claims
that context s

semantic role

in the interpretation

like those in the

bank case but

grammatical or pragmatic role

claims like those in the bank case. If those

accommodated

successfully be

one

role or

the

bank case

is

a

mark

how one might accommodate

pragmatic

who

think that the bank case can

by an account

either

role,

central role

and then

I

discuss

of this discussion

in favor

the

how

is to

is

that

it

is

its

that features context’s grammatical

wrong, then their

inability to

of the Contextualist approach. So,

first

I

bank case using context’s grammatical or

Contextualists

accommodate

the bank case.

The

get a better understanding of the details of the

Contextualist position with respect to semantics

semantic role to

knowledge claims. Others claim

the key to interpretation of knowledge

that features context’s pragmatic role are

accommodate
discuss

is

all

of knowledge claims- not only

grammatical and pragmatic

—

in part

by comparing context’s

roles, but a

by-product of the discussion

yields favorable results for the Contextualist.

Grammatical:

When

context plays

its

grammatical

either a lexical or a structural ambiguity in

(unarticulated) lexical items.

When

role,

what

it

is

may

disambiguate (by resolving

articulated), or

it

may

supply missing

a person articulates a sequence or pattern of

sounds, that phonological expression usually picks out exactly one grammatical
3

expression, a sentence with a fully determinate syntactic structure.

sometimes the sequence of sounds

articulated alone
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However,

might not be sufficient

to pick out

4
the sentence the utterer
expresses

complete, and thereby

The

first sort

fix,

In such cases, context
serves to disambiguate
or

which sentence (which grammatical
sentence)

of grammatical role context

may have

is

is

uttered.

to disambiguate an

ambiguity of grammatical structure.
Consider the following articulation
(example
appears in Stanley/Szabo 227):
Visiting friends can be annoying

The grammatical

.

structure of this articulation

ambiguous; the underlined

is

articulation

might pick out one of two different utterances.
For a given occasion of articulation,
context plays the role of determining which
grammatical structure
oi context in

the

is

uttered.

The

role

disambiguating grammatical structure has no
relevance to accommodating

bank case above, since there

is

no

structural

ambiguity of this sort present

in either

of the relevant articulations.

The second

sort ot

grammatical role context can have

is

to

disambiguate lexical

ambiguity, and this sort of grammatical role does provide
one method of

accommodating

the linguistic evidence in the bank case. Consider
the following

articulation:

Hannah knows
Notice that

item

-

bank.

two very

the bank

B ank

is

It’s

some

one uncontroversially lexically ambiguous

a sequence of sounds (or a spelling) that might be used to pick out

Chris Potts points out that ambiguity
is

open.

this articulation contains

different lexical items

discussion, there

is

—

one, ’bankl’,

in natural

whose

language

is

referent

is

a financial institution,

pervasive. Right. But throughout this

idealization of the language assumed.

easier to discuss phonological examples, but the

same points apply

words/sentences.
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to graphically identical

and the other, ‘bank2’, whose referent
grammatical

role,

it

uttered. In the

is

When

river.

- together with

serves to determine

grammatical expression

by the

is

bank

is to

similarly,

above

is

assume

to

claim that

that

accommodate

know

Hannah twice

Hannah knows

the

is

the linguistic evidence in the

articulates the following

bank

is

open.

the

bank

earlier time, before the bill gets

Hannah

articulates

know

is

however, what gets uttered

is

not

bill

conversation

-

call

it

bank

two

strings

of sounds:

know

‘know

is

that in

picks out a different lexical item,

articulated,

know,

is

the same,

despite appearances to the contrary, each of

On

this

method of accommodating

the

the lexical ambiguity theory-- the articulations above contain a

ambiguous item, know and context serves
,

is

to determine,

part of the utterance

on

on a given occasion

that occasion.

lexical ambiguity theory does not provide a successful

case.

it

—

of articulation, which lexical item

the

bank conversation

becomes important, context determines

true proposition.

Hannah’s utterances expresses a

The

of

mentioned, context determines that in what

‘know 4376’. On both occasions, what

lexically

role

open.

the later phonologically identical articulation

it

The

(the sound) picks out a particular lexical item, call

3798’. But at the later time, after the

call

later.

similarly lexically ambiguous. For discussion, let’s

Hannah does not know
At the

and not the

makes

pick out, on a given occasion of utterance, the correct lexical item. So

one way

to

the articulation itself—which

case, for example, the context

clear that the utterance contains the former lexical item

context

context plays this kind of

First, if

know

is

lexically

ambiguous,
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its

ambiguity

accommodation of

is

rampant. That

is,

know

if

is

lexically

ambiguous,

ambiguous between just a few
with

know

it

does not seem plausible to claim that

lexical items.

Assuming

that

it is

merely

each lexical item associated

corresponds to exactly one relevancy region of logical space, positing only a

few fixed relevancy regions could not account wide variation

in relevancy conditions

necessary to accommodate

if

ambiguity
In order to

is

all

make

lexical provisions for the

would have

this

Second,

know ’s

many

all

is

implausible.

wide variety of relevancy conditions

reasonable occurrences of know the lexical ambiguity
,

it is

one

implausible to claim that a typical language learner

distinct lexical items associated with just

method of accommodating

A third

lexical

to posit lots of distinct lexical items associated with the

phonological item. Since

masters that

.

rampant, the lexical ambiguity method of accommodation

necessary to accommodate

theorist

occurrences of know

the

bank case

is

one phonological sound,

not successful.

grammatical role that context can play

is

to supply

missing lexical parts

of the articulation, and this sort of contextual role provides the basis for yet another
grammatical-style method of accommodating the bank case. Consider the following
conversational situation (example appears in Stanley/Szabo 232):

Mary: “Jim plays chess on Sundays.”
Helen:

“Max

does too.”

The sounds Helen makes alone - Max does too - do not determine what she

utters;

but unarticulated.
context supplies missing lexical items that are covertly present

5

Throughout

Hannah had
open”. Having an

this chapter, I’ll discuss the case as if

and then “Hannah does not know the bank

is

matters.
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said

“Hannah knows

the

bank

is

open

indexical as the subject just contuses

1

Helen

s

articulation

on

that occasion

amounts

to the following utterance, in

which

missing lexical items ‘plays chess on Sundays’
are supplied by the context:

‘Max

Had Helen

plays chess on Sundays.’

articulated those

circumstances (say,

when

have uttered something

same sounds - Max does too - under

the conversational topic

different. In the

one

string of

tennis on Saturday), she

sounds (one unambiguous phonological
that,

the

same phonological

is

structure),

on different occasions of articulation,

covertly present but unarticulated. So similarly, in the bank case,
one
the conversation

way

to claim that different utterances are associated with

structure because context supplies different covertly present but

of sounds, Hannah knows the bank

yields, together

with context, something

is

The second
latter

The

first

open, articulated on the earlier occasion,

like the

following utterance:

‘Hannah knows the bank has normal open hours
Sundays.

are

to

unarticulated lexical items in the earlier and latter occasions of articulation.
series

to

associated with several different lexical

is

context can supply different lexical items

accommodate

would

example above, context does not serve

disambiguate one phonological item that
items. Rather, for

is

different contextual

that include Saturdays rather than

’

series

of sounds, Hannah does not know the bank

is

open

,

articulated

on the

occasion, yields, together with context, something like the following very different

utterance:

‘Hannah knows the bank has

its

normal open hours rather than new hours

.’

Despite appearances to the contrary, each articulation, together with context, picks out

an utterance that expresses a true proposition.

conversation

-

call

it

On

this

method of accommodating

the missing lexical items approach
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- contextual

the

variation, via

missing lexical items, explains

why

each articulation in the conversation
seems

acceptable.

The missing
accommodation

lexical items

in the

bank

approach does not provide a successful
This approach requires that

case.

when

a string of

phonological items occurs on a given occasion (and so
in a fixed context), the utterance
associated with that articulation

is

fully determinate.

That

is,

an articulation plus

context yields exactly one grammatical sentence, exactly
one structured array of
linguistic items.

In the

bank

case, as with virtually

assertions, such a requirement

utterances that

is

implausible.

seem equally good candidates

Hannah makes on

all

cases involving knowledge

Consider just a few of the many
for association with the articulation

the earlier occasion:

‘Hannah knows the bank has opening times on only one day of the weekend, and
that day is not Sunday.’

‘Hannah knows the bank

is

open on the day

after Friday, but not

on the day before

Saturday.’

That there

is

a one-one correspondence between the phonological structure articulated in

a particular context and a determinate lexical structure, while plausible in the chess
case,

is

implausible in the bank case.

None of the

three grammatical

method of accommodating

the

bank

ways of contextualizing provides

case.

I

a successful

don’t think any epistemologist actually

thinks that context’s grammatical role explains the linguistic evidence in the bank case.

However,

in attempting to construct a

accommodate

the

bank

case,

I

map

of how one might use context to

would be remiss
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in omitting these

ways of

comextuaHzing. Additionally,
discuss, on. In particular,

I

,

hope

hope that the present dtscussion
wi.l inform the
it

will result in a better
understanding

epistemological Contextualist’s
claim about what

semantic

is

- and what

is

not

later

of the

- context's

role.

Pragmatic:

According

to the

pragmatic approach, what

is

said (i.e„ the proposition

expressed) might communicate
different propositions on
different occasions.
Alternatively put, what

context

is

needed

to

is

the proposition expressed

s

to

determine what gets

proposition. Generally, context
plays a pragmatic role
is

obviously

false.

Consider the following proposition

is

not going to die.

suppose that Johnny has just gotten a small
scrape on his knee and

proposition above
S jnith

is

which

in turn

is

when

Stanley/Szabo 235; originally from K. Bach
1994, 134);

in

Johnny Smith
Let

what gets communicated;

supply the “missing pieces” needed

communicated by a given

(example appears

said alone does not determine

what

his

mother

says. Notice that

what she

that the

articulates,

Johnny

not going to die, determines exactly one
grammatical structure (utterance),

determines exactly one proposition (what

is said),

so in the case described,

context plays neither a grammatical nor a semantic
role. In the case described, the
proposition the mother expresses

however, seems

to

be something

communicated, namely,

that

is

obviously

true.

Context’s role

Johnny Smith

scrape. (Notice that the role here

is

false.

isn’t

What
is

gets

communicated,

to pick out the true proposition

going to die from his recent knee

significantly different

from context’s grammatical

6

Obviously “John knows P and Jim does too”

is

a

knowledge assertion
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in

which the “Jim knows P”

part

many

role; there are

proposition.)

Had

circumstances,

Smith

isn't

it

utterances

(many grammatical

structures) that pick out that

same

the original proposition above
been expressed under different

might have communicated a different
proposition,

say, that

Johnny

going to die from his recent heart attack.
So again, Johnny’s mother’s

articulation fully determines a grammatical
structure uttered that in turn fully determines

a proposition expressed, but the proposition
expressed alone does not fully determine

which proposition gets communicated.
Similarly, the pragmatic approach to an
that

one ot the propositions expressed -

knows

the

bank

is

open, or the

On one

is fully

At the

earlier time

proposition that

when Hannah

is false.

in the

says “I

The proposition

evidence does not eliminate

all

is

is

not.

One

bank case goes something

know

the

false

bank

is

bank

is

open

”,

version of

like this:

she expresses a

because (loosely) Hannah’s

which the bank is closed.
making an obviously false

the possibilities in

participants in the conversation, recognizing that

the

determined but,

without contextual considerations, the proposition communicated

accommodation

Hannah

or the other occasions on which

made, the proposition expressed

the pragmatic approach to

bank case claims

Hannah does not know

latter proposition, that

>

is

in the

either the earlier proposition, that

°P en communicates some other proposition.
the relevant utterance

accommodation

The

assertion violates a Gricean norm,

employ context to determine which true
proposition she communicates. What Hannah actually communicates is not the
false proposition she expresses but some other proposition, namely, the proposition
that if the bank has not changed its regular hours, she knows that the bank is open.
Another version of the pragmatic solution
roughly like

At the

later

time

when Hannah
is false.

Hannah’s evidence

is

accommodation

in the

bank case might go

this:

a proposition that

plausibly

to

at the

says “I do not know the bank is open”, she expresses
The proposition is false because (loosely) just as
earlier time was sufficient for it to be true that she knew

supplied by context’s grammatical role.
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bank was open, so that very same evidence remains
sufficient
Hannah’ s evidential state has not changed, so neither does

the

at the later time;

the truth of the

knows the bank is open. The participants in the conversation,
recognizing that making an obviously false assertion
violates a Gricean norm,
employ context to determine which true proposition the husband
communicates.
proposition that she

What Hannah actually communicates is not the false proposition she
expresses but
some other proposition, namely, the proposition that although Hannah
knows the
bank

is

open, she

is

really

The two versions employ

concerned about getting the check deposited

essentially the

same

strategy for

accommodation

in the bank.

in the

bank

7

case.

Let’s call this the basic pragmatic approach.

The basic pragmatic approach

to

accommodation seems implausible.

It

requires

that the participants in the conversation readily recognize as false either the
earlier or the

later

proposition expressed by Hannah. Accepting the basic pragmatic approach also

means

make

that very

many of the

claims (propositions) about knowledge

we commonly

(express) are false. Stanley has this to say about the pragmatic approach to

quantifier

domain

restriction, but

I

think

it

is

equally apt in the present case of context

dependence:

The obvious disadvantage is that one has to abandon ordinary intuitions concerning
the truth or falsity of most [in this case many] sentences containing ...[‘know’].
This is worrisome because accounting for our ordinary judgments about the truthconditions of various sentences

is

the central

aim of semantics. Since these

judgements are the data of semantic theorizing, we should be careful with proposals
that suggest a radical revision of these judgements. (Stanley/Szabo 240).

At
case.

I

this point,

I

turn to yet another

introduce an approach that

Relevant Alternatives Theory

seem

to

is

means of accommodating cases

non-contextualist;

(NCRAT).

Initially, the

it

bank

the non-contextualist

discussion of

be a complete divergence from the present topic
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is

like the

— ways

NCRAT might

that

accommodate

the

bank case by using context’s
pragmatic
initially

appears to be. While

use of context,

it

will,

I

role.

But

it

is

not the complete divergence

NCRAT may accommodate the bank

claim, need to

it

case without making

employ some version of a pragmatic
use of

context to explain cases that are
virtually parallel to the bank
case. So, the same serious

disadvantage that plagues the basic
pragmatic approach also plagues

removed,

its

cousin once

NCRAT.

To begin

the apparent divergence, consider
the following version of a

NCRAT:

[knows] = , ha, relation

R such that R (<x,w,t,p>) if and only if
(1) p is true a, w and
x
believes
(2)
that p at w and t, and
(3) x has ruled out the p-alternatives that are
relevant for x at
and t (where x,w,t,p are variables for
persons, worlds, times and
propositions respectively). (This formulation
is Stanley’s; it appeared
in an
,

w

Ve

0f

earlier

T

n

Llng “ lstic Basis

for

Contextualism,” pp.40-41, that Stanley gave
at, m°oo
the -0CL University of Massachusetts
conference Contextualism in Epistemology
and Beyond. In it, ‘x’ is used for the subject of the
knowledge claim - the purported
knower, in the discussion that follows, I follow my
convention of using ’s' as the
variable for the subject - the purported
knower. Keep in mind that no variable
applies to the speaker on this view, because no
aspect of the circumstances of

utterance

is

relevant.)

In Contextualist relevant alternatives theories,
the context

in

of use plays a semantic

helping to determine the semantic content of ‘know’ relative
to context. That

role,

is,

on

the Contextualist account, the circumstances of the
speakers and hearers help determine

e-relevancy, but not on non-contextualist relevant alternatives theories.
In contrast to
the Contextualist position, for

NCRAT,

the

word ‘know’

is

invariant;

it

has the same

semantic content with respect to every context, namely the knowledge relation specified
above. Utterances containing the word ‘know’

may have

respect to different circumstances of evaluation,

different truth-values with

e.g., at different possibilities

or times,

case that one of the propositions expressed must be false. There might be some other
why the proposition expressed is not the proposition communicated, but if both of
the knowledge propositions are true and no other explanation is given, this is problematic.
It

isn’t the

Gricean-style reason
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because the facts about which alternatives are
relevant for the putative knower

differ in

these different circumstances.

now the bank

So,

that

bank

hours

is

is

open,’'

At the

case.

earlier time,

when Hannah

Hannah’s circumstances are such

says

that the bank’s

“Hannah knows

having changed

its

not a relevant p-alternative, but at the later time, Hannah’s
circumstances are

such that

it

is

a relevant p-alternative. Equivalently,

earlier time, that the

bank

is

open>

<Hannah, the actual world, the
earlier version

is

in the extension

later time, that the

actual world, the

of the knowledge-relation, but

bank

is

open>

is

not. (See Stanley’s

of “On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism”, 41.)

accommodates the bank case without appeal

NCRAT,
case in the

<Hannah, the

NCRAT thus

to context.

however, can not accommodate the following

slightly different

bank

same way:

Hannah and her husband are on the phone on a Friday afternoon. Hannah plans to
stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. But as she drives past
the bank, Hannah notices that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on
Friday afternoons. Hannah mentions this to her husband on the phone. Suddenly,
she loses her cell-phone connection. At home, Hannah’s husband realizes that a

very important

money
isn’t

in their

comes due on Monday, and that they have
account to cover it. While Hannah says to her
bill

to

have enough

friend in the car, “It

very important that our paychecks are deposited right away”, her husband says

home, “Banks do change their hours. How can we be certain that’s
going to happen tomorrow?” As Hannah’s husband says, “I guess

to his friend at

not what

is

Hannah doesn’t

really

simultaneously, says,

know that the bank will be open tomorrow,” Hannah,
“I know the bank will be open tomorrow morning.”

Notice that the original bank case and the one above are virtually the same case.

sort

of accommodation of the case above seems reasonable, particularly since the story

just presented seems, like the earlier version, perfectly acceptable, but

and can not accommodate the
that

Some

it

accommodates

slightly altered version of the

bank case

the original bank case. Unlike Contextualists,
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NCRAT does not
in the

same way

NCRAT can’t

claim that the explanation

lies in the

context of utterance;

NCRAT can’t claim that the

reason both Hannah’s utterance and her
husband’s both seem acceptable

is

that the

gEeaker

s

atten tions, beliefs, etc. differ.

knower

s

circumstances count toward determining the relevant
alternatives. In the case

above, according to

°Pen>

is

According

to

NCRAT,

NCRAT the quadruple <Hannah, the actual

either in the extension of the

knowledge

relation or

only the purported

world,

it is

not.

t,

that the

Since there

exactly one purported knower, world, time, and
proposition involved, there

one (determinate) quadruple (exactly one proposition expressed);

either

expresses a false proposition or her husband does. The only
reasonable
to

accommodate such a case

is to

is

bank

is

is

exactly

Hannah

way

for

NCRAT

appeal to the pragmatic role of context. Either

Hannah or her husband (depending on which version of the pragmatic approach you
pick) expresses a false proposition but communicates

determined proposition, which

is true.

some

other contextually

The pragmatic approach

to

accommodation

that

NCRAT must employ in the slightly altered version of the bank case is essentially the
same approach
Accepting

as the pragmatic approach to

NCRAT,

accommodation but which

such a view

NCRAT + pragmatics.

think

in the original

bank

case.

then, involves also accepting the pragmatic approach to those cases

that deserve

I

accommodation

NCRAT

NCRAT alone cannot accommodate.

has two significant drawbacks.

cases in a parallel manner. According to

NCRAT,

it is

First,

it

I’ll

call

cannot handle parallel

not conversational context that

determines the relevant alternatives; instead, the relevant alternatives are determined by
the proposition P, together with the purported knower’ s circumstance in a world and at

a time.

Keeping the

distinction in mind, there are a
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few minimal requirements about

the

conditions under which a P-altemative
there can be

knowledge

no change

in the p-alternatives without a

relation just

the purported

knower,

“relevant for

is

is

an ordered

set

w is the world,

t

w at t” for NCRAT.

s in

change

in

s,

w, or

t,

First

since the

with the following form: <s,w,t,p> where

is

the time, and p

is

the proposition. That

s is

is,

the

p-alternatives are not included in the ordered quadruple,
precisely because they are fully

determined by the members of that

set.

Second, the p-alternatives on the non-

contextualist version can’t change just because the focus of
the speakers and hearers

changes; otherwise the view might just amount to Contextualism.
With these

requirements in mind, consider the features in the bank cases that make
them
In both, the purported

knower

whose evidence remains
both cases, there

is

in

fixed.

both the earlier and the

latter

utterances

The world does not change, nor does

a change in focus; in both cases

it

seems

not in the revised bank case

latter utterance,

is

accommodation

time. In the original

bank

Hannah,

the proposition. In

that a possibility

relevant to the evaluation of a knowledge ascription that earlier

feature of the theory that allows theoretical

is

was

not.

in the original

case, there

parallel.

is

becomes

So, the only

bank case but

an earlier and a

but in the revised case the utterances are simultaneous. In the original

bank case, the subject changes her focus - she considers a scenario under which the

bank has changed

its

normal hours, but

in the revised

bank case the speaker changes

focus - he considers a scenario under which the bank has changed

the original case, theoretical

change
option

in focus

is

accommodation can be made by

can be “pinned”

to a

change

in time.

open. Focus of speakers and hearers

knowledge ascriptions on

this account.

is

But

normal hours. In

NCRAT because the

in the revised case,

no such

not relevant to the evaluation of

One might deny wholesale
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its

his

that

mere changes

in

focus are epistemically relevant, but

seems odd

it

to

claim that changes in subject-focus

are epistemically relevant to determining
the truth value of a

changes

in

cases,

is

it

speaker/hearer focus are not. Given the parallel
nature of the two bank
a disadvantage that the theory

must accommodate them

ways - one via a non-contextualist theory and

The second drawback
pragmatic approach.

amounts

to

If

is that

more

of the “story” - Hannah’s friend

true,

something

the other via context’s pragmatic role.

inherits the

limited

problems of its close cousin the

number of cases. Namely,

the

false proposition as false.

when you

who

in the car

consider those

who

That

true.

hear only one side

(presumably) thinks Hannah has just

that he

NCRAT + pragmatics also requires that many (though not as

many) of the claims about knowledge
it

more

this is

and Hannah’s husband’s friend who (presumably) thinks

like its close cousin,

different

requires the implausible claim that the participants in

still

problematic becomes strikingly clear

just said

it

bank case readily recognize the

something

two very

NCRAT retains the serious problems of the basic

NCRAT + pragmatics, and

limited pragmatic approach

the revised

it

NCRAT accommodates the revised bank case, then NCRAT

basic pragmatic approach, just in a

said

knowledge claim while

that

we

routinely

make

are false.

And, again just

also prevents us from taking our intuitive judgments seriously
g

about the truth-value of propositions in a range of cases.

8

Even

if

NCRAT does not accommodate the revised bank case by offering some pragmatic-style

explanation of how both speakers communicate something true,

it still

yields the result that either

Hannah

or her husband utters something false even though the participants have a strong intuition that both

speakers have “said” something true. So even without the pragmatic addition,

NCRAT requires that we

give up our intuitive judgments about the truth-value of propositions in a range of cases, and has the
result that

many of the

does not accommodate
friend or the

claims about knowledge that
the

husband and

bank case,

his friend

—

it

is

we

make are false. Additionally, if NCRAT
why the participants - either Hannah and her

routinely

obliged to explain

readily accept as true a proposition that
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is

false.

Neither the basic pragmatic approach nor
a successful

accommodation of both

Furthermore,

if

accommodate
amounts

to

no view

its

cousin

NCRAT + pragmatics offers

bank case and the revised bank

that features context’s

bank case (and

the

the

its

case.

grammatical or pragmatic role can

relatives) without significant problems, this

an argument in favor of Contextualism - the group of views that claims

context plays a semantic role in determining which proposition gets expressed by a

given knowledge ascription.

Semantic
Recall the schematic for context’s semantic role: what

expressed.

structure

When

is fully

context plays

its

semantic

fills in

Consider two examples (they appear

‘I

On

said

+ context = what

sentence or grammatical (lexical)

in

the covertly present but missing parts.

Stanley/Szabo 233):

is tali’

go to the beach often’

each occasion of utterance, the grammatical sentence

the proposition expressed

comparison

class,

and

is not.

is

completely determined, but

In the first case, context provides the relevant

in the second,

it

provides the relevant subject.

occasions of utterance, these sentences express different propositions.

that

accommodates the bank case by claiming

role Contextualist, with a capital ‘C’.

that

it

is

9

This differs from Schaffer’s terminology.

On
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I

different

call

is

s

any view
semantic

the linguistic evidence

one of the goals of

mine, Contrastivism

not.

On

resolved by context

Accommodating

provided by conversations like the bank conversation

is

is

determined, but that one lexical structure does not fully determine

exactly one item expressed; context

‘John

role, the

is

is

a form of Contextualism; on his

it

Contextualism in epistemology. To the extent that other ways of accommodating
these
cases are not successful, this accommodation becomes an argument in favor
of this

approach.

But Contextualism comes

up only

in the

metalanguage or

grammatical sentence.

on the

the logical form;

On

it

in

many

forms.

The contextual parameter can show

can be covertly present as a parameter in the

the former kind of view, there

later there

is

no contextual parameter

in

Different versions of Contextualism claim that the

is.

contextual parameter (metalinguistic or not) gets “filled” by different kinds of things
degrees, tracking points, or sets of possible worlds.

Contextualism

“filled”

in

is

if attention is restricted to

a non-metalinguistic contextual parameter that gets

by possible worlds, differences remain; the word ‘know’ might be an indexical

whose meaning
the

which there

And even

-

is

partly contextually determined so that the

open parameter

is

part of

Kaplanesque character of the word ‘know’, or there may be a more independent

parameter, filled by the pragmatic mechanism of saturation.

of these views (or kinds of views)
each claims that accommodation

is

Contextualist.

in the

bank case

However, these views are

significantly different.

how

works

the contextualization

in the

is

On my

Each view
due

And

is

terminology, each

Contextualist because

to context’s semantic role.

in these views, differences in

semantics translate into real and significant

differences in epistemology.

Standards, Tracking points, or Possible Worlds
For the moment,

I

the logical form. Instead,

logical

form

that are

open

leave the question of exactly

I

how

a contextual element enters

turn to a discussion of what, exactly,

to

be

filled

by context.
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fills

the slots in the

Standards:

Cohen (1999)

Stewart

gives the following account of the truth
conditions for

knowledge claims:
1

S knows P' is true in c iff P is true, S believes that P,
and S’ s evidence meets the
standard operant in c for sufficient justification for P.

Leaving aside the other particulars of this account, one feature
of a view of this
blank

that the

left

by context

determines what standard

is

is filled

is

made.

On

by a contextually determined standard. Context

operant in

evidence meets the standard that

is

(Mark Heller (1999)

c.

S has sufficient justification for P only

if

S’s

operant in the context in which the knowledge claim

Cohen-style views, what

justification.

style is

shifts

from context

to context is a standard for

also proposes a standards style view.)

Tracking points:
Keith DeRose (DeRose 1995) gives the following account of the truth conditions
for

knowledge claims:
S knows P

by

On

is

true in c iff

P

is

true

and S can track P’s truth

to a point

determined

c.

a DeRose-style view, context supplies points in logical space through which S must

track (roughly, accurately predict) the truth of P.

Sets of possible worlds:

David Lewis (1996) gives the following account of the

truth conditions for

knowledge claims:
‘S

knows

P’

is

true in c iff S’s evidence eliminates all worlds relevant in c in

which

not-P.

On

a Lewis-style view, context supplies sets of possibilities that are

alternatives to

P

in c.
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(somehow)

relevant

The

three approaches I’ve just sketched
reflect very different, obviously

different, epistemic views.

justified-true-belief

,

makes

the particular difference

thing

the slot left

fills

Whether knowledge

on which

I

want

open by context.

to concentrate is the difference in

Whether the

might seem

From Contextualism

resulting epistemology.

gotten via elimination, tracking, or

for fairly obviously different
epistemic accounts.

points, or sets of possibilities

notes in

is

slot is filled

insignificant,

to Contrastivism in

However,

what kind of

by standards, tracking

however, as Jonathan Schaffer

Epistemology,” the choice affects the

Schaffer explains one reason to prefer sets of
possibilities to

standards:

Some

contextualists invoke standards (strength of epistemic position)
instead of
alternatives [possibilities]. Every standard corresponds to
a set of alternatives: a
given standard s determines a distance in logical space, d, which
determines a

of worlds, b (DeRose 1995, 34-5; Heller 1999, 116). But not every
set of
alternatives corresponds to a standard: if a set of alternatives
does not comprise a
sphere

sphere in logical space, no standard will correspond to it. Thus, alternatives
are
preferable to standards on grounds of generality. (Schaffer 2004,
3).

The corresponding point

also holds for tracking points.

On

a DeRose-style view,

possibilities are ordered with respect to similarity to the actual possibility.

The context

determines a tracking point - a point along the similarity ordering - through which S

must track the

truth

that includes all the

of P. That point determines a

of possibilities, namely the one

worlds that are of greater or equal similarity to the actual world.

Because tracking points can only capture
possibilities that is

set

possibilities along a

continuum, each

set

of

determined by a tracking point occupies a sphere of logical space.

Consider the following three diagrams of logical space:
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-1
f

Figure

employs
of the

possibilities

third.

1

Figure 2

can capture

all

three, in particular, the
cottage-cheese-like nature

So, sets of possibilities are preferable
because they can do

all

the

work of

standards or tracking points, and then
some; sets of possibilities can capture
relevance

even when the relevant regions of logical
space are non-contiguous. Furthermore,
ot the features ot context that
Contextualists

and hearers

want

to capture is the focus

in a context, possibilities are preferable

because there

is

if

one

of the speakers

every reason to

think that the possibilities determined by this
feature of context will be disjointed and
not spherical (Schatter 2004,3).

The choice

to use possibilities clearly yields different

epistemic results:

In an everyday, non-skeptical circumstance,

you are asked whether you know you
have hands rather than octopus tentacles. You say “I know I
have hands.” (This is
roughly Schaffer’s example and point from a seminar on contextualist
epistemology)

On

a DeRose-style view, for example, the context determines a tracking
point that

fairly close to the actual possibility.

you are handless but dreaming
fair).

There

is

is

On

the similarity continuum, a possibility in

closer than one in

which you

are tentacled (this

is

which
seems

no obvious way on the tracking point-style view or the standards view of
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^eluding the nearer

possibility while including the

the set oi possibilities

on which

more

distant one.

the speakers and hearers focus

seems

In the example,
0

disjointed:'

,3

Figure 4

Since possibilities are preterable to standards
or tracking points on grounds of
generality because they can capture
non-contiguous regions of logical space,
all

the different views discussed

open

lor context to

fill.

- assume

However, keep

in

that these are the items that

mind

that

fill

I

-

will

in

the slot that

is

any view discussed might be

formulated with standards or tracking points as the contextually
supplied element.
Metalinguistic vs. Non-metalinguistic

There

is

a central division

among

metalinguistic and non-metalinguistic.

the

On

ways of handling context’s semantic

role

-

metalinguistic approaches, the contextual

parameters do not occur within the logical formula, but in non-metalinguistic

approaches the contextual parameters are present

in the logical formula.

On

the former,

context’s disambiguation of which proposition gets expressed by a given utterance

is

antecedent to interpretation of the logical form (when metalinguistic contextual

parameters are determined), but in the

latter,

context’s disambiguation of which

proposition gets expressed by a given utterance occurs during the interpretation of the

logical

form (via contextual parameters present

i°

Though someone might gerrymander
mentioned comprise a sphere, the

the

way

in the logical form).

....

tracking points

fact that the possibilities
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work so

.

.

that the relevant possibilities just

must comprise a sphere on the standards and

Terminological note: Throughout the following discussion, ‘context’

somewhat ambiguous between

the informal notion of conversational context

is

-

loosely

the aspects of focus, interest, surrounding, setting, etc that are part of the
conversational
situation

— and

least a speaker,

the formal notion of context

—

an ordered

set

of n-tuples, consisting of at

world, and time. The two are clearly closely related.

distinction matters,

mark

try to

I

When the

it.

Metalinguistic:

Montague-style approach:

On this

approach, context

is

built into the

evaluative parameters. Propositions are not functions from world-times to truth values.
Rather, they are functions from context-possible worlds (points of reference) to truth-

values.

These points of reference are ordered n-tuples consisting of —at

least

—

a

speaker, a world, a location, and a time. In order to handle words other than the

traditional indexicals,

T,

‘here’,

now’, these points of reference will need

to include,

say, a set

of relevant alternatives that are operant for the speaker

situation.

Leaving aside the issue of which parameters, exactly, should be included these

points of reference, this approach seems flawed because of

explanatory power, rather than some failure that

Montague-style approach

approach

in general

is

is

adopted to accommodate the bank case, then the linguistic

must also be Montague-style. But

of that general approach

tracking points view

still

means

general loss of

particular to epistemology. If a

the failures of this general

approach are well-documented (See Stalnaker 1972). In

failings

its

in that conversational

particular,

two explanatory

are:

that disparate sections of logical space can’t be captured

views.
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by these kinds of

a)

The simpler account of pragmatics

[a

Montague-stye approach] which merges

possible worlds with contexts cannot account
for Donellan’s distinction. If one
goes directly from sentence (together with context)
to truth value, one misses the
ambiguity, since the truth conditions for the sentence
in the fixed context (in normal
cases at least) coincide for the two readings.”
(Stalnaker 1972, 391).
b) ‘I am here now,’ since true at every point of
reference, turns out necessarily true,
which it is not; it is analytic but not necessary. On the
Montague approach, there is
no explanation for the difference between analyticity and
necessity. (See Stalnaker

1972,386).
Since the Montague-style approach to context

is

unsatisfactory

on grounds unrelated

epistemology, and because no Contextualist in epistemology currently
advocates

it, I

to

do

not discuss this further.

Model

theoretic approach:

On

the metalinguistic model-theoretic approach,

propositions (as usual) have their truth-values relative to a model

model

is

an ordered

triple:

M=

<D,W, A>. The

a domain of individuals, a set of possible worlds, and an

assignment to the free variables.

On

this

approach, a proposition’s truth

is

evaluated

only relative to a restricted set of models; context restricts the admissibility of models.

Each conversational context provides a

on the

restriction

set

of models that might be

used in the evaluation of a given proposition. Consider Stanley and Szabo’s example of
this

approach as

The model

it

applies to context’s role in quantified

theoretic approach

works very well

domain

for sentences

restriction:

which contain only one

quantified expression, such as:
(30) Everyone smokes.

.Suppose that the domain of quantification for a particular utterance of (30) [as
determined by the conversational context] is the students in Mr. Desiato’s third.

.

.

grade class.

model
which

We incorporate this fact into the semantic theory,

theoretic approach,
the

domain

is

by considering the

truth

according to the

of (30) relative to models

in

the set of students in Mr. Desiato’s third-grade class.

(Stanley/Szabo 348).

Rather than context’s restricting admissible models by determining that only those

models with a particular domain of individuals
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get considered, the contextualist

who

opts for the

model

theoretic approach claims that conversational
context restricts the set

of models by determining (pragmatically)

that only those

worlds -those relevant to that context— get considered.*

Hannah

first utters

models so

Hannah knows

that the truth

the bank

of that utterance

is

not apply.

Know

,

the

bank

is

is, it

bank

case,

when

open,’ the context restricts the set of

its

regular hours, but

when Hannah

utters

open,’ that restriction on admissible models does

then, might have a

mechanics of context, that

In the

particular set of

considered relative only to models that don’t

is

contain worlds in which the bank has changed

Hannah does not know

'

models with a

straightforward

’

meaning, unencumbered by the

might pick out a binary relation and have invariant

content.

On

the

model

theoretic approach, contextualization takes place at the level of the

entire discourse rather than at the level

of some

sort

of constituent of the discourse.

Just as intra-sentence contextual variation can’t be adequately handled by the

theoretic approach to quantifier

‘Every sailor waved to every

to

domain

sailor’

restriction

model

-as shown by particular utterances of

(Stanley/Szabo 249), the model theoretic approach

Contextualism in epistemology can’t adequately handle intra-discourse contextual

variation

- even

in the case

of compartmentalization. Lewis mentions the case of two

epistemologists on a bushwalk:

As

they walk, they

error.

By

talk.

They mention

all

manner of far-fetched

possibilities of

attending to these normally ignored possibilities they destroy the

knowledge they normally possess. Yet
where they are going! (Lewis 565).

all

the while they

know where

they are and

Likely the domain of individuals will also be restricted as a consequence of restricting the admissible
worlds.

Ill

Suppose

that

one epistemologist says

whether or not I’m a brain

sentence. These

at

you

that

in a vat, but, hey, there’s that big
fern

within a mile of the trailhead.”
conversational contexts

to the other, “I grant

It

seems

clear that there are

two

I

don’t

where

I

know

know

we’ll be

different

play within the same discourse, and even
within one

two conversational contexts would determine very

on admissible models, and neither

restriction alone

would provide a

could adequately capture “what the epistemologist says”

when he

different restrictions

set

of models

that

utters the sentence

above. In order to capture the meaning of the sentence
above, context variation will

have to be allowed

model

at

some

level

lower than that of the whole discourse. Since the

theoretic approach allows only for contextual variation at
the discourse level,

it

handle legitimate cases of compartmentalization.

fails to

Non-metalinguistic
Again, there

is

not just one non-metalinguistic approach but a whole range of

approaches. Their unifying feature
logical form. In each

form

is

that context enters the picture at the level

of these views, there

that context “fills”

or there

is

a parameter

-

either there is a

whose content

is

an “open” feature present

word whose reference

shifts across contexts, or

of

in the logical

shifts across contexts,

some combination of the

two.

Indexicalist

Indexicalists claim that ‘know’ itself

logical

form whenever ‘know’ appears.

Kaplanesque character; ‘know’

is

is

context-variant; context enters the

In other words,

‘know’ has a content and a

an indexical whose referent on a given occasion
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is

determined

in part

by the context on

that occasion

of use. Jonathan Schaffer,

who

is

not

an indexicalist, offers the following
characterization of the position:

So just as the character of ‘I’ is a function from
context to an individual by the rule
speaker of the utterance so the character of
‘knows’ is a function from context to an
epistemic property by the rule relevant alternatives
(Schaffer 2004, 2)
,

For mdexicahsts, there

is

a rule (the character) that at each context
determines the

term’s referent (content) at that context. Significantly,
the function

from context

views, the term’s meaning
So, the term

to content

is its

know’ picks out

-

it is

the character of the indexical

competent speakers

that

invariant character, and

its

learn.

content

is

On

indexicalist

context-variant.

different epistemic relations in different contexts.
Again,

Schaffer:

The

traditional epistemologist supposes that there is

one [binary relation of the
schematic form Ksp], while the indexicalist claims that there are many
(Schaffer
2004, 5).

According

to the indexicalist, there

may be one

epistemic relation, call

it

a Ki that

content (referent) of ‘know’ at one context and a different epistemic relation,
the content of ‘know’ at

pairs <S,P>,

where S

is

some

the subject (purported knower) and

more

2,

the

that is

other context. Each K-relation will be a set of ordered

S stands in the given K-relation

In order to get a

K

is

P

is

the proposition to which

at that context.

clear account of how the indexicalist treats the

bank case,

consider the following schema of an indexicalist account of extension, content, and
character:

12

‘Rule’ here

is

meant

indexicalist view.

to allude to Lewis’ view.

Many have

taken Lewis to have been presenting an

Others, notably Barbara Partee, do not: “....we are dealing not with a lexically specific

context dependence but with the kind of conversational standard-setting that Lewis discussed.”

(Comment

4.1

of her comments on Stanley’s paper).

1

think there
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is

room

for interpretation in

what Lewis

1

.

The extension of ‘knows’

world
ordered pairs, <S,P>, where S
in

w relative to context c = that relation R
is a subject who exists at w
and P is a

proposition, and S’s evidence rules out
members of the R-set.
2.

The content of ‘knows’

The character of knows’

is

of ‘knows’ relative to

any world

w relative to c

in

is

the set of relevant alternatives to

P

in c.

a schema for an indexicalist account of character because
the R-

of an indexicalist view are given by specifying

the value of that variable. In thinking about the

all

possibilities that are

c.

set is a free variable, specific instances

above as being

of

a function that takes any context c to the
content

Schematic Definition: the R-set for c
is

non-P

relative to context c is a function that takes

w to the extension of ‘knows’

The example above

all

n

filled in

bank

case,

we can

think of the schema

by a Lewis-style account of relevance, though indexicalists

will

handle the bank case in essentially the same way. In the bank case, indexicalists

claim that two different propositions can be expressed by the same sentence, ‘Hannah

knows

the

bank

is

open,’

made on two

occasion, the proposition expressed by the utterance ‘Hannah

claims (loosely) that

Hannah

on the

later occasion, a

knows

the

the

bank

is

bank

is

knows

the

stands in the Kj relation to that the bank

compatible proposition

open’- one

On

separate occasions of utterance.

that claims that

is

is

the earlier

bank

is

open,’

open. While

expressed by the utterance, ‘Hannah

Hannah

stands in the

K

relation to that

2

open. At the two different contexts, the word ‘know’ picks out two different

epistemic relations, so that though the sentences seem incompatible, they are not. The

Ki relation includes the pair <Hannah, that the bank

that the

bank has changed

its

hours

is

is

open> because

the possibility

not relevant in that context, but the

K2

does not include that pair because the possibility that the bank has changed

stated in print, but

Whether Lewis

is

I

am

told that

when

relation

its

hours

asked, he said he considered himself an indexicalist (Schaffer).

an indexicalist or not

is

really irrelevant here.
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is

relevant in that context.

and so

The proposition Hannah expresses

at the earlier

time

is true,

the one she expresses at the later time.

is

should be clear that according to the indexicalist, the referent of
the word

It

'know' changes across contexts;

However,

contexts.

its

refers to different epistemic relations at different

it

Kaplanesque character remains the same:

The character of ‘know’

the function from contexts to epistemic relations, such
each context c n> the value of the function is that epistemic relation R to
n
which ‘know’ refers at the context c n
is

that at

.

The claim
its

that

character.

character

is

‘know’

is

an indexical includes the claim that the meaning of ‘know’

A significant consequence of the claim that the meaning of ‘know’

that the character function (described

rule-like. In other- words, the function’s

mechanism

epistemic relation operant at a given context

typical language-user

One

— must be

above

-

in schematic

is

is its

form) must be

for determining the particular

the function that

is

easily leamable by a

rule-like.

serious problem for the indexicalist approach

produced. If the indexicalist approach

is

is

that

no such

rule has been

to succeed, a straight-forward, rule-like

function that can serve as the meaning of ‘know’ must be produced. This difficulty for

the

view has been pointed out most recently by Jonathan Schaffer

Contextualism to Contrastivism

No

in

“From

Epistemology”:

contextualist has ever offered anything near a precise account of relevance.

Indeed, the only contextualist
is

in

who

has even

Lewis (1996), who proposes seven

is little

more than a laundry

list

made

rules. ...But

a serious attempt in this direction

with

all

due respect

to

Lewis, this

of rules of thumb, replete with unclear principles,

subject to a variety of counterexamples, and open to skeptical usurpation as merely

pragmatical. (Schaffer 2004, 17).

The

viability

of a particular indexicalist account depends on whether or not

offers a character function for ‘knows’ that

is
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that account

suitable to serve as the term’s meaning.

.

The

viability

on

directly

relevance.

of a particular indexicalist account of character
depends obviously and

that particular indexicalist’s definition of
the R-set, the particular account of

The

definition of relevance at a context

must be precise enough

by the average language user (not an ad hoc “laundry
part ol a term-specific index (not

amounting

list”),

to general

must be

suitable to serve as

pragmatic means of

accommodation), and must provide the character function with the means
capture the meaning of

know

like other indexicals.

linguistic freak.

The

indexicalist.

On

In

to correctly

(by not generating counterexamples).

A second serious problem for indexicalists is that
behave

to be applied

‘knows’ does not seem to

Indexicalists, so the objection goes,

irregular shiftiness of ‘knows’

make ‘knows’

a

particularly problematic for the

is

the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism,

’

Jason Stanley

illustrates

this central point:

It is

no surprise

that context-sensitive expressions typically allow for standard-shifts

within a clause. In each case, the context-sensitivity
but to the particular context-sensitive term
expression, then

we would

predict that shiftiness
sensitivity

way

If

is

linked not to the discourse,

‘know’

is

a context-sensitive

expect similar phenomenon. [In particular, indexicalists
the level of the term since they claim that the context

is at

of knowledge claims

is

due

‘know’

to fact that

that is lexically specific.].... So, if contextualism

context sensitive in a

is

were

true,

we

should expect

the following to be fine:

(44)a Bill

knows

that he has hands, but Bill does not

know

that he is not

a ...[BIV],

b Bill does not

know

that he is not a

.

.
.

[BIV], but Bill

knows he has

hands.

Of course,

both of these are not fine - they

are, as contextualists

have taken great pains to argue, of dubious acceptability.

.

.
.

[Keith

themselves

DeRose

calls

such sentences “Abominable Conclusions”]....

Of course,

contextualists have expended a great deal of effort trying to

explain the oddity of

.

.

[(44)a]

.

Once

a skeptical possibility has been raised, they

any view on which knowledge claims are semantically context-sensitive is a
don’t think this is right. But
is somehow linked to the term itself.
context
sensitivity of knowledge
is still exactly right for the indexicalist, whose view is that the
specific.
is
lexically
due to the fact that ‘know’ is context-dependent in a way that

Stanley suggests here that

view on which the context
his point

claims

is

sensitivity

I
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say, that has ramifications for the
evaluation of future uses
But there ar e two worries for this str ategy.

“f-

of ‘know within that

First, it leaves the oddity
of
proposes a certain pragmatic constraint
about the
xt;sensitivity of “know’' that simply has
no parallel with pragmatic principles
governing the interpretation s of other
context-sensitive expressions. Thus,
these
inds of claims about how raising skeptical
scenarios change the discourse look like
stipulations to save the theory from
unattractive consequences such as
(44)b (See
Stanley’s earlier version of the paper,
pp. 33-34. He makes the same point in the
revised version -Stanley forthcoming, 22-23.)

c

L(44)b)] unexplained.

Stanley

s

,

comments here

- based on

predict

,

significantly

more

Second,

are

it

damning

to the indexicalist position.

the ease with which other indexicals shift
shifty than

in tact

it

is.

the

meaning

of

why

that

‘know’

is

Second, because indexicalists claim that

context- variation happens via the lexically specific

no explanation for

—

First, indexicalists

mechanism of indexing, they have

the raising of skeptical scenarios in a discourse
seems to affect

know’ throughout

the rest of the discourse.

Jonathan Schaffer, in “From Contextualism

to

Contrastivism in Epistemology,”

points to an additional explanatory failure for the indexicalist -the failure
to explain the
lack of parallel shiftiness in

that

knowledge claims

‘Moore knows he has hands

that involve ‘rather than’ clauses, such as

rather than stumps’

and

in those that

do

not,

such as

‘Moore knows he has hands’:
[I] ndexicality

predicts that non-binary ascriptions should be as shifty as their binary

This is because, with indexicality, the shiftiness is generated by a
semantical rule triggered by the occurrence of ‘knows’. Since ‘knows’ occurs in all
the knowledge ascriptions, they should all generate this shiftiness.(Schaffer 2004,
counterparts.

12).

Even granting

that there is

Shaffer’s point

footnote

1

seems

8, p. 12).

some remaining

shiftiness in the first comparative statement,

correct: the former statement

is

less shifty than the later (see

While statements such as ‘Moore knows he has hands
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rather than

stumps, and

Moore does

BIV, seem perfectly natural,
for the presence

know

not

that he is a being with

also think the indexicalist has

I

of the ‘rather than’ clauses.

contextual variation

is

hands rather than a handless

“built in” to the

On

no satisfactory explanation

the indexicalist position,

sentence handless

BIV

indexicalist, this fact

the

meaning of ‘know’ on each occasion of its

so any additional and explicit mention of a
possibility as being relevant

what the rather than clause does

all

— makes no

sense. If

when someone

—which

use,

just

is

utters the

second

scenarios are contextually relevant, then, according to the

is

already taken into account via the lexically specific and
context-

sensitive character of ‘know’.

So, the indexicalist

is left

without an explanation of the

lack of parallel shiftiness in and the natural-sounding nature of what
Schaffer calls
contrastive

knowledge claims- those

that include a ‘rather than’ clause (Schaffer 2004,

6 ).

In

left

sum, indexicalists have

failed to generate a viable character function, they are

with an indexical whose behavior

satisfying account of contrastive

is

linguistically freakish,

and they

fail to

offer a

knowledge claims.

Contrastivist

First,

some terminological

He

third relatum view.

contextualist view,

calls

it

points: Jonathan Schaffer

‘contrastivist’

which he characterizes

and wants

as Contextualist

Contextualist on Schaffer’s.

on

my terminology

On my

to distinguish

it

from the

as “the theory that ‘knows’ contributes

semantical context-dependence to utterances in which

What counts

developed and advocates a

is

it

occurs” (Schaffer 2004,1).

different

from what counts

terminology, Contextualism

is

as

the claim that

14

Notice that you don

‘t

have

to accept that

any knowledge claims are non-binary to accept the point here.
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context contributes a semantical role in
disambiguating utterances in which ‘knows’

On my

occurs.

characterization, the model-theoretic approach,
the

the indexicalist approach, and the third relatum
approach are
Schaffer’s, only the indexicalist

some terminological
Schalfer

s

-mere

is

the contrastivist

place relation

term ‘know’

whose

itself is

is

my

a brand of Contextualism.

view ‘know’

third relatum

is

not an indexical. Rather, ‘know’

is

is

a three-

determined (in part) by context. In other words, the

not context-dependent, but

features of the conversational context.

knowledge claim

that there are

terminological. So on

terminology, Contextualism and contrastivism contrast,
but on
is

On

Contextualist.

a Contextualist. Again, the point here

differences, but they are just that

terminology, contrastivism

On

is

all

Montague approach,

On

this

its

third relatum is

view,

when an

determined by

apparently binary

made, the claim has a hidden contextually determined relatum;

(ignoring worlds and times) ‘knowledge’

is

a 3-place relation between a subject, a
5

proposition, and contextually determined alternatives to the proposition.

Whereas

indexicalists claim that ‘know’ picks out different binary epistemic relations in different

contexts, the contrastivist claims that ‘know’ picks out exactly one three-place epistemic

relation in every context:

The difference between indexicality and ternicity can be formally represented as the
difference between an indexed binary relation Kjsp (which may be given the natural
language paraphrase

Kspq

Namely,

(s

knows

that

as: s

bears that property to p) and an unindexed ternary relation

p rather than q). (Schaffer 2004,12 footnote).

that indexicalists predict similar shiftiness,

when

in fact the shiftiness is

not parallel.

15

In the first

paper

in

which Schaffer develops

the view, the third relatum

is

contrast class of alternative propositions (Schaffer, manuscript), but in the

relatum
view,

I

is

an argument slot

filled

by a contrast proposition (Schaffer 2004,

an argument

slot filled

more recent paper,
5).

In

my

discussion of the

take the third relatum to be an argument slot filled by a set of contrasting possibilities.

think anything

I

say turns on these differences.
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by a

the third

I

don’t

In addition to there being

an important difference between the
indexicalist and

the contrastivist about the basic kind of
relation that

two-place relations or one three-place relation

knowledge

- the two

-

is

a large family of

differ significantly in

how

context works to disambiguate a knowledge utterance.
Indexicalists claim that

knows P

gets uttered, a lexically specific index determines

mechanism determines which of the many two- place
in that particular context.

lexically specific

- no

Contrastivists,

‘knows’-specific

what gets

relations

is

said, that

‘S

this

is,

the referent of ‘knows’

on the other hand, claim

- mechanism

when

that there is

that determines

which

no

alternatives

get included in the contrast class. Rather, there are a variety
of general linguistic

mechanisms
According
‘prefers’.

at

cream

that determine the appropriate contrast class for that context.

to the contrastivist, the appropriate

For

contrast class.

ice

work

‘prefers,’ there is

Sometimes

no

model

lexically specific

the contrast class

is

According

cream

so that

Sue

membership

it is

where the speaker

articulated

by a

‘Anne prefers chocolate
is

determined by the

is

looking

at a list

‘know’

it is

of other flavors

is

‘rather than’ clause, as in

stole the bicycle’; other times the contrast class

in

is

‘Anne prefers chocolate,’

to the contrastivist, the contrast class for

determined. Sometimes

rather than

store

‘know’

for determining the

to strawberry ice cream.’ Other times, the contrast class

(articulated at the ice

Mary

mechanism

articulated, as in

saturation of a free but unarticulated variable, as in

offered).

for the semantics of

similarly

‘Bobby knows

is

not articulated

determined by the focus of the participants, their

interrogative interests, or salient features of their location or conversation. While for

indexicalists there

is

one uniform rule - the character of ‘know’—

that determines for

each articulation which possibilities are relevant, for contrastivists there
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is

no such

rule.

That

is,

though for each context there

is

exactly one contextually-determined set of

possibilities that is the value for the third relatum, there is

in

no uniform way

to determine

advance what value gets picked, no learnable rule that language
users master.

Again, Schaffer:

turn

now

second main difference between [indexicalist views] and
contrastivism, namely that between relevance and saturation. These are
distinct
I

linguistic

to the

mechanisms

for factoring alternatives into the truth-conditions,

which

By

differ as follows.

relevance, alternatives enter into the truth-conditions via the
semantical rule of relevant alternatives (as triggered by the ‘knows’ indexical).

Whereas by saturation, alternatives enter into the truth-conditions via such
mechanisms as ‘rather-than’ -arguments, interrogatives, focussing, and free
(as serving to saturate the q slot). In short,

specific relevance function, whereas

by relevance there

by saturation there

is

variables

exists a ‘knows’-

no ‘knows’ -specific

relevance function but rather just a variety of general linguistic mechanisms for
saturating an argument slot. (Schaffer 2004,17).
So, according to the contrastivist, the bank case can be

the contrast class at the earlier context of articulation

at the later

bank has changed

the possibility that the

later

relation but

closed, the

its

<Hannah,

bank has

that the

entirely

So, at the earlier time

a true claim, and

normal hours but

I

new

when

that, in

at the earlier

closed }>

is

a

says,

not a

discussing

the Stanley-Szabo discussion in

class at the

bank

that the

is

member of the knowledge

open, {the bank has

is

class

time does not include

<Hannah,

triple

its

normal hours but

member of the knowledge

‘Hannah knows the bank

she later says, ‘Hannah does not

know

is

is

relation.

open,’ she

the bank

is

makes

open,’ she

16

yet another true claim

have said

is

hours }>

when Hannah

•

makes

bank

is

from the contrast

normal schedule but the contrast

time does include that possibility. The ordered

open, {the bank has

’

its

different

is

context of articulation. The contrast class

accommodated because

how
“On

.

context contributes to interpretation of knowledge claims,
Quantifier

Domain

Restriction,” and yet

discussed an epistemic account on which what context contributes
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to

it

does not seem

knowledge assertions

is

I

follow

that

an

I

have

Schaffer

s

contrastivist account has

accounts. First, the contrastivist position

epistemic role of context

is

some important advantages over competing

is

clearly better than the position that the

grammatical in that

While both posit unarticulated

it

supplies unarticulated lexical parts.

parts, the contrastivist

proposes a covert variable rather

than an unarticulated grammatical component (missing lexical parts).
While those

might think context plays

of grammatical role are plagued by the claim

this sort

there

is

a one-one correspondence between what

what

is

uttered, contrastivists

is

do not make the comparable implausible claim

a one-one correspondence between what

is

uttered and

that

on a given occasion and

articulated

is

who

what

that there

Instead, they

is said.

propose a one-many correspondence between utterances and propositions expressed;

one utterance can expresses different propositions

in different contexts

because there

is

an open variable that can get saturated by various contrast classes.

unarticulated quantifier

think so.

I

domain

restriction.

It

Lewis

starts off

speaking as

infallibilist analysis.

tides

of shift for

.

.

‘all,’

.

but rather

.

I

QDR view,

but delivers an indexicalist one.

comes

closest to a

QDR view

that

QDR version, the

is

the

On

a contrastivist-style

on the counterfactual supposition
criticisms

I

make

that the phrase

against contrastivism

QDR

So on the

On

like

on

the

-

was

that

it

uttered”

does not

it does not ensure that the knower believes the known
does not resolve Gettier cases successfully - also apply to a QDR version of the
version, general linguistic mechanisms — focus, presupposition, and attention it

determine the operant quantifier restriction and so determine the operant contrast
use.

QDR view,

invariant and picks out a three-place relation.

propositions are true, that

proposition, and that

On

else’

The important

(Schaffer, correspondence).

known

contrastivism.
is

content of the third relatum (the contrast class) “defaults to the value that would be

denoted by ‘rather than anything
ensure that

don’t

was going to come out of the ‘all’ in his
when he starts writing the rules, he doesn’t invoke the general
invents new knowledge-specific rules. So think Lewis

.

advertises a

The view

1

if all the variability

But then

the contrastivist account, the content ‘knows’

view.

might seem that Lewis espouses such a view, but

agree with Schaffer (correspondence):

QDR version,

content of the third relatum

is

like

on

the contrastivist account, since the

class,

mechanism

a linguistically general pragmatic one (that

is, it’s

on any occasion of

for determining the

not epistemically

specific), the focus, presuppositions, and interests of the speakers and hearers need not include the true

knower accepts, or the possibilities that would resolve Gettier
- but any
puzzles. (One might develop another QDR-style approach - one that is not contrastivist in style
of
determiner
the
restriction
is
domain
quantifier
if
problems;
QDR approach will suffer from these same
possibility, the possibilities the purported

e-relevance, then e-relevance involves only general linguistic (pragmatic) mechanisms, so such a view

cannot rightly adopt knowledge-specific requirements for relevance.)

122

Second, the contrastivist avoids the central
problems had by the indexicalist.

Namely, the

failure to

produce a ‘knows’-specific rule

that is suitable to serve as the

character for ‘knows’ and the failure adequately
to account for
linguistic

behavior ‘knows’

contrastivist avoids the

that there isn’t one.

ways

in

which the

disanalagous to the behavior of other indexicals.
The

is

problems associated with a lexically-specific

Instead, the contrastivist relies

saturate the third relatum, the q-slot. So,

on general

by not claiming

rule

linguistic

‘knows’

that

is

by claiming

mechanisms

to

an indexical,

contrastivists simultaneously relieve themselves of the
obligation to produce an

appropriate rule ol relevance and of the burden of claiming
(in the face of

counterexamples) that ‘knows’ behaves

like other indexicals.

Third, the contrastivist, unlike the indexicalist, has a good
explanation for the

presence of rather than clauses in knowledge claims as well as for some
of the other
linguistic

behavior associated with ‘knows’. The ‘rather than’ clauses indicate the

presence of a third relatum

unarticulated in

this

open

form, which

in the logical

knowledge claims whose surface

q-slot in the logical

is

covertly present but

structure

is

binary.

The presence of

form also explains why “[knowledge ascriptions also

feature contrast-preservation under ellipsis” (Schaffer 2004, 7). In the following,

prefers chocolate

and Ben does

too,’ the

the foil”(Schaffer 2004, 7). That

is, if

contrast-preservation under ellipses,

word

Ann

‘too’ serves as

an

‘Ann

ellipsis site that “copies

prefers chocolate to vanilla, then through

we know

that

Ben

also prefers chocolate to vanilla.

Similarly, the contrastivist explains:

Suppose

that

an inquiry

is

underway

wagon, and one says ‘Holmes knows
too’.

Here what Holmes knows

is

and the evidence for the syntactic

that

as to whether

Mary
Mary stole
that

reality

Mary

and Watson does

wagon,
Watson conjunct is

the bicycle rather than the

of the contrast
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stole the bicycle or the

stole the bicycle,

is

that the

‘r

atSon

ff

^j

knows

that

7'f

The presence of the variable
presence of the ellipsis

site;

Mary

sto| e the bicycle rather

than the wagon. (Schaffer

for the contrast class in the logical

form explains the

the ellipsis site copies the contrast class.

Unfortunately, the root of much of the contrastivist’
s success
the

view

most serious problem. Because the

s

via just a variety of general linguistic

for saturating an

slot (Schaffer

2004,17), the

interrogatives,

and ‘rather than' clauses of the speakers and hearers

problem

when

that the contrast class

is

the subject

The
is

(unbeknownst

in

in that context.

The

need not include alternatives that block knowledge
to the speakers/hearers) is in a Gettier situation.

contrast class need not include an alternative merely because that
alternative

which the conversation takes place while

and subjects
situation).

argument

contrast class are determined by the focus,

a significant feature of the subject’s circumstance.

example

also the root of

saturation of the third relatum takes place

mechanisms

members of the

is

--

The

are in a Gettier situation (and so are

bottom of a

to the participants

No mechanism

all

participants -speakers, hearers,

unaware

that they are in a Gettier

participants are in typical sheep-type Gettier situation in

participants are at the

unbeknownst

Consider a Cohen-style Gettier

field pointing at a

—

all

the

sheep-shaped rock behind which -

there’s a sheep, and one utters

in the contrastivist’ s arsenal

which

T know

that’s a sheep.’

of general linguistic mechanisms can

generate the result in this case that the contrast class includes the alternative that there

a sheep-shaped rock
utterance

is true.

An

in the field.

The

contrastivist account has the result that the

above

In general, the contrastivist account can’t resolve Gettier cases.

additional, though not as serious, difficulty for the contrastivist

remaining shiftiness of so-called non-binary ascriptions. Schaffer has

124

is

the

this to say:

’s

Since non-binary ascriptions are relatively explicit
as to the value of q, they should
have a lesser degree of shiftiness. Thus ternicity predicts,
for instance, that

“Holmes knows

Mary

that

and so should leave

little

stole the bicycle rather than the

have a binary surface structure;

it

not contain alternatives in which

what she

stole

was

shiftiness remains:

include worlds in which

right that the contrast in the case

someone other than Mary does

trivial.

If

alternative that

Holmes

thieving (footnote, page 12).

epistemically

seems

less shifty than their counterparts that

roller skates (Schaffer 2004,12).

“Thus the

is

Mary

it is

this

weakens the argument

Schaffer acknowledges that

stole the

wagon may

someone claims ‘Moore knows he has hands

Moore knows

or

may

some

not

is

that he has

rather than

hands rather than

stumped and dreaming

is

in the

“remaining shiftiness” that matters, not the ‘rather than’

The significance of the remaining

clause.

the stealing or in which

My point here is that the remaining shiftiness is far from

stumps depends on whether or not that Moore

—

above does

a brain-in-a-vat vertically hallucinating Mary’s

stumps’, then - because whether or not

contrast class

(i)

explicitly fixes q

to shift.... (Schaffer 2004,13).

knowledge ascriptions do seem

‘Rather-than’

wagon”

shiftiness

of ‘rather than’ clauses somewhat

for ternicity itself, because in the vast majority of cases non-

binary ascriptions and binary ascriptions are on a par with respect to the kind of

shiftiness that really matters in resolving the (ever-pervasive) skeptical problem.

So, contrastivism fails to resolve Gettier cases. Additionally, the argument in

favor of the view based on the lack of shiftiness in ‘rather than’ ascriptions

than

it

first

is far

weaker

appears to be.

Condexicalism -Doing the Two-Step:

I

is filled

now want
in part

to

defend a view on which the “slot”

by an indexing rule and

in part
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left

open

to

be

filled

by context

by general linguistic mechanisms.

I'll

claim that such an approach

is less

a purely contrastivist view.

The suggestion

initially

made by Barbara

problematic than either a purely indexicalist
view or

something

for

like this

approach was

Partee at the Contextualism in Epistemology

and Beyond

conference. She mentions that ‘know* might have
something important in

with here. She gave the

common

of the two following examples;

first

In the claim “it’s

-56degrees here now” ‘here’ might mean here inside this
plane or
might mean here in this space our airplane is flying through
right now. (Page 4 of
her comments on Jason Stanley’s paper.)
it

When

I

call the linguistics

department to ask

how to

reach Partee, the person

who

answered the phone began by saying “Well, I think she’s here” she
might have
meant here occupying the points in space that are just beside the space
occupied by
the voice on the phone, here in the linguistics
here
office,
on Umass campus or here
,

in this country.

As

Partee points out, here varies both with respect to the location of the
speaker and

with respect to the boundaries of that region. The referent of ‘here’ changes with a

change

in

what

change

in

speaker or a change in location.

change

in

what

I

I

call its ‘base

is

planet

here’ in our galaxy

I

that

when

the speaker location changes either from a

think that ‘know’

is like

is like

the referent of ‘here’ changes with a

it

varies

from the minute,

of space indicated,

makes

First, the

in ‘this

to the grand, in ‘the

new

another.

‘here’ in that

it

shifts

mutidimensionally.

‘here’ in that the shifts take place via similar

Potts, in conversation,

might work.

and not

And

when

here’ in the very precise region

‘know’

‘here’

i.e.,

call its ‘boundaries,’ as

electron

is

,

the following suggestion about

I

also think

mechanisms. Chris

how the

dual shiftiness of

boundaries. The boundaries of the appropriate region are

determined via general pragmatic mechanisms of the conversational context, such as the

interests

and focus of the participants. These general mechanisms determine a
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on the admissible contexts (of the formal kind)

restriction

for that particular

conversational occasion. So, in any given conversational exchange, there are many,

many
form

contexts that are available for use; that

<w,x,l,t,.

speaker,

t

is

.

> where w

a time, and

is

is,

a world of utterance, x

where the

ellipses

mark

many, many n-tuples of the

there are

is

a speaker,

1

is

a location of the

the presence of other conversational

parameters. (Significantly, the Kaplanesque account of context provides for richness in

what parameters get included.) Via general pragmatic mechanisms, the conversational
situation restricts the contexts that are available for use

context’s third-tuple. For example, in

some of the many

by placing

my conversation with the

available contexts (ignoring time and

its

restrictions

on the

secretary, consider

complexities as well as other

possible parameters that might be included in the context):

<@,sec, right corner of linguistics office>
<@,sec, linguistics office>

The

comer of dining room>
<@,j, dining room>

<@j

,

right

<@,sec,

UMass>

<@,j, Shelburne Falls>

<@,sec,

USA>

<@,j,

interests, beliefs,

USA>

and focus of the participants determine

that intra-room

distinctions are too fine-grained, and that inter-town or inter-country distinctions are not

fine-grained enough.

What

these general

mechanisms do

is

determine the right “level”

for the locational parameter; they restrict admissible contexts to those

parameter

is

of the right kind. Again,

this sort

whose

locational

of restriction, though determinate,

achieved not by a rule-like function, but rather by general pragmatic means. In

the only

second

two contexts

set.

listed that are not ruled out

(Obviously there would be

lots

by the

this case,

restriction are those in the

of available contexts admissible on
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is

this

restriction that aren't listed,

namely,

all

those where room-wide locations occupy
the

third parameter.)

Next, the base region. The
is

way

that the the base region for ‘here’ is
determined

via a lexically specific rule, ‘here’s’ character,

‘here’ is the function that assigns to

the constant function

which

is

each context that content which

from possible worlds

The character of

indexical.

is

represented by

to the location (of the speaker)

of that

17

context.

So,

when

the secretary reports ‘Well,

I

think she’s here,’ the lexically specific

rule for ‘here' determines that the secretary’s location

of ‘here’. That

is,

is

only contexts in which the secretary

the base region for the referent

is

the second

member of the

n-

tuple are relevant in determining the referent of ‘here’. So, together with
the restriction

on appropriate contexts already
referent of ‘here’

is

in place, the character

the linguistics department.

On

the other hand, had

here' the indexical nature of ‘here’ plus the restriction

determines that the base of the region

A

few comments on the

shifts to

shiftiness

of

my

of ‘here’ guarantees

uttered

‘I

am

on appropriate contexts

location,

‘here’.

I

that the

Its

my dining room.

base

is

easily

and readily

shiftable because ‘here’s’ indexical nature guarantees that the base shifts as the speaker

either

changes or relocates. However, the

strictness (narrowness)

of its boundaries

is

not nearly as shifty, because the interests of the conversational participants do not in

general

shift intra-conversationally; shifts in

boundaries generally happen only

discourse level. But intra-discourse boundary shifts can take place.

are often

marked

explicitly in the conversation, as in ‘Not only

is

When

they do, they

Partee here in this

country, she’s here in this room,’ or they are the result of a compartmentalized
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at the

conversation, such as the case of two micro biologists in the
forest, looking

through a microscope and simultaneously discussing when they
were
forest and whether or not a particular

chromosome

is

‘here’ at the

at

samples

last ‘here’ in the

end of the pointer on

the microscope.

Keeping here
First,

when Kaplan

in

mind

as a model,

now

I

turn to the boundaries for ‘know’.

introduces contexts, he notes that “aspects of the contexts” other

than speaker, place, time, and world “would be used

if

new

demonstratives

pointings, You, etc.) were added to the language” (Kaplan 412).
natural language,

the purposes of

it

seems

To accommodate

a

clear that additional “aspects” of context are required. For

accommodating ‘know’,

- a relevancy

traditional 4-tuple

(e.g.

at least

parameter, call

one parameter needs

it a.

to

be added to the

So, for the purpose of this

discussion, time will be ignored and a context will consist of the following ordered

<w,x,l,a>, where

Finally,

made

Ca

is

—think

Cw

is

,

a world,

Cx

is

a speaker, and

a set of alternatives to what

contrast class!

knower), then the subject

is

(Notice that

not a

is

Q

purportedly

if

is

member of the

a location of the speaker.

known when

the speaker

is

the utterance

many

4-tuples

context of utterance. Unlike

whose members stand

is

not the subject (the purported

variable for the speaker appears in the n-tuple) So, again there are many,

available contexts,

set:

NCRAT,

a

many

in the appropriate relations to

one another. Ignoring the complexities of the locational parameter, and considering

Hannah’s conversation with her husband about the bank, some of the available contexts
for the

bank case

are:

<@, Hannah,

mall, {posted hours 7-9, posted hours 8- 12, etc. }>

17

See Kaplan, p.403.
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>

<@, Hannah,

mall, {bank changed from what’s posted,
posted hours 7-9 posted
hours 8- 12, etc. }>

<@, Hannah,

mall,

{Hannah

is a BIV(so no bank exists),
bank changed from
what’s posted posted hours 7-9, posted hours
8-12,etc.}>
<@, Hannah, mall, {car in mall spot 22, car in mall spot
34, etc.}>
,

<@, Hannah,

mall, {car stolen (so not at mall), car in
mall spot 22, car in mall
spot 34, etc.}

<@, Hannah,

{Hannah is a BIV (so no car exists), car stolen (so not
at
mall), car in mall spot 22, car in mall spot
34, etc.}>

What

mall,

the conversational context does, then,

is to restrict

putting a restriction on the alternatives parameter.

the available contexts by

Whether the topic

is

bank hours or

car location, the conversational context determines that
the alternatives parameter’s

boundaries are set

at the right level.

The

restriction is placed

on the

alternatives

parameter by general pragmatic mechanisms that take into account things

assumptions that the conversational participants have

like the

(that they aren’t brains in vats) as

well as their focus and interests (they are not initially focussing on the
possibilities that

banks have changed hours or that car

thefts at the mall are

on the

rise,

though

later the

focus regarding banks but not cars changes). Robert Stalnaker, in “Pragmatics” has this
to say

about the process of boundary

setting:

Presuppositions are propositions implicitly supposed before the relevant linguistic
is transacted. The set of all the presuppositions made by a person in a

business

given context determines a class of possible worlds, the ones consistent with all the
presuppositions. This class sets the boundaries of the linguistic situation. (Stalnaker

1972 388).

The boundaries

for ‘know’, then, are determined

by general pragmatic mechanisms

that

determine a restriction on the admissible contexts. Notice that the members of C a need
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not form a unified region of logical space;
they can

logical space or

even several individual points

Again keeping

know

in

gets determined.

mind

starting point, recall the indexicalist

schema

to disjointed regions of
8

in logical space.'

the analogy to ‘here’,

via an indexing

It is

amount

I

now turn

mechanism

that

to

is

how

the base for

lexically specific.

for the extension, content,

As

a

and character of

‘know’:

1

.

The extension of ‘knows'

in

world

ordered pairs, <S,P>, where S

w relative to context c = that relation R
is a subject who exists at w and P is a

proposition, and S’s evidence rules out

members of the
2.

R-set for

The content of ‘knows’
The character of knows

possibilities that are

relative to context c is a function that takes

is

‘knows’ relative to
So, recall that any indexicalist

non-P

of

c.

w to the extension of ‘knows’
3.

all

n

in

any world

w relative to c.

a function that takes any context c to the content of

c.

would accept something

like the

above schematic

for

defining the extension, content, and Kaplanesque character of ‘knows’, though each
particular theorist will give a different definition of the R-set. That

indexicalist will

have his or her

own

definition that satisfies the

is,

each brand of

open R-set

Furthermore, recall that since the learnability of the character function

is

variable.

directly

derived from features of the definition of the R-set, the viability of a particular brand of

indexicalism lays firmly

I

now

explaining)

state

my

my

at the feet

of that theorist’s definition of the R-set.

particular brand of “indexicalism” by giving (and then

definition of the R-set:

18

This

is

an advantage. In

knowledge comes

in

“On

the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism”, Jason Stanley argues that

degrees, then ‘know’, like

‘tali’

and

‘flat’,

should be gradable, but

it

is

if

not (see

section two). Stanley’s objection applies to both standard-style views and tracking point-style views. But

on

this

account, as on others (like contrastivism) that allow for the e-relevant regions of logical space

context to be non-contiguous, there

is

no reason

to think that

knowledge comes

any two contexts that both include the actual world) one e-relevant region
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is

in

in

“degrees” or that (for

a subset of the other. So,

a

For any possibility, p,
1 )

p

is

p

is

a

member of the

2)

or the subject believes

3)

or p

is

4)

or p

is

p

is

the

proposition, Condition 4 determines that

hank

is

open rather than

into account in both

become

iff

the case

relevant by the Rule of Special Similarity
a member of the alternatives parameter for

Condition 4 determines the base for ‘know.’ That

known

R-set for a context of utterance c

the subject’s actual world

it

is,

is

c.

by determining the purportedly
alternatives to the proposition that

to the proposition that the

car

is

in spot
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that get taken

of Hannah’s utterances, and they determine that other

relevant because of feature of Hannah’s circumstance, since
she

is

possibilities

the subject

(purported knower). Together with the restriction on contexts already in
place, the
indexical character of ‘know’ (via Condition 4) ensures that on the

first

occasion of

utterance the relevant alternatives (the R-set) does not include the bank’s having

changed hours, because

that alternative

is

not a

member of C a

for the context

determined by that particular occasion of utterance. However, that same Condition 4 together with the different restriction in place at the time

- ensures

that

on the occasion

of the second utterance, the R-set does include the bank’s having changed hours, though
not the possibility that Hannah’s a BIV. The lexically specific character of ‘know’

determines, largely via Condition 4, a base for ‘know’ which comes with appropriate

boundaries because of the already present restriction on admissible contexts. So,
‘here’, the contextuality

like

of ‘know’ operates both via a lexically specific indexing

mechanism and via general pragmatic mechanisms. Condexicalism

is

a two-step

process.

since these sets can be as

word ‘know’

is

random

as general focus

and attention can be, there

gradable.
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is

no reason

to think that the

Membership

in the R-set,

and hence

in the specific relation

on a given occasion of utterance, not only varies along two
and the other not,

it

also varies along

lines,

picked out by ‘know’

one lexically

specific

two additional dimensions - one speaker (and

audience) specific and the other subject-specific. Condition 4
captures ‘know’s context

dependence by capturing as relevant the worlds
relevant

on

that particular occasion.

referent of ‘know’ varies

that is rich

those

who

enough

Conditions 1-3 capture the

depending on

his specific location within a world.

that the speakers

facts

and hearers take

way

in

which

to

be

the

about the subject, his beliefs, his world, or

(Though a notion of context can

clearly be defined

to also include parameters that are subject-specific or agent-specific,

accept the view detailed above aren’t forced to accept such an expanded

account of context’s parameters.) Both to mark that the sort of variance guaranteed by
Conditions 1-3

sort

is

subject-dependent, not speaker-dependent, and to

of variance needn’t be handled via parameters

make

formal context,

in a

I

clear that this

call this sort

of

variance ‘circumstantial variance.’

Though

the role of Conditions 1-3 should be fairly clear at this point,

state the central function

of each condition. Condition

speakers and hearers do not focus on the actual world,

makes

some

clear that if speakers in one world

other world,

it is

discussed

at

is

a

guarantees that even

it is

if the

relevant. Condition

1

also

knowledge claim about a speaker

in

the subject’s world that’s relevant and not the speaker’s.

Condition 2 guarantees that even
subject believes she

make

1

briefly

I’ll

if the

speakers and hearers are not aware that the

a BIV, that possibility

length in Chapter 3,

1

is still

don’t discuss
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it

relevant.

Since Condition 3 was

again here. Clearly, Condition 3

is

supposed

block knowledge in Gettier cases, even
when neither the subject nor the

to

speakers and hearers
Clarification

is

aware

that the subject is in a Gettier
circumstance.

and Results:

Significantly, condexicalism

pragmatic (in the sense used

To make

this

more

is

earlier);

clear, consider

not an account in which the role of
context

it is

one

in

which the

of context

role

an example: Suppose the secretary,

a desk in the linguistics departmental office,
reports that ‘Barbara

Barbara

in fact

is

down

own

the hall in her

‘here’ in the case given is the very

she communicates (pragmatically)

the semantic

Hannah

says,

<S,P> such

meaning
‘I

know

that S's

Hannah expresses
(pragmatically)

According
above are

to

is

One might hold

office.

narrow region of space

occupies. So the proposition she expresses

is

some

is literally,

bank

is

is literally,

some

all

non-P

possibilities.

other proposition that

fixing each term’s respective semantic

is true.

in that context is

is true.

is

On

such a view

So

when

the set of ordered pairs

the proposition

Condexicalism

meaning

is

when Hannah

first utters

not such a view.

both utterances

mechanism

in a given context.

is

is

‘here’),

a pragmatic

says ‘here’, the semantic referent of that term in that context

term

that the referent of

semantically, false, though what she communicates

semantically, true, though there

department. Likewise,

when

Similarly, one might hold that

condexicalism (and the accompanying account of

literally,

here,’

is sitting at

semantically, false, though what

open’, the referent of ‘know’

evidence rules out

who

semantic.

that the secretary physically

other proposition that

for ‘here’ is very precise.

the

is

is

is

When

work

in

the secretary

in the linguistics

‘know’, the semantic referent of that

an epistemic relation that includes the pair <Hannah,

134

at

that the

bank

is

open>. In both cases, the propositions expressed are

That the referent was fixed

it

by a pragmatically determined

in part

acceptable contexts does not

literally,

make

this a

semantically true.

restriction

on

view on which context plays a pragmatic

plays a semantic one. Condexicalism, then, retains an important
advantage of

role;

its

kindred semantic accounts over pragmatic accounts and their descendants
(like

NCRAT). Namely,

like other

semantic accounts of the context dependence of ‘knows’,

condexicalism allows us to take our semantic intuitions seriously when
utterances like Hannah’s and take

them

to

be

is

that

no indexicalist has

successfully specified an appropriate character function for ‘know’.

is

clear

and

is

hear

true.

Recall that one central problem for the indexicalist

function described above

we

not an

ad hoc laundry

list.

The
The

character

definition of the

R-set has only 4 components. Furthermore, each component corresponds to what a

normal language user might (upon careful reflection) find

meaning of ‘know’.
Condition

1

First, “ruling

is

an intuitive aspect of the

out” replaces the traditional notion of justification.

corresponds to the more intuitive truth condition. Condition 2 just amounts

to the notion that the beliefs

of the subject matter. Condition

“ruling out” has to be reliable, and Condition 4 reflects the

3 basically states that the

way ‘know’

in fact varies

across conversational contexts, depending on the interests of the speakers and hearers in

that context.

So, like Lewis’ view, condexicalism defines a character function for

‘knows’, but unlike Lewis’ view, that function

is

easily graspable, intuitive,

and not ad

hoc.

19

This might be something like a view taken by Peter Lasersohn
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in

“Pragmatic Halos”, Language 1999.
,

Recall that a problem for the metalinguistic
model theoretic approach and for the
purely indexicalist approaches

is

that they

have the result that the behavior of ‘knows’

linguistically freakish, in particular with respect
to

The metalinguistic model
shiftiness, so

it

is

in the discourse.

metalinguistic

shifts

refers.

its shiftability.

theoretic approach does not allow intra-dialogue

unable to resolve cases in which there

is

a clear compartmentalization

Condexicalism can resolve compartmentalization cases. Unlike
the

model

theoretic approach, condexicalism allows for intra-conversational

and even intra-sentences

shifts in the specific epistemic relation to

Condexicalism allows for such

shifts because, unlike restrictions

which ‘know’
on admissible

models, restrictions on admissible contexts can change intra-dialogue or even
sentence. Shifts in the restriction on admissible contexts are either

much

the

explicit

same way

marking

is

as similar shifts are

in cases in

marked

marked

intra-

explicitly, in

for ‘here’, or they can occur without

which the participants knowingly

participate in a bifurcated

conversation, as in compartmentalization cases. Consider examples of the former kind

-those that include explicit markers: ‘Barbara

the

is

not here in the office, but she

US’ and ‘Schaffer does not know he has hands

know he
of the

has hands

when

latter kind, the

in

epistemology

class, but

he’s reaching for the cereal in the morning.’

is

here in

he does

And an example

kind in which the claim does not include an explicit marker:

epistemologists on a trek in the bush, and one says,

do know where the trailhead

is’

T don’t know I’m

Two

not a BIV, but

I

(Lewis 565). In such cases, condexicalism clearly

allows the shifts (by counting the knowledge assertions as true) because of a change
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in

the restriction

on admissible contexts; boundary

restrictions are

determined

20
pragmatically by focus and attention. The one sentence contains different
contexts.

So,

knowledge ascriptions have

greater shiftiness, so to speak, according to

condexicalism than they did according to the model theoretic approach, but has ‘knows’
gained too

much

shiftability

of ‘knows’ even when there seems

shiftiness?

compartmentalization.

As

One problem

a result, one

faced by indexicalists

to

is that

they predict easy

be no bifurcation of the context, no

would expect easy

acceptability of the following

(unacceptable) “abominable conjunctions”:

a) Bill

knows

that he has hands, but Bill does not

b) Bill does not

know

that he

is

know

not a ...[BIV], but Bill

that he

is

not a ...[BIV],

knows he has

hands.

(See earlier discussion on Stanley’s criticism of indexicalism.)

The

indexicalist’s prediction about shiftiness does not

behavior of ‘knows’ in the case above, and in general.
shiftiness within a conversation,

in

one “direction” but not the

conversation,

it

seems

that shift takes place,

skeptical”,

and when a

other.

When

does take place

a skeptical scenario

knowledge ascriptions

same ease of shiftiness

Knowledge

23).

resist the shift

back

in that the

by general linguistic mechanisms that
lexically specific indexing

ascriptions resist

tends to take place

introduced within a

to their earlier, “pre-

Importantly, condexicalism does not predict the

that purely indexical accounts predict.

from a purely indexical approach

is

it

linguistic

subsequent ascriptions within that discourse, but once

to affect all

meanings (Stanley

shift

match with the

Condexicalism

differs

boundaries for the alternatives are governed

restrict the

admissible contexts antecedent to any

mechanism. So, condexicalism predicts

20

that variations in the

uttered.
This seems unproblematic because each conjunct is true at the context that is operant when it is
the
which
at
context
one
is
no
there
But
true.
is
The sentence as a whole is true because each conjunct
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boundaries for ‘know’ will vary only
change, that

is,

when

there

is

when

the interests of the speakers and
hearers

a compartmentalized conversation or a
shift in

conversational focus. Since restrictions on admissible
contexts reflect the

presuppositions of the conversational participants, condexicalism
also predicts that

'knows' will

shift in a

"lopsided”

way with

respect to skeptical scenarios;

presuppositions are easier to drop within a conversation than to
add. If we fix a

on acceptable contexts within a conversational context, then ‘knows’

restriction

shiftiness unless there is a

subject

s

change

resists

in the proposition, the world, the subject, or the

beliefs or circumstances (location within a world).

So, because presumably

none of these features change, condexicalism makes the following prediction about
the

two sentences mentioned
the restriction

earlier

:

The

shiftiness

on admissible contexts, and

this

of ‘knows’ above

is

due

to a

change

can only be the result of a change

presuppositions operant in the context. Sentence (b) could be true only
a compartmentalized conversation or if there if there

is

in

in the

if there is either

a highly unlikely and non-

standard shift in the presuppositions operant in the context. Sentence (a) might be true
if there is

a compartmentalized conversation or if there

operant in the context that

is

marked by

explicit

is

a shift in the presuppositions

mention of a skeptical scenario. Notice

that given these conversational circumstances the claim that

‘knows’ refers

contexts to different binary relations, neither of the sentences above

conjunction, because each conjunct

ascriptions

make

perfectly

is

is

true.

good sense under

Such sentences just

an abominable

true at a different context. In fact, such

the kind of conversational circumstances

under which they might legitimately get counted as true according

whole sentence

is

at different

aren’t suitable for use in an
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to condexicalism.

argument (formal or informal),

Condexicalism explains much of the seemingly freakish
‘knows’, and

it

provides a model for the shiftiness of ‘knows’, namely, ‘here’.
‘Here’

can serve as a model for shiftiness for ‘knows’
carefully.

when such

the conversation.

shifts

the

—

provided the analogy

Non-boundary-related intra-conversational

both terms, and

shiftiness behavior of

shifts are equally

shifts occur, they are usually

When restrictions on

marked by an

made

uncommon

explicit

for

remark

in

admissible contexts are held constant, ‘here’

more frequently than ‘knows’, but

that

is

because the features that are relevant

meaning of ‘here' change more frequently than those

meaning of ‘knows’.

is

to

that are relevant to the

In general, and in contrast to a purely indexical account,

condexicalism makes ‘knows’ less of a linguistic freak.
Recall that the central drawback to the contrastivist view

the truth conditions right in

knowledge cases

situation but the conversational participants

in

right.) Additionally, the

which the subject

do not realize

truth conditions right in these cases (or at least

was

it

it.

is

that

it

fails to get

in a Gettier

Condexicalism gets the

has a better chance at getting them

condexicalism can explain some features of the behavior of

‘know’ that the contrastivist highlights. ‘Rather than’ clauses make sense on the
condexicalist account because they

contrastivist Schaffer

variable

is

mark

acknowledges

being really being copied

in a caveat, “it

is

may be

7,

is

the

whether a

footnote 12). Unlike the contrastivist,

not tied to the claim that a contrast class

clause, so the condexicalist

difficult to discern

As

[as the contrastivist claims], or a presupposition is

merely being carried”( Schaffer 2004,
condexicalism

a restriction on admissible contexts.

is

read off of the ‘rather than'

free to claim that the ‘rather than’ clause

is

a loose marker

context.
since each premise of a sound (reasonable) argument would need to be true relative to the same
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of a more complete (or more exact) restriction
that

is in

play as a result of the

presuppositions of the conversational participants.
Whereas in accounting for “nonbinary” knowledge ascriptions, contrastivists must
explain their “remaining” shiftiness

by appeal

to

some

additional context dependence that

is

not part of the theoretical

apparatus (see earlier discussion), a condexicalist’s
explanation of knowledge claims
that include ‘rather than’ clauses leaves

for

no “remaining” shiftiness

by the theoretical apparatus, because on

conversational marker for a

more

some

view the

more explicit/complete

that is in place in the conversation in

inherits

that

‘rather than’ clause

restriction

which the assertion

unaccounted

that is

is

ot the advantages of contrastivism, while not

is

just a

on admissible contexts

made. Condexicalism. then,

succumbing

to

some of its

serious drawbacks.

Conclusion
Three points emerge from

this chapter.

One: Precisely how a given theory

incorporates context into the explanation of knowledge ascriptions matters greatly
epistemically.

Two:

If

arguments are

to

be made from the linguistic behavior of

‘knows’ (or more carefully, ascriptions containing ‘knows’) to the rejection of
Contextualism, then the linguistic-based arguments need to be general enough
capture

all

to

of the various views that come under the category of Contextualism. Three:

There are ways of contextualizing that capture the advantages of Contextualism but
avoid

many of the

criticisms

aimed

at

it;

the

view
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I

offer,

condexicalism,

is

such a way.

CHAPTER 5
LOOSE ENDS

So,

said that the central topic of this dissertation

I

How well

is:

does

l

contextualism

In

fare as

Chapter

2,

1

an epistemic theory? I’ve argued that

problem

ENT:

full

fares well.

argue that neither the Closure Principle nor the

Underdetermination Principle
account for the

it

is at

the root of the skeptical problem. Neither can

range of skeptic-inducing

stories.

Instead, the root of the skeptical

is:

If ‘S

knows

has evidence

E

P’

is

true in context

in that possibility, then

That the principle

at the root

P

then for every possibility e-relevant in

c,

of the skeptical problem

suggests that the resolution of the skeptical problem

This chapter, then,

is

c, if

S

true in that possibility.

is

is

is

contextualized strongly

also contextualized in

also an argument that contextualism in

explanation of and solution to skeptical problems

—

some form

best because

it

some way.

offers the best

can explain and

resolve skeptical cases that other non-context based views cannot.

In Chapter 3,

1

argue that though Lewis’ brand of contextualism

fails to

handle

Gettier problems successfully, a modified version of a Lewis-style contextualism can

resolve Gettier problems.

By

substituting the following Rule of Special Similarity for

Lewis’ Rule of Resemblance, a Lewis-style contextualism can resolve Gettier problems:

When

considering whether subject S knows proposition P in context

c,

the Rule

of Special Similarity applies:

I

drop the capital ‘C’ because

“non-contextualist”

way

in this chapter, as in

Chapters

are not discussed.
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1-3, other

views that employ context

in

a

Rul e of Special Similarity
it

p

is

For any possibilities and
p

:

snd

p

is

a possibility

and proposition Q,

q,

relevant in c in virtue of

some rule other than ROSS
in which Q is a false belief or
presupposition

figures prominently in the formation of
S’s belief in P
then if q is appropriately similar to
p -doxastically indiscernible from
respect to S, exactly similar to
p in that is also false at

that

p with

Q

q, and is
otherwise very similar top with respect to S’s
circumstance — q is also
e-relevant in c (that is,
q cannot be ignored in c).

Unlike Lewis’ rule of Resemblance,

ROSS

ROSS

is

mainly a subject-sensitive rule (though

does add possibilities that become relevant via a
speaker-sensitive

Loosely,

ROSS

applies

when an

already relevant possibility

is

one

has a false belief or presupposition about his circumstances,
and
inclusion of additional possibilities

when

is

clearly

open

to inclusion in

is

ROSS makes the

circumstances.

’s

the subject’s circumstances.

an epistemology that

broadly contextualist. That not every aspect of e-relevance
not be a problem for the contextualist.

triggers the

not centrally based on

conversational context. Instead, the basis for the solution

is

ROSS

of the subject

then, offers a solution to Gettier problems that

But the rule

which the subject

a special similarity to already relevant

possibilities obtains with respect to certain features

ROSS,

in

rule).

is

is,

in other respects,

context dependent should

view of which

is

it

a part no

less “contextual.”

In Chapter 4,

1

claim that a

new way of contextualizing knowledge

ascriptions-

one that combines the insights of indexical versions of contextualism and contrastive
versions of contextualism

- can resolve many of the

difficulties that arise

from

contextualism’s claim that the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions are context

dependent (or perhaps more carefully, which proposition gets asserted when a
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knowledge ascriptions gets uttered depends on

The view, condexicalism,

context).

follows:

Contexts These are Kaplanesque contexts, they are abstract
ordered

members

least a four

speaker,

Q

is

purportedly

The

<w,x,l,a

> where C w
,

is

the location of the speaker, and

known

alternatives parameter

sets, consisting

the world of utterance,

C a is

Cx

is

of at

the

the set of alternatives to the

proposition.

C a is

the set of alternatives for a context.

An

alternative

is

any non-P possibility (possibility in which not-P is true). Though
every
alternative to P is eligible for membership in C not every
alternative need be
a
member of C a for every context in which P is the purportedly known
,

a

proposition.

A

Restrictions

hearers

restriction

can be placed on admissible contexts by the speakers and

who

participate in a conversation. Restrictions are determined via
general linguistic mechanisms such as the speaker and hearer’s general focus,

and presuppositions. These contextual restrictions are based
on the alternatives parameter; if speakers and hearers presuppose that they are
specific attentions,

not BIV’s, then a restriction

is

no admissible context contains an

in place:

alternatives parameter (an a-set) that includes a

BIV

possibility.

‘Knows’ ‘Knows’ is an indexical with the following extension, content, and character:
1
The extension of ‘knows’ in world w relative to context c = that relation R n of
.

ordered pairs, <S,P>, where S

is

a subject

proposition, and S’s evidence rules out

2.

members of the R-set for c.
The content of ‘knows’ relative
the character of knows

is

‘knows’ relative to

all

exists at

non-P

w and

P

in

is

a

possibilities that are

to context c is a function that takes

w to the extension of ‘knows’
3.

who

any world

w relative to c

a function that takes any context c to the content of

c.

The R-set captures e-relevance:
For any possibility,/?,/?
1)

p

is

is

a

member of the

R-set for a context,

2) or the subject believes (to
3)

or

4)

or p

is

some degree)

that p

is

the case,

p

relevant by the Rule of Special Similarity.

is

a

member of C a

.

In addition to claiming that the dissertation

is

a discussion in three parts of how

well contextualism in general fares as an epistemic theory,

emerges from the discussion and
and defense of a

emerges

is

c, iff

the subject's actual world

new

that the dissertation

kind of contextualism.

It

is,

I

also said that a

secondarily, the development

should be clear that the view that

condexicalism with obvious and minor adjustments to
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view

ROSS

and

to the

interpretation of

some

ENT. The adjustment

rule other than

in

ROSS.../ becomes

condition other than condition

relevance in a context’ should

4.’

And

now be

ROSS

‘if

is

p is

relevant in c in virtue of

member of the

R-set in c in virtue of a

ENT is simply that

‘e-

understood not as Lewisian relevance but

membership

i.e.

points about condexicalism remain

evidence according to the view?

a

that ‘if

the re-interpretation of

relevance as determined by condexicalism,

Two

p

is

And what

in the R-set for

c.

somewhat open. What counts

does ‘rule out’ mean?

The

first

as

point will

remain largely open, and the second will remain somewhat
open. Giving a precise and
accurate account of what counts as a subject’s evidence
the present dissertation.

However,

I

is

a topic beyond the scope of

can make some useful comments about what a

reasonable account of evidence should include.

As

a starting point, consider Lewis’

account of evidence and ‘elimination’:

I

say that the uneliminated possibilities are those in which the subject’s entire

perceptual experience and

memory

are just as they actually are. There

possibility that actually obtains.... ;call

uneliminated

match

iff the subject’s

E

(or

memory)

Then

actuality.

perceptual evidence and

his perceptual experience

experience

it

and memory

a possibility

memory

in actuality....

W,

eliminates a possibility

in

is

W

one
is

W exactly

When

perceptual

that is not because the

propositional content of the experience conflicts with W....The propositional

content of our experience could, after
the experience that conflicts with

W:

all,

W

be
is

false.

Rather,

a possibility in

it

is

the existence of

which

the subject

is

not having experience E. (Lewis 553).

As

it

stands, Lewis’ account of evidence

and elimination

is

problematic, as

shown by

Schaffer in “Knowledge, relevant alternative and missed clues.” Roughly, the problem

is

that a subject

may have

an actual experience that serves as a piece of evidence

in

eliminating possibilities even though the subject does not recognize the experience as a

piece of evidence. So a successful account of evidence will require that in order for an

144

experience or a

memory

to

count as part of the subject’s evidence,

at the

very least the

subject will have to be aware that an experience
has evidentiary ramifications.

Additionally, for a subject to eliminate/rule out a
possibility based on evidence E, the
subject might also need to be convinced that

E

is

inconsistent with that possibility

(Schaffer forthcoming 18). So, if the account of evidence
experiential account, then

some

just

is

is

neutral

something

like

Which

constraints, exactly,

I

leave open. Also.

between an account of evidence according

to

fully captured”

is

the propositional content of the subject’s experience “accurately and

(Lewis 553).

have experience E

If

evidence

experiential, then subject s’s evidence

is

in possibility p.

If the subject’s

propositions something like that

won.

A

have

this feature:

may be

it

seems

to

me

iff

E

S does not

experience can be properly captured

by the propositional content of the subject’s experience, then S’s

bits

that I’m hearing from

of evidence will be

Jim that the Pat’s

proposition that really fully and accurately captures S’s experience will also
S’s having (propositional)E will guarantee the truth of E. So,

stated in either

its

original

form or

its

stands, will guarantee the truth of P.

an account of evidence that

way

hope

which evidence

guarantees the truth of P because S’s evidence eliminates a possibility
p

now

I

the subject’s experience (with appropriate constraints) and one
according to

which evidence

it

Lewis’

additional constraints need to be placed on a what

counts as evidence for a subject.

condexicalism

is

is

ENT

propositional form and condexicalism, as

The view does

not,

however, accommodate

propositional but not foundational or experiential in the

described; if this turns out to be the correct account of evidence, then

condexicalism does not guarantee the truth of P because E might be false

world. If this

is

at the actual

the right account of evidence, then condexicalism will need to be
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revised as follows:

ENT

truth condition will

need

should take
to be

added

its

“propositional” form (see footnote
18), and a

to the condexicalist account.

This brings us to ‘ruling out’. If evidence

Lewis’ ‘elimination’: Subject S’s evidence
in

which S

is

not having experience

E

E

is

experiential, then ‘ruling out’ just

rules out possibility/? iff
p

(Lewis 553). However,

if

is

evidence

is

a possibility

is

propositional, then ‘ruling out’ should be understood
as follows: Subject S’s evidence

E

rules out possibility

ruling out

is left

p

iff S’s

slightly

evidence

open just so

not true at p. So, condexicalism’s account
of

is

that

it

can accommodate a wider range of views

about evidence.

Condexicalism claims
inconsistent with

all

non-P

that

when

‘S

knows

P’

possibilities in the R-set.

is

true in c, S’s evidence e

So when

‘S

knows

P’

is

is

true in a

context, the presuppositions of the speakers and hearers (via
condition (3)), the beliefs

of the subject (via Condition
Conditions (1) and (4))

-

(2)),

and

facts

about the subject’s circumstances (via

together with the subject’s evidence

remaining possibilities are possibilities

in

which

condexicalism has the result that whenever

(in

P.

If

- guarantee

evidence

is

that all

propositional, then

any context) S knows

P, the speaker’s

presuppositions, the beliefs of the subject, and certain facts about the subject’s

circumstances - together with the subject’s evidence entail
condexicalism,

we have knowledge by

P.

According

to

a combination of presupposition, belief,

circumstance, and evidence.

Presupposition and Defeat
Notice that unlike Lewis’ contextualism, condexicalism contains no rules of
permission.

On

Lewis’ account, these rules of permission - rules that allow
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conversational participants properly to ignore
a possibility- are The Rules of

Method, and Conservatism.

Reliability,

Instead, according to condexicalism,

conversational participants are free to ignore any
possibility they like, provided that a)

roughly

the participants agree -usually tacitly -to do
so and b) doing so does not

all

conflict with

I

11

According

one of the conditions

first

discuss

a),

for

membership

in the R-set in that context.

the general freedom of agreed-upon presupposition.

to condexicalism, the presuppositions of the
participants in a conversation

determine which possibilities they are ignoring. These presuppositions,
together with
the participants’ particular focus, determine a restriction

Generally speaking,

when

on acceptable contexts.

speakers and hearers participate in a conversation they tacitly

agree to presuppose lots of things, to take them for granted. They are able to
achieve
this tacit

agreement because the things they presuppose are customary or expected

some way.

Participants

that are “out

participants

who

are trying to

communicate do not make presuppositions

of the ordinary;” otherwise, they

may make

in

a presupposition that

fail to

is

communicate. Occasionally,

“out of the ordinary,” in which case, that

presupposition or intention to ignore gets explicitly mentioned in the conversation (and

is

either implicitly accepted or explicitly rejected). In describing the

Conservatism, Lewis remarks:

“We

Rule of

are permitted, defeasibly, to adopt the usual and

mutually expected presuppositions of those around us”(Lewis 559). The condexicalist

can embrace

this

remark; condexicalism also has

presupposition, because

presuppositions, and

its

it

this general

has no specific rules that

“restriction”

comes

must be accepted by the conversational

permission for

restrict the permissibility

built into the theory

participants
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whose goal

— the
it

is

to

of

presuppositions

communicate.

So, the presuppositions can’t be unexpected or
unusual (unless they are explicitly

mentioned and then mutually accepted) because
Condexicalism

same ground

s

would block communication.

that

general permission for agreed-upon presupposition,
then, covers the

as Lewis’ rules of permission.

Defeat, according to condexicalism,

is fairly clear.

De facto

permission to

ignore a possibility (as a result of a presupposition) can be defeated
if Condition

(1), (2),

or (3) adds that possibility to the R-set. Loosely, participants in
the conversation cannot

presuppose something that conflicts with Condition
(3)

can trump a presupposition that a world

participants in a conversation

may make

admissible contexts in such a

way

(1), (2),

not relevant.

is

or (3); Condition (1), (2), or

More

a presupposition that restricts the set of

that a possibility, q,

is

member of any

not a

admissible context’s a-set (alternatives parameter), but that not-g
not automatically

make q

attentions of the speakers

carefully, the

not e-relevant. E-relevance amounts to

and hearers. Recall

(briefly) that

is

presupposed does

more

on Lewis’ account, defeat

based on the Rule of Resemblance generates unsatisfactory results and

Chapter

3).

prohibition

While Conditions

-

(1), (2),

and

(3)

is

is

ad hoc

(see

roughly correspond to Lewis’ rules of

— the way

the Rules of Actuality, Belief, and Resemblance

according to condexicalism

that just the

more straightforward and more

defeat works

successful.

Implications

It

should be clear that

makes use of the term

ENT follows straightforwardly from

‘e-relevance’. In Chapter 2,

discussion, e-relevance

was

to be taken as

that ‘e-relevance’ in a context should

I

interpreted as
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ENT

stipulated that for the purposes of

Lewisian relevance.

now be

Condexicalism.

I

have above stipulated

membership

in the R-set for

that context.

In

changing the account of this

critical

component of the view, does

the

newly generated view suffer any adverse effects?
Provided S’s evidence

S’s experience and

is

memory

or the propositional

content of that experience fully and accurately captured, condexicalism
preserves the

According

truth condition.

then by P

for

is

true in

any context.

would not

If

c.

new

to the

By Condition

P were not

rule out all the

view,

it

is

true that S

knows P

(1), the actual possibility is a

true in c, then

non-P

if

S can’t

know P

member of the

R-set

because S’s evidence

in c

possibilities in the R-set for c,

in context c,

namely S’s evidence

does not rule out the actual possibility.

Condexicalism also preserves the implication between knowledge and
According

to the

view,

if

By Condition

P

in

a

member of the

context

new

c.

it is

true that S

know P because

S can’t

possibilities in the R-set in

possibility S that believes

in context c, then

S believes that

(2), a possibility that the subject believes to

R-set for any context. So,

in his beliefs) then

knows P

if

- not

be the case

S does not believe P (and S

is

S’s evidence does not rule out

which not-P, namely S’s evidence does not

belief.

is

consistent

all

rule out the

P.

Finally, condexicalism preserves a reasonable version of the closure principle:

If

it

is

true that S

know Q
If

it is

that

P

in c,

and P entails Q, then S

is

in a position to

in c.

true that S

that are

know

knows

members of the

that

P

in c, then S’s evidence rules out all

R-set for

possibilities. In c, then,

S

because S can rule out

all

is in

c.

Since P entails Q,

a position to rule out

non-P

all

all

non-Q

non-Q

possibilities in the R-set. So,
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non-P

possibilities

possibilities are

non-P

possibilities in the R-set,

S

is in

a position to

know

1

Q

in c.

Condexicalism, then, preserves

principle;

it

may

at least

one reasonable version of the closure

also preserve other forms of closure.

Case Studies
Skeptical cases, lottery cases, cases of knowledge by induction, and
cases of

knowledge of statistical laws
condexicalism. In
context or

if the

all

it,

get handled in the

same way according

to

these cases, if the speakers and hearers attend to a possibility in a

subject gives

that possibility is a

attend to

all

it

a sufficiently high degree of belief to that possibility,

member of the

R-set for that context. If the speakers and hearers

the restriction placed on admissible contexts

the attended-to possibility

is

a

member of the

some

“loose enough” to guarantee

a-set (the alternatives parameter) for all

admissible contexts, which in turn guarantees

context. If the subject believes to

is

its

membership

in the R-set for that

non-trivial degree that a possibility

be the case, then Condition (2) guarantees that such a possibility

is

a

may

actually

member of the R-

set for that context.

The
that

essential feature of a skeptical case

somehow

how ENT,

skeptical cases of all sorts.

ENT, with

that there is

some

skeptical story told

undercuts our knowledge of some ordinary proposition. In Chapter

discuss at length

via

is

with ‘e-relevanf understood to be Lewisian, resolves

It

should be clear that condexicalism offers the same results

‘e-relevance’ understood as

membership

the relevance of the skeptical scenario in skeptical cases

Attention. According to condexicalism, that

that yields a set

2,

in the R-set.

is

Lewis’ account

secured by the Rule of

same relevance

of admissible contexts whose

On

is

secured by a restriction

a-sets are appropriately broad,

i.e.,

they

include BlV-type possibilities. Likewise, on Lewis’ view, in ordinary circumstances.
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such skeptical scenarios are not relevant, so knowledge

Rule of Attention secures the result that skeptical
attended

to.

Condexicalism secures

that

same

is

preserved.

On

his view, the

possibilities are not relevant unless

result ; skeptical possibilities are not

relevant in ordinary circumstances because the conversational participants
presuppose
that they are not, thereby placing a restriction

on admissible contexts such

admissible contexts have a-sets that are appropriately narrow,

i.e.,

that all

they does not include

BlV-style possibilities.

I

have said (Chapter 3) that

lottery cases should

be treated like skeptical cases

rather than Gettier problems. Unlike Lewis’ contextualism, condexicalism handles

lottery cases like skeptical cases.

those

who

participate focus

virtue of focussing

When

on the

on the topic

at

lotteries are the topic

possibility that the subject

hand— fair

possibility that the subject holds the

winning

lotteries.

ticket,

of conversation, then

might a winning

If the participants attend to the

by not presupposing

that

lose, then that possibility is included in the a-set for all admissible contexts,

guarantees that the “winning possibility”

subject does not

know that

a

is

he will lose the

ticket in

member of the

lottery, despite

he will

which

R-set. In such cases, the

overwhelming

statistical

2

evidence to the contrary.

Cases involving knowledge by induction and cases involving knowledge of
statistical natural

Chapters

1

and

laws

3).

are, again, like skeptical cases

In cases in

the legitimacy of the

inductively predicted

sample

which the

participants focus

size, they stop

outcome

fails to

according to condexicalism (see

on the induction

step or on

presupposing that possibilities in which the

hold are irrelevant. In such cases, the subject
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does not have knowledge by induction because
possibilities in which the inductively

outcome

predicted

is false

are

members

the a-set for

the R-set in that particular context. In cases
in

sample size are presumed

comments apply
Second

Law

reliable,

admissible contexts and so of

which both the inductive step and

knowledge by induction

to cases involving

of Thermodynamics.

all

is

preserved. Similar

knowledge of statistical natural laws,

When

such a law’s

the

statistical

like the

nature becomes the

center of attention, the participants no longer presuppose
that the statistically predicted

outcome
unlikely

is

the only possible outcome.

The

possibility in

outcome occurs - say negative entropy

Thermodynamics

-

However, as long

as the statistical nature of the

involving

its

is

in the case

no longer being ignored, so

violation)

is

which the

it

of the Second

(primarily) by the restriction

ilk.

of

R-set.

is

preserved.

Condexicalism does not handle these

on admissible contexts

that reflects the attentions, focus,

like the inclusion

of ROSS

modified Lewis-style contextualism can resolve Gettier cases, the inclusion of

ROSS

(appropriately modified) ensures the

working with other relevance rules

works

in conjunction

(Condition

if the

2), or

same

(as in Lewis),

with Conditions

(1), (2),

the R-set because of being actual (Condition

then

very

law (or some skeptical scenario

and presuppositions of the conversational participants. Just
in a

Law

becomes a member of the

not the focus of attention, knowledge

Gettier cases are of a different

statistically

results for condexicalism. Instead of

ROSS, on

and

1),

(4). If

the condexicalist view,

a possibility

is

member of

being believed by the subject

being attended to by the speakers and hearers (loosely, Condition

subject has a false belief or presupposition in that possibility,

See Chapter

a

3 for the solution to poor-Bill-style cases.

152

ROSS

4),

can add

-

possibilities to the R-set

provided those possibilities are appropriately
similar to the

already included possibility. Condexicalism
and the modified Lewisian view discussed
in

Chapter

different

3, then,

resolve Gettier cases in essentially the

mechanisms. Condexicalism, with

yields better results than Lewis’ original

Additionally,

ROSS

view

on the condexicalist account,

the

as an essential component, clearly

in resolving Gettier cases (see

way

that defeat (or trumping)

quite clear and the application of the rule (condition)

is

not

ad hoc.

relevant

sets

(i.e.,

If the participants

make

same way, but with somewhat

it

employs

Chapter

works

3).

is

to resolve Gettier cases

a presupposition that renders a possibility not e-

they impose a restriction such that the possibility

of all admissible contexts), Condition (3) -

ROSS

is

excluded from the

—can trump

a-

that presupposition

by making just that possibility a member of the R-set. Consider a Cohen-style sheep
Gettier

example

in

restriction

the participants nor the subject

The speakers and

Gettier situation.

do not attend

which neither

to or focus

on

is

aware of being

hearers presuppose that sense data

possibilities that include

on admissible contexts

is

is reliable,

in a

and so

sheep-shaped rocks. So, while the

such that none of the a-sets contain sheep-shaped

rock possibilities, Condition (3) does guarantee that the sheep-shaped rock possibility
a

member of the

possibility

R-set.

is

Condition (3) causes both the inclusion of the sheep-shaped

and the exclusion of BlV-style

appropriately similar) in a

way

that is not

possibilities (since

ad hoc.

BIV

possibilities aren’t

So, in the Gettier case described,

condexicalism (unlike Lewis’ view or contrastivism) has the result that the subject does

know

that he has

hands

in that context but

does not

field.
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know

that there

’s

a sheep

in the

A

Final Explanation

An

interesting complaint has been

made

against the contextualist by Stephen

Schiffer in “Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism”:
to

The Moorean and

have a vehement disagreement about knowledge, but

if

the Skeptic

the contextualist

her resolution of the skeptical problem, there was no disagreement
in the
there

is

is

seem

right in

place;

first

no explanation of the source of the disagreement (Schiffer 325-328).

The complaint against

the indexicalist version of contextualism

Moorean says ‘Moore knows he has hands’ and
he has hands,’ there

is

the skeptic says

to the

skeptic says

‘It

the

‘Moore does not know

no disagreement because each speaker’s use of ‘knows’ picks out

a different knowledge-relation. If the indexicalist

analogous

when

is this:

is

correct, the following claims are

knowledge claims above: Moore says

isn’t raining

where

I

‘It is

raining where

am.’ In the raining example, not only

I

am,’ and the

is

there

no

disagreement, but that there isn’t one should be clear to the participants in the
conversation. Analogously, in the claims involving ‘knows’, there should also be no

disagreement and no confusion of the

sort that

could lead us to find the knowledge

claims paradoxical (Schiffer 325-328)(Also Schaffer 2004, 23).

The comparable complaint
this:

when

does not

the

Moorean

know he

against the contrastivist version of contextualism

says ‘Moore

knows he has hands’ and

has hands,’ what the Moorean really asserts

the skeptic says

is that

may be confusion caused by
disagree;

Mooreans claim

rather than that he

is

a handless BIV.

the use of the binary surface structure, the

that

one three-tuple
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is

a

‘Moore

Moore knows he

has hands rather than that he has stumps and what the skeptic really asserts

Moore does not know he has hands

is

is

that

Though

there

two do not

member of the knowledge

relation.

while another claims that a different three-tuple
the following are analogous to the

chocolate ice cream

,

3

is not.

If the contrastivist is correct,

knowledge claims above: Moore says ‘Jane

by which he means

that Jane prefers chocolate ice

and then the skeptic says ‘Jane prefers chocolate

cream

prefers

to vanilla

by which he means

ice cream,’

Jane prefers chocolate ice cream to coffee. In the ice cream example,
confusion
arise

because the surface structure of the utterances are binary, but there

is

that

may

no genuine

disagreement. Analogously, contrastivism might explain confusion based on binary
sui face structure

why
for

(and so

it

has an advantage over indexicalism because

skeptical arguments feel so nightmarish (Schaffer 2004,23-24), but

it

it

can explain

can’t account

any genuine disagreement between the skeptic and the Moorean.
Neither indexicalism nor contrastivism has a theoretical peg on which to hang

the hat of disagreement

such a peg.

disagree.

It’s

between the Moorean and the

not that the

Moorean and

Rather, they disagree in such a

conversation in the

first

place.

BIV

which

is

relevant, while the

I

think condexicalism has

the skeptic have a conversation in

way

that prevents

which they

them from having

a

Each “flaunts” a conversational parameter. Loosely,

skeptic insists that every conversational context

a

skeptic.

Moorean

insists that

that possibility is not e-relevant.

is

one

in

which the

possibility of being

every conversational context

The Moorean wants

the

is

one

to place a restriction

in

on

admissible context, but the skeptic refuses to allow that restriction. Certainly confusion

could result from this sort of inexplicit, unarticulated flaunting of presuppositions.
Additionally, if we could ask each to

list

his pre-conversational presuppositions,

3

we

The Moorean claims <moore, that moore has hands, {that moore has stumps}> is a member of the
knowledge relation, and the skeptic claims <moore, that moore has hands, {that moore is a BIV}> is not
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could see the intractable disagreement.

I

Moorean and

It’s

the Skeptic, respectively.

takes seriously a skeptical possibility,

that possibility,

he

still

possibility seriously.

simply

insists,

possibilities

He

knowledge
it

is

Moorean

is

to characterize the

a fallibilist

who

it’s

just that he refuses to take that

it.

And

the Skeptic

that BlV-style

seriously; he just refuses to presuppose anything. So, the

is this:

the disagreement

is

not apparent from the logical form

like the indexicalist’s account,

relation in each person’s assertion

),

‘know’ refers

first

member of the knowledge

place.

relation.

to a

because the disagreement goes

a stubborn-minded disagreement about the parameters of the

conversation in the

a

not that the

way

no matter the everydayness of the circumstance,

must be taken

deeper;

the right

maintains a presupposition that excludes

of the respective propositions (since

much

is

the while insisting that though he can’t rule out

knows he has hands;

condexicalist’s response

different

all

think this
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